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Essays on the Effects of Frictions on Financial Intermediation
Mohammadreza Bolandnazar
This dissertation aims to study the behavior of intermediaries under market im-
perfections and the consequences of that for the financial market’s functioning. To
do so, I focus on two classes of market frictions: funding constraints and information
asymmetry. Chapter 1 studies how the dealers’ capital constraints affect the market liq-
uidity in the presence of imperfect competition and how recent regulations have shifted
the competitive landscape of interest rate swaps. On the subject of informational fric-
tions, Chapters 2 and 3 study empirically and theoretically the pace at which prices
incorporate private information under the limited learning capacity of the informed
traders.
Understanding the microstructure of the swap markets is of interest to both poli-
cymakers and academics, especially for it helps in the efficient implementation of post-
crisis regulations, namely the Dodd-Frank Act. An understudied dimension of the swap
market microstructure is the determinants of the cost of the market-making activity.
Using a proprietary regulatory dataset collected by the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC) on both the interest rate swap transactions and the collateral re-
quirements at the London Clearinghouse (LCH), in Chapter 1, I study the key balance
sheet constraints that affect the ability of the bank-affiliated dealers to provide inter-
mediation service to the end-users. Most of the interest rate swaps are now mandated
to be centrally cleared. This has increased the dealer’s need for collateral in the form
of highly liquid assets (cash and cash equivalents) to back their swap exposures. Facing
capital adequacy measures such as Supplementary Leverage Ratio (SLR), dealers find
it even costlier to increase the size of their balance sheet to fund these margins. I show
that a 1-percentage point increase in SLR leads to an increase of 1.09 percentage points
in the bank’s cost of capital per unit of margin requirement. Furthermore, I find the
funding spread of the dealers (the difference between the cost of external funding and
the risk-free rate) is also a relevant factor for determining the dealer’s marginal cost of
swap transaction; a cost that is evidently transferred to the end-users in the form of less
favorable prices. Measuring the cost of intermediation for the dealer-to-client interest
rate swap market is challenging because of the high concentration in the market– the
first seven dealers intermediate more than 50% of the total notional traded. Therefore,
one must consider the nontrivial effect of markups in transaction prices to estimate
the marginal cost of intermediation reliably. For this reason, I model a differentiated
product demand for swaps in the spirit of empirical Industrial Organization (IO) litera-
ture and structurally estimate this model to account for the markups in the transaction
prices using estimated price elasticities. The demand estimations show economically
interpretable heterogeneity among the end-users in their taste for duration risk hedging.
The structurally estimated equilibrium model of intermediation can serve as a basis for
answering counterfactual policy questions, especially in the debate on the social costs
and benefits of excluding initial margins in calculating supplementary leverage ratio.
In Chapter 2, I turn the focus to the impact of informational frictions on market-
making activity. More specifically, we study the informed trading under random stop-
ping time. Empirical evidence is provided based on an episode of time when the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (SEC) unintentionally disclosed security filings to
some investors before the public for several years. For technological reasons, the delay
between the private and public disclosure was exogenously random. We exploit the
variation in the time window of private information to show the intensity of trades
and the speed at which market prices reach their efficiency, decrease with the expected
arrival time of public announcement. In addition, we find the learning capacity of the
insider determines the evolution of trading intensity over time.
In Chapter 3, inspired by the stylized facts observed in the earlier chapter, I extend
the Kyle (1985) model of strategic trading to a case with limited learning capacity of
both the dealers and the informed traders (insiders). The insider does not perfectly
observe the true value of the security, but he continues to hone his knowledge by
using private information sources over time. Two classes of equilibria emerge from this
model. In one class, the insider trades excessively patiently, and the market efficiency
is reached only asymptotically. In the second type, the insider optimally chooses a
deterministic time T , before which he trades patiently as in Kyle (1985) until the
price reaches its full efficiency. After T , the insider keeps revealing every piece of new
information immediately, and the market price stays efficient while the insider keeps
making profits. Which equilibrium emerges depends on the insider’s learning capacity,
initial informational advantage, and the private source’s informational content.
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Despite regulatory efforts to promote centralized trading, the dealer-to-client (D2C)
interest rate swap (IRS) market is still highly concentrated. In my sample, more than
50% of the trades in notional value are executed by the largest seven dealers. This
promotes concern over the fragility of the IRS market once we note that 91% of trades
are intermediated by the Globally Systemically Important Financial Institutions (GSI-
FIs). On the one hand, mandatory central clearing of swaps (followed by U.S. Wall
Street Reform Act) and its unavoidable margin requirement, has increased the GSIFIs’
need for highly liquid collateral to back swap positions. On the other hand, a chain
of capital adequacy measures (following the same regulations) has tied the hands of
these institutions from readily increasing the size of their balance sheets in order to
comply with new margin requirements. My estimates show that only supplementary
1This work was completed while working as an Intern in the Office of The Chief Economist of the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (July 2018 to August 31, 2020). This research was produced
in the author’s official capacity. The paper was cleared for public distribution by the Office of the
Chief Economist. The analyses and conclusions expressed in this paper are those of the author and do
not necessarily reflect the views of other Commission staff, the Office of the Chief Economist, or the
Commission.
2Special thanks to my dissertation committee, Michael Johannes, Suresh Sundaresan, Stijn Van
Nieuwerburgh, and Wei Jiang. I thank Jorge Alegria (discussant), Moin Amani, Agostino Capponi,
Olivier M. Darmouni, Alex Ferko, Richard Haynes, Harry Mamaysky, Lihong McPhail, Scott Mixon,
John Roberts, Rajiv Sharma, Bruce Tuckman, members of the CFTC Office of the Chief Economist,
and seminar participants at the World Federation of Exchanges Clearing and Derivatives Conference
for insightful discussions and suggestions.
1
leverage ratio (SLR) constraints have increased the marginal cost of intermediation in
the IRS market, by 19%. This is particularly important from a welfare perspective: in
an already concentrated market, dealers are able to transfer their intermediation costs
to the end users.
The clearinghouses typically require two forms of margins: an initial margin, which
is set at the portfolio level to account for future exposure of open positions, and a
variation margin, which is set at the position level to account for mark-to-market value
adjustments of an open position. As reported by the International Swaps and Deriva-
tives Association (ISDA), in 2017, the notional amount of cleared fixed-for-floating
interest rate swaps totaled $55.2 trillion, accounting for 95% of total notional value
traded. This translates into a significant amount of capital that banks must post as
margins. Figure 1.1, shows the total amount of margins posted in proprietary accounts
by the clearing members as collateral for their interest rate swap portfolios at the Lon-
don Clearing House (LCH). The amount of collateral has increased by around 75% over
the past five years. The numbers are a telltale sign of a tremendous need for highly
liquid assets once it is noted that the majority of the margins are cash or cash equiv-
alents. On a similar grounds, Duffie et al. (2015), using a data set of bilateral credit
default swap (CDS) positions, provide evidence that initial margin requirements have
significantly increased the aggregate collateral demand in the CDS market.
Even though mandatory central clearing has remarkably shifted the structure of
derivatives markets, it has not been the only component of the post-crisis regulatory
framework that has affected these markets. In an attempt to mitigate the vulnerability
of the banking system, regulators have adopted new capital adequacy rules to ensure
that banks hold sufficient capital to absorb shocks. Consequently, the regulated finan-
cial institutions find it costlier to increase the size of their balance sheets, which may
lessen their ability to actively participate in market making activities. This in turn can
2
Figure 1.1: Total Margins Posted in Proprietary Accounts at the London Clearing
House (USD)
adversely affect the market liquidity of the assets and derivatives that are intermediated
mainly by bank-affiliated dealers. Some banks have started to report the “margin value
adjustment” (MVA) on their balance sheets to reflect the cost of funding initial margins
they post on their clearinghouse accounts.
In this paper, using transaction-level data on interest rate swaps from the Commod-
ity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), I study the impact of the recently imposed
clearing mandates and capital requirements on market making activity of bank-affiliated
dealers and their ultimate consequences for market liquidity in swap markets. Studying
intermediation costs in a highly concentrated market is challenging, as the researcher
must first consider the competitive structure of the market. Not all the deviations of
swap prices from their fair value are because of the marginal costs of trades once there
is a nontrivial role for market power. For this reason, I develop a structural model
of client demand for interest rate swaps in the spirit of Industrial Organization (IO)
literature on demand for differentiated goods. I use transaction-level regulatory data of
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more than 2,000,000 cleared interest rate swaps to estimate the demand system, which
serves as basis for decomposing the price deviations into marginal costs and markups.
Once I control for the impact of market power, I analyze the determinants of the in-
termediation costs by exploiting the variations in collateral requirements of different
swaps.
The estimation of the demand system shows a significant amount of heterogeneity
among the client groups in their taste for swaps. For instance, while a flat yield curve
makes all client groups more attracted to swaps, central and municipal banks have a
better taste for swaps when yield curves are steep. Moreover, the duration risk hedging
motives varies significantly across different client types. Nonfinancial corporations have
shown significant interest in receiving fixed rates while insurance companies, pension
funds and government sponsored enterprises (GSEs) have been more enthusiastic about
receiving floating rates. In addition, the results show that some clients, namely hedge
funds, demand swaps frequently but in small quantities, while GSEs trade much less
frequently but at significantly higher notional values.
Supply-side estimates show the dealer’s funding spread (the difference between their
funding rates and the risk-free rates) is an important factor determining the marginal
cost of intermediation. Moreover, constraints related to the SLR and the Leverage
Coverage Ratio (LCR) make up a significant proportion of intermediation costs. All
else being equal, by imposing a 1 percentage point higher SLR requirement on the
dealers, the marginal costs go up by 1.09 percentage points per unit of margin. Also,
it appears that the impact of the LCR on the marginal cost of capital is modest: a 1
percentage point increase in the LCR requirement for the dealers increases the marginal
costs by 8.9 basis points per unit of margin.
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1.2 Literature Review
Empirical evidence on the impact of clearing mandates and margin requirements on
system-wide collateral demand, asset prices, and market liquidity is not large, partly
due to the lack of granular data on cleared transactions and required margins. Figlewski
(1984) and Gay et al. (1986) study the role of margin requirements in mitigating coun-
terparty risk in future markets. Moreover, Heller and Vause (2012) and Sidanius et al.
(2012) empirically investigate the impact of central clearing mandates on the aggregate
collateral demand. Benos et al. (2020) argue that centralized clearing has improved
swap market liquidity and trade transparency.
My paper contributes to the growing literature on the impact of the new regulatory
framework on price and quantities in financial markets. Haynes et al. (2018) provide
empirical evidence on the impact of the Basel III leverage ratio on the composition of
active participants in derivatives market. Goulding (2019) studies the causal impact of
these regulations on prices in the bilateral over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market.
Boyarchenko et al. (2018) investigates the post-crisis bank regulations on persistent
deviations from the law of one price when basis trades require leverage.Klingler and
Sundaresan (2019) argue that the balance sheet constraints of bank-affiliated dealers
coupled with asymmetric demand for receiving fixed rates has further narrowed 30-year
interest rate swap spreads. The empirical work of Fenn and Kupiec (1993) was among
the first to investigate the determinants of margin requirements in cleared derivatives
markets. Koeppl et al. (2012) analyzes efficient clearing mechanisms in the presence of
margin rules. In a working paper, Hedegaard (2014) provides evidence on the impact of
market volatility, contract-specific volatility, and tail risk on the margin levels of future
contracts in clearinghouses. Capponi et al. (2020) empirically study the relevance of
portfolio risk and market conditions in setting margin levels in a cleared CDS market.
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Siriwardane (2019), using a regulatory data set on CDS transactions, finds evidence for
the impact of capital shocks to intermediaries on the prices in the CDS market. To
the best of my knowledge, my paper is the first to combine the proprietary transaction
data with the daily data on the dealers’ margin requirements to study the trade-level
funding costs.
In addition, this paper is related to the literature on the cost of regulatory capital
for financial institutions and in particular, the banking industry. Koijen and Yogo
(2015) study the shadow cost of regulatory capital for life insurers, while Koijen and
Yogo (2021) analyze the fragility of the market for variable annuities. Kisin and Manela
(2016) estimate the shadow cost of capital constraints for banks that exploited a costly
loophole to loosen these constraints. Benetton (2021) explores the impacts of leverage
regulations on UK mortgage providers.
Finally, my paper contributes to a strand of literature that adopts an IO structural
estimation framework to study financial markets. Crawford et al. (2018) study the
effects of asymmetric information and imperfect competition in the Italian market for
lines of credit. Xiao (2019) estimates a structural model of bank competition to analyze
shadow bank monetary transmission. Koijen and Yogo (2021) use a similar framework
to study the insurance market. In a related work, Koijen and Yogo (2019) take a some-
what different approach to study the heterogeneous demand of institutional investors
and its relevance for equity valuations.
1.3 Regulatory Background
The failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 heightened the concerns of market
participants about counterparty credit risk on the one hand, and the opacity of the
interconnections of financial institutions on the other hand. At the center of this concern
were OTC markets, and in particular, derivatives markets, which are known to be one
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of the main culprits of the global financial crisis of 2007–2008. Consequently, one of the
main policy objectives of the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act was to mitigate systemic risk in the OTC derivatives market by improving the
counterparty risk exposure of market participants and promoting trade centralization.
During the past few years, central clearing of many standardized derivatives has become
mandatory in an attempt to achieve the former goal, and trading on Swap Execution
Facilities (SEFs) has been promoted as a mechanism toward achieving the latter.
Central Clearing. Central Clearing Platforms (CCP) are important players in pro-
moting stability and efficiency of financial markets. After a buyer and a seller agree on
a trade, a CCP interposes, becoming the counterparty to both the seller and the buyer
and guaranteeing the settlement of the trade by insuring the parties against counter-
party risk. As a result of this intermediation, the CCP may end up with substantial
exposure to counterparty risk. This exposure is reduced mainly by imposing margin
requirements on the counterparties.3 In the United States, clearinghouses typically set
the initial margins for interest rate swaps such that they cover the losses in the value of
the portfolio of a clearing account based on a value-at-risk (VaR) model or an estimated
expected shortfall, using simulation models based on historical data.
The first phase of mandatory clearing of standard IRSs was implemented in March
2013 and was limited to trades between major swap dealers. The next phase, which
began in September 2013, extended the mandate to trades by almost all entities. While
clearing of standard derivatives is primarily due to clearing mandates by regulators,
other incentives encourage market participants to clear their trades even for those ex-
empt from clearing mandates. In general, novation of trades with multiple counter-
parties to a single party (the CCP), has led to higher economic benefits of clearing
compared to bilateral trades. Moreover, following new margin rules, major dealers now
3The margins are set typically after netting out the open positions; therefore, netting can also be
regarded as a natural way of reducing the exposure.
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have to post initial margins against their noncleared derivative positions. This raises
the capital costs of bilateral trades (a cost added to the inherent counterparty risk spe-
cific to these trades) and hence encourages the dealers to voluntarily clear those trades.
As reported by the ISDA, swap market participants have cleared more than required
by regulations in all years after the clearing mandates became effective.
Centralized Trading. In September 2013, the CFTC further required that a subset
of the most popular interest rate swaps of certain floating indexes (USD-Libor, EUR-
Euribor, and some GBP-Libor with specific trade characteristics) subject to central
clearing must be traded on swap execution facilities (SEFs) or a few specific markets.
The SEFs typically offer three categories of trading protocols: a central limit order
book, a request for quote system, and a request for streaming system.
Capital Requirements. The US regulatory framework for implementing the Basel
III Tier 1 leverage ratio comprises primarily rules and measures that are commonly
referred to as the supplementary leverage ratio (SLR). Even though the SLR does not
reflect every aspect of recent reforms related to regulatory capital requirements, it is a
major factor affecting the activities of regulated dealers in the derivatives market. The
SLR specifies the amount of common equity capital (Tier 1 capital) that banks must
hold against their on-balance sheet assets (book value of assets) and off-balance sheet
exposure. In a nutshell, US banks must attain a Tier 1 leverage ratio of at least 3%.
Moreover, major bank holding companies are required to hold an additional 2% buffer
at the parent level and a 3% buffer at the subsidiary level.
Currently, off-balance sheet exposure is calculated using a method known as the
current exposure method (CEM). Specifically, for cleared interest rate swaps, it consists
of potential future exposure (PFE), which is defined as the gross notional value of
the swap times a conversion factor that depends on the maturity bucket of the swap.
However, entering a cleared interest rate swap requires posting an initial margin, which
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does not reduce the PFE, while financing the required amount might increase the size
of balance sheet and indirectly impact the required capital. The latter effect is the main
focus of this paper.
The LCR is another capital requirement related to the recent regulations. Under it,
banks must hold at least as much high quality liquid assets (HQLA) as their projected
cash outflows during a specific stress scenario of typically 30 days. The initial margin
posted at the clearinghouses are mostly cash and cash equivalent assets, which means
that a tight LCR constraint can tie the hands of dealers in IRS market making because
it requires them to post their highly liquid assets as margins in the CCPs that could
otherwise be used for more profitable activities.
1.4 Data
Following the Dodd-Frank reform and specifically, under Part 39 of the Commodity
Exchange Act, major clearinghouses are mandated to report, on a daily basis, confi-
dential trade data of centrally cleared swaps to the US Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC). The data set contains account-level information on all clearing
members, and specifically, the amount of required and posted margins for any asset
class. Moreover, the data set represents trading details such as notional value, price
(i.e. fixed-rate and floating-rate index for an IRS), effective date (start date), and ma-
turity date for all open positions that are cleared. For the case of interest rate swaps,
the clearinghouses report the end-of-day delta ladders4 and the discount curves used
for interpolating the yield curve.
Swap dealers are a set of entities designated by the CFTC, whose activities cen-
4In its simplest form, a delta ladder summarizes the sensitivity of the valuation of a swap portfolio
with respect to changes in a predetermined set of key zero rates. The key zero rates are typically the
same set of rates that are used for valuation and discounting of cash flows. Hence, the delta ladder
captures the riskiness of a portfolio of swaps at different spots on the yield curve.
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Table 1.1: Number of Unique Entities per Client Category
TYPE Receiving Fixed Paying Fixed All
1 Hedge Fund/Asset Manager 3, 262 3, 722 4, 010
2 Insurance/Pension Fund 645 726 793
3 Bank 381 574 596
4 Nonfinancial 127 551 585
5 Other Financials 86 148 159
6 Central/Municipal 52 60 62
7 GSE 13 12 13
ter around market making for swaps and who typically exceed a certain de minimis
threshold in terms of gross notional. Clearing members are generally the swap dealers
who provide market making and clearing services to the end users. I call an entity
who is not a swap dealer a client.5 These dealers use their house accounts at each
clearinghouse to hold their proprietary positions.6 Each clearing member is identified
by a unique legal entity identifier (LEI), which then can be used to match position data
with external regulatory data, such as call reports of the corresponding member and
its parent (which is the bank-holding company for the case of bank-affiliated dealers).7
Another set of regulations (under Part 45 of Commodity Exchange Act) requires swap
counterparties and in particular, the swap dealers to report their weekly transactions to
swap data repositories (SDRs). This data set provides more a granular understanding
of the swap transactions, especially the life-cycle events (such as novation and com-
pression of a trade or post-trade allocation to new counterparties including a central
counterparty) that occur from the initiation date of a swap until its maturity (or early
termination). As such, life-cycle events are common for interest rate swaps, one should
5I use the terms “clients” and “end users” interchangeably.
6There is also another type of account, called a customer account, which is used for clearing services
that clearing members provide for the swap position of their customers.
7The LEI is a unique entity identifier approved by the International Organization for Standardiza-
tion (ISO) that consists of 20 letters (alphabetical and numerical).
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be careful with identifying unique transactions to avoid double-counting of the trades.
More specifically, each trade in an SDR is assigned a unique swap identifier (USI) that
can be used to link a reported trade to its original transaction, through a required data
field that contains information on the prior swap’s USI. This helps with identifying
the main payers of the original trade as well as determining whether a trade has been
executed on a SEF.8
To identify the client types, I use an internal data set at the CFTC that assigns
the LEIs to entity types. This covers around 85% of the clients in my sample. I
used Bloomberg to find the entity types for the rest of the clients. Table (1.1) reports
the number of unique entities (identified with an LEI) in each client type category :
1– Hedge Funds and Asset Managers; 2– Pension Funds and Insurance Companies;
3– Banks; 4– Nonfinancials; 5– Central Banks and Municipal Banks; 6– Government
Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs); 7- Other Financials.
For bank-affiliated dealers, I gather the balance sheet information and regulatory
ratios such as quarter-end level of total assets, the SLR, and the LCR, from Bloomberg.
I map each subsidiary with the same set of information from its ultimate parent. Finally,
I obtain the dealer’s credit default spreads, the overnight indexed swap rate (OIS), the
Libor rate, and the MOVE index from Bloomberg.
1.4.1 Summary Statistics
My sample covers all the fixed-for-floating interest rate swaps traded between a swap
dealer and a client, and cleared at the LCH, over 2014–2019. Table (1.2) reports the
8For example, suppose a swap trade is executed between counterparties A and B and is reported
with a hypothetical USI0 identifier. Once the clearing novation takes place, typically, the original
trade is replaced by two new trades with new identifiers USI1 (between A and the CCP) and USI2
(between B and the CCP). If the researcher’s interest is in identifying the payers of the original trade
(i.e., A and B), the single reports of USI1 or USI2 do not suffice. However, using the information on
prior trade (that is required to be reported in Part 45 data), the researcher can extract the identity of
the payers from the original transaction.
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summary statistics for the variables used in this study. Fixed Rate is the actual fixed
rate of the transaction (in percents). Fair Fixed Rate (Fair Coupon Rate) is the fair
coupon rate that is calculated using the end-of-day curve data provided by the LCH,
from a single-curve discounting methodology (in percents). Fixed Rate Spread is the
difference between the fixed rate and the fair coupon rate (in basis points). Finally,
PV01 is the annuity factor for the fixed payments of the interest rate swap, which is
calculated using the end-of-day curve data provided by the LCH.
Table 1.2: Summary Statistics of Transaction-Level Variables
Panel A: Client Paying Fixed
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Pctl(25) Pctl(75)
Fixed Rate (%) 1,270,839 1.661 1.298 0.760 2.368
Fair Fixed Rate (%) 1,270,839 1.635 1.316 0.738 2.354
Fixed Rate Spread (bps) 1,270,839 2.549 29.017 −3.844 3.337
Notional (USD) 1,270,839 60,511,773 166,294,887.000 3,600,000 52,380,000
PV01 Per Unit Notional (bps) 1,270,839 -7.901 -6.111 -4.585 -9.447
Panel B: Client Receiving Fixed
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Pctl(25) Pctl(75)
Fixed Rate (%) 1,166,206 1.642 1.320 0.750 2.340
Fair Fixed Rate (%) 1,166,206 1.624 1.353 0.720 2.334
Fixed Rate Spread (bps) 1,166,206 −1.824 25.693 −3.811 4.029
Notional (USD) 1,166,206 65,075,978 178,102,217.000 3,742,744.0 55,738,115
PV01 Per Unit Notional (bps) 1,166,206 7.875 6.140 4.543 9.483
Summary statistics for the transaction-level data. Panel A is for the subsample of transactions
in which the client is paying the fixed rate. Panel B is for the subsample of transactions in
which the client is receiving the fixed rate (paying the float rate). Fixed Rate and Fair
Fixed Rate are in percents. Fixed Rate Spread is in basis points. Notional is the US Dollar
equivalent of the notional for the trade. PV01 is the annuity factor of the trade.
Figures (1.2a, 1.2b), show the aggregate fraction of traded notional across maturity
bucket–float index pairs. Each cell has a lighter color if the logarithm of the total
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USD-equivalent notional traded in that cell divided by the total sum of the notional
traded is smaller. The first plot (1.2a) is for clients paying fixed trades and the second
(1.2b) is for clients receiving fixed trades. As shown, not all the swap products have
the same popularity. Among the yield curves, the USD-Libor, the EUR-Euribor and
the GBP-Libor attract the highest trading activity, and among the maturity buckets,
the 10–year, the 5–year and the 2–year maturity swaps are the most traded swaps.
Table 1.3 reports the summary statistics of client activity across various dimensions.
Panels A, B, and C of Table 1.3, respectively, report the number of trades and the sum
of notional-traded aggregated over all six years of my sample (2014–2019) for every
maturity bucket, the number of trades and the sum of notional-traded aggregated over
all six years for every float-index, and the number of trades and the sum of notional-
traded aggregated over all float indexes and all maturity buckets.
One takeaway from this exploration is that SEF trading does not span the entire
spectrum of trades in the D2C swap market, partly because only certain classes of
interest rate swaps are required to be traded on SEFs. Even though the structure of
the market for interest rate swaps has dramatically changed over the past few years due
to clearing mandates, the D2C trades are still on their first steps toward a centralized
market. As such, one might not find it surprising that the D2C swaps are highly
concentrated. More than 50% of the trades (in notional) are executed by the largest
seven dealers, and more than 90% of the trades (in notional) are executed by the largest
21 dealers. These numbers are a telltale sign of an only slightly less-concentrated market
than the credit default swap market studied by Siriwardane (2019).
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Table 1.3: Summary Statistics of Client Activity in D2C IRS Market
Panel A: Client Activity across Buckets
Client Pays Fixed Client Receives Fixed
Bucket Notional (trillion $) SEF (%) Count SEF (%) nDealer nClient Notional (trillion $) SEF (%) Count SEF (%) nDealer nClient
< 6M 8.46 11.99 20334 11.45 56 386 12.32 8.8 20627 11.07 56 382
1Y 13.72 26.60 59995 22.52 61 1526 13.88 28.5 59797 24.56 62 1530
2Y 23.05 44.93 200254 46.48 69 2644 22.74 45.0 192868 44.99 62 2482
3Y 5.30 43.75 60614 43.07 66 1735 5.18 45.2 50170 43.00 62 1410
5Y 19.24 47.67 408013 50.09 70 3967 18.78 47.2 367044 51.83 68 3183
7Y 5.51 36.17 94145 40.24 63 2177 5.41 36.3 73662 46.06 65 1596
10Y 13.90 47.50 432207 50.75 69 4174 13.58 46.7 405328 49.89 66 3445
12Y 0.43 25.87 10212 36.26 55 508 0.42 26.4 8485 37.09 55 401
15Y 0.84 45.96 27064 50.45 61 998 0.81 44.5 22340 56.40 58 940
20Y 0.97 36.54 36359 47.02 63 1438 0.87 34.9 32381 44.55 59 1285
30Y 2.40 51.04 136675 61.76 58 2648 2.19 49.1 127499 61.75 61 2155
Panel B: Client Activity across Indexes
Client Pays Fixed Client Receives Fixed
Float Index Notional (trillion $) SEF (%) Count SEF (%) nDealer nClient Notional (trillion $) SEF (%) Count SEF (%) nDealer nClient
USD-LIBOR 40.589 50.75 537255 65.85 69 4408 41.434 47.02 450398 68.15 65 2969
EUR-EURIBOR 24.129 37.45 349797 50.55 54 2601 25.433 37.76 335588 49.89 54 2366
GBP-LIBOR 7.937 43.81 139704 52.37 53 2163 7.866 44.24 127558 53.93 52 1996
AUD-BBR 3.596 5.28 60183 14.14 44 912 3.481 6.42 60020 15.60 47 948
CAD-BA 3.507 24.67 53175 35.27 39 895 4.324 24.52 64893 38.01 37 1146
JPY-LIBOR 3.047 19.13 63254 34.54 41 1387 3.059 21.06 54444 29.45 41 1194
SEK-STIBOR 2.490 12.96 57403 18.13 34 964 1.859 14.54 46400 21.13 35 958
NZD-BBR 1.630 4.03 31266 7.24 37 733 1.702 3.64 32908 7.13 34 680
ZAR-JIBAR 1.300 3.81 31821 14.31 32 726 1.382 5.99 32456 14.14 31 776
HKD-HIBOR 1.148 0.14 23644 0.50 40 415 1.124 0.12 22894 13.8 44 375
SGD-SOR 1.129 0.60 31348 2.02 32 383 1.236 0.59 32362 22.6 34 396
CHF-LIBOR 0.929 23.33 16026 16.78 37 492 0.919 21.06 16976 18.24 35 462
PLN-WIBOR 0.677 8.48 27957 14.64 33 785 0.618 9.10 25653 17.84 37 727
NOK-NIBOR 0.635 9.66 23265 17.30 34 549 0.667 9.89 20030 15.31 34 569
CZK-PRIBOR 0.542 3.29 18383 5.68 32 658 0.514 4.23 15742 6.75 33 577
HUF-BUBOR 0.395 6.50 17608 10.38 31 677 0.392 6.32 17824 10.11 33 566
DKK-CIBOR 0.082 1.46 1625 2.19 20 80 0.086 1.33 1410 4.33 21 81
MXN-TIIE 0.058 0.87 2158 0.93 33 228 0.078 0.65 2645 0.44 32 261
Panel C: Client Activity across Years
Client Pays Fixed Client Receives Fixed
Year Notional (trillion $) SEF (%) Count SEF (%) nDealer nClient Notional (trillion $) SEF (%) Count SEF (%) nDealer nClient
2015 1.37 48% 38,492 62% 54 1,047 1.32 44% 30,925 61% 51 787
2016 3.89 52% 91,969 68% 59 1,673 3.64 53% 78,314 69% 56 1,174
2017 19.39 34% 316,278 44% 58 3,228 20.51 30% 288,281 45% 62 2,618
2018 31.41 39% 485,611 47% 63 3,841 30.81 39% 441,147 48% 64 3,111
2019 36.86 41% 536,003 46% 74 4,038 38.96 41% 505,543 47% 69 3,400
Summary statistics of the clients’ trading activity. Panel A shows the summary statistics of
the clients’ activity across maturity buckets. Panel B shows the summary statistics of the
clients’ activity across floating indexes. Panel C shows the summary statistics of the clients’
activity over the years in our sample.
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Figure 1.2: Distribution of Activity Across Maturity Buckets and Floating Indexes
(a) Clients Paying Fixed (b) Clients Receiving Fixed
1.5 The Model
First, I clarify the notion of a swap product (or product for short) as used in this paper.
Each interest rate swap product is uniquely indexed by a pair of (float− index, bucket),
where float− index denotes the underlying curve for the floating rate leg of the swap,
and bucket refers to the maturity bucket of the swap. For example, a plain vanilla
fixed-for-float swap on USD − LIBOR− 3month, traded on June 20, 20199 with ma-
turity date June 20, 2021, is an IRS product indexed by (USD − 3mLIBOR, 2Y ear).
Furthermore, I assume that the markets for paying-fixed and receiving-fixed are entirely
segmented. This assumption is based on the stylized fact in my sample period: over the
entire universe of cleared interest rate swap transactions, only 6% of the client trades
go through nondealers.10 Let J = J P ∪ J R denote the set of all IRS products, where
9In the real world, swaps do not necessarily come into effect at the trade date, but rather, at a date
called the “effective date” or “start date.” Yet, the majority of plain vanilla IRS contracts have an
effective date that is not more than two business days after the trade date. These swaps are called “spot
start” swaps. Another standard start date is the IMM dates, which are typically the third Wednesday
in March, June, September and December. For example, an interest rate swap with a 2-IMM start
date has an effective date that is the second IMM date after the trade date.
10Recall that the choice of the terms “paying-fixed” and “receiving fixed” are based on the viewpoint
of the client. In fact, in a “paying-fixed” market, the client pays the fixed cash flows and the dealer
pays the floating rate at the payment dates.
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P refers to paying-fixed and R refers to receiving-fixed sides of the market. For ease of
notation, I suppress the dealer’s subscript f , and focus on one particular dealer in this
section. Let A and L denote the amount of assets and liabilities on the balance sheet
of the dealer at time t = 0. In what follows, I first describe the net present value of
the swap intermediation for the dealer in a single-product case, that is |J | = |J P| = 1,
under two special cases: with and without leverage constraints. Once the intuition is
established, I will present the general case.
1.5.1 Special Case: Single Paying-Fixed Swap With no Leverage Constraint
Suppose that there is only one paying-fixed swap product available in the market, that
is |J | = |J P| = 1 with only one cash payment date for both legs in a year from the
trade date. The swap will be priced at par (i.e. it requires no upfront payment) with a
random payoff y1 for each unit of notional. For example, for a plain vanilla interest rate
swap, priced at par, in which the dealer pays the float rate, y1 = k − x̃, where x̃ and
k denote the floating and fixed rate, respectively. I use˜in this notation to emphasize
that the fixed rate is deterministic at t = 0, while the floating rate is a random variable
and is only realized at t = 1. If the dealer enters the trade for q units of this trade, he
will get a payoff of q.y1 at t = 1, but needs to post an additional amount m = m (q, k)
of initial margin, decided and set by the CCP depending on the size of the order and
the current exposure of the dealer. I chose this notation to emphasize that the margin
requirement is dependent on both the quantity (notional value) and the fixed rate of
the swap. I assume that the dealer raises this money by issuing an unsecured debt11 in
a competitive debt market.12 He must pay back (R + SD) ×m at the end of the next
period, where R represents the risk-free rate and SD represents the funding spread of
11I follow Andersen et al. (2019) who motivated this assumption by the dealer’s need for complying
with regulatory HQLA requirements.
12When m < 0, I assume that a corresponding amount of cash inflow from entering into the new
swap would be used to retire legacy debts.
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the dealer, and both values are known at time t = 0. The initial margin account receives
interest of R during the period. In the next period, the dealer will gain a net cash flow
of qy1 − SDm as a result of the new swap position. The time-0 present value of the





where Q is the fair-value measure, assuming
such a measure exists.13 In particular, the fair coupon rate of the swap is defined as
k = EQ [x̃], thus










One can immediately observe that in order for the dealer to be willing to enter the
trade, the swap should be priced at a level different from its fair value. To see this,
consider the case of a paying fixed plain vanilla IRS. If the IRS fixed-leg is priced at
the fair value, that is k = k, then the value of the position of size q for the dealer is
−SD
R
m < 0. Indeed, when there is no upfront payment for the swap, the fixed leg of the
IRS must deviate from k at least up to a level that makes the trade profitable for the
dealer. More specifically, for any k < k + SDmq , trading q units of this swap provides
negative value to the dealer.
1.5.2 Special Case: Single Paying-Fixed Swap With Leverage Constraint
In this case, I assume that the dealer faces a regulatory leverage ratio constraint. There-
fore, by financing the cash needed for the initial margin, the dealer alters his balance
sheet composition. This may require the dealer to hold a sufficient amount of equity
capital to satisfy regulatory constraints. Furthermore, I assume that the dealer can
finance an investment with new equity at a marginal cost of R+ SE where SE > SD.14
13Here, I abstract from the technical details in establishing this existence. The reader may refer to
Andersen et al. (2019) for further discussion of this.
14The pecking order of financing choices in my model is exogenous. Andersen et al. (2019) analyze
the dealer’s pricing decision for the swaps under the FVA framework. Assuming a competitive debt
and equity market, they derive marginal costs to the dealer’s shareholders associated with cash, debt,
and equity financing. They find that debt financing is strictly preferred over equity financing.
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Let $ denote the current leverage ratio, that is $ = A−L
A
, and $ the minimum leverage
ratio required by the regulations. I assume that the dealer’s balance sheet satisfies the
regulatory constraint at any given time (i.e., $ ≥ $). Following the evidence provided
by Andersen et al. (2019), I assume that the banks adopt a fixed capital buffer, $−$,
at the beginning of every quarter. Equivalently, one can assume that at the start of
every quarter, the bank holding company decides on the optimal level of the precaution-
ary buffer (and equivalently, sets the bank-quarter level $), which is a decision made
exogenous from (and before) the trading desk’s decision for opening new positions. To
maintain $ leverage ratio when the trading desk requires adding m amount of margin,
the desk must secure $m amount of equity capital, and finance the rest, (1−$)m, by
issuing an unsecured debt in a competitive debt market. If λ denotes the shadow cost
of compliance with the regulatory constraints, the margin requirement, in this case,
leads to λ$m loss of profits through the leverage constraint. Equivalently, λ denotes
the spread between the marginal cost of equity financing and the marginal cost of debt
financing, that is λ = SE − SD. Thus, the net present value of the new trade is15







− (SD + λ$)m (q, k)
)
.
15More formally, if the amount of capital to be raised must be at least a fraction $ of total assets,
then the dealer’s capital constraint is in the form A − L + e ≥ $ (A+m), where e is the additional
equity capital raised for the new initial margin m. Recall that I started with the assumption that
before executing the new swap trade, the internal leverage constraint is binding, that is, $ = A−LA .
Thus the constraint is reduced to e ≥ $m. The maximization problem can be written as
max
k







− SD (m− e)− SEe
)
s.t. e ≥ $m.
Let λ represent the Lagrangian multiplier of the regulatory capital constraint. Hence the Lagrangian
for the dealer’s optimization problem is written as







− SD (m− e)− SEe
)
+ λ (e−$m)
If the dealer intends to maintain its leverage at $, then e = $m = $qm̃. First order condition












Further, I assume that the marginal amount of collateral m (q, k) is affine in quantity
q, that is, m (q, k) = qm̃ (k). Finally, the dealer sets the new swap position’s fixed
rate to maximize the net present value subject to the regulatory capital constraint, in
a Bertrand-oligopoly fashion. The first-order condition for the fixed rate is
(









where cemc = SD + λ$ and Ω = − ∂q∂k . Note that if
∂m̃(k)
∂k
= 0, the optimal fixed rate




This equation resembles a regular Bertrand-Nash pricing rule, in which the deviation
of the fixed rate from the fair coupon can be decomposed into a marginal cost term,
cemcm̃, and a markup, qΩ . However, in general one might expect m̃ (k) to be an arbitrary
function of the fixed rate, thus ∂m̃(k)
∂k
6= 0. In fact, the marginal cost, cemcm̃ (k), depends
on the price (i.e. k) since the risk profile of the IRS depends on the cash flow of both the
floating leg and the fixed leg. In the next section, I present a simple initial margin model
in which m̃ (k) depends linearly on the fixed rate. More specifically, m̃ (k) = kx− y for
some constants x and y. Solving for the optimal fixed rate spread gives










Next, I move to a more general case in which there is demand for several paying-fixed
and receiving-fixed swaps at any time t. If the dealer chooses to provide intermediation
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, the total value of the






kPj − kj − cPj (k)
)
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denotes the marginal cost of adding the swap to the current book of the dealer. Note
that, when there is only one annual cash payment for the swap, the annuity factor is
simply the discount factor D = 1
R
, where R is the one-year risk-free rate. However, in
the real world, there are several payment dates, t1,j < t2,j < t3,j < ... < tNj ,j = Tj, for






, where the time difference ti − ti−1 is stated in the fractions of a
year.16 As in the single-product case, I assume the only source of marginal cost is the
collateral requirement for funding the initial margin. Marginal cost is also dependent
on the fixed rates, as the main source of variable cost is the cost of marginal collateral.






kj − kRj − cRj (k)
)
qRj ,





, where τ (ti, ti−1) is the year
fraction between dates ti−1 and ti based on a given day count convention (e.g. 30/360, Act/360, etc.).
The day count conventions are a characteristic of the swap trade and are set at the origination of the
trade. For the purpose of illustration, I abstract from details related to day count conventions in this
manuscript. However, all the analyses are done taking the trade day count conventions into account.
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are defined the same way as in
the paying-fixed case above. In the vector form










kR − kR − cR
))>
qR,
where  represents the element-wise product of vectors. To relate the observed fixed
rates to the marginal cost of intermediation, I need to model the initial margins re-
quested by the CPP for a portfolio of swaps conditional on the dealer’s contemporaneous
exposure (open positions).
1.5.4 Initial Margin Methodology: A Modified ISDA SIMM Model
For calculation of the required initial margins, I assume that the CCP follows a method-
ology very similar to the ISDA Standard Initial Margin Model (SIMM). The ISDA
SIMM provides a guideline for calculating the initial margin for noncleared OTC deriva-
tives.17 In its general form, ISDA SIMM defines the initial margin for the interest rate
risk class18 as the sum of Delta Margin, Vega Margin, and Curvature Margin. For the
sake of simplicity, I only consider the Delta Margin for margin calculations in this pa-
per. More specifically, given the set of Kι risk instruments (i.e. zero rates at key tenors
based on which the discount curve is interpolated) for each yield curve ι, for any par-
ticular dealer, I define the vector of risk sensitivities s = (sκ,ι)κ∈Kι,ι∈I where κ denotes
a particular rate tenor (e.g. 5year) and ι indexes a yield curve (e.g. USD-3mLibor).
Risk sensitivities are calculated at the account level and measure the change in the
value of a portfolio given specific changes to the underlying curves. More formally, for
17Even though it is originally written for noncleared swaps, at least for the interest rate swaps it is
general enough to be used for cleared swaps as well. In fact, in my regression results I show that by
using even a simplified version of the ISDA SIMM, I can explain about 84% of variation in the initial
margin set at the account level in the sample.
18There are four more risk classes in the ISDA SIMM: credit, equity, commodity, and FX. A discus-
sion of these risk classes is beyond the scope of this paper.
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each tenor κ of the curve ι, sκ,ι = ∂V∂zκ,ι is the change in V, the net present value (NPV)
of the entire portfolio, given a 1 basis point shift in the zero-rate zκ,ιfor key tenor κ of
curve ι. The end-of-the-day values of these sensitivities are called the “delta ladder”
and are provided by the CCPs; I later use them in my cost calculations. Assuming
a Value-at-Risk methodology for measuring the future changes in the mark-to-market
value of the open positions, in an economy in which the underlying risk factors follow a
stationary Gaussian process, one can write the required initial margin as proportional




where ω is a normalization factor and Υ is a constant covariance matrix of the under-
lying risk factors. I set the constant matrix Υ equal to the values provided by ISDA
SIMM documents, described in ISDA SIMM™ methodology, version 2.3.19. Moreover,
I set the normalization factor ω = 0.55, which I obtain from a panel regression of ob-
served initial margins per account, per day on the observed panel of
√
s>Υs values.
More details are in Section 1.7.1.
Next, I derive expressions for the marginal collateral requirements of the new swap
positions. To this end, suppose that the dealer starts the day t, with a delta ladder
st−1 and by the end of the day adds qP amount of notional for swap products J P and
qR amount of notional for swap products J R. The NPV of the entire swap book at the
end of day t is written as





















qRj j ∈ J R.
(1.4)
For calculation of the sensitivity of a swap with respect to the vector of key tenor
zero rates z = (zκ,ι)κ∈Kι,ι∈I , I follow a standard convention in which one shifts the
curve at the particular key tenor (one at the time), by 1 basis point, reprices the cash
flows (by calculating the NPV under the new hypothetical curve), and approximates the
sensitivity as ∂Vj
∂zκ,ι
u 4Vj,κ,ι1bp where4Vj,κ,ι is the change in the NPV as a result of the shift
in the key tenor zero rate. Next, I define uj,κ,ι = ∂Dj∂zκ,ι and vj,κ,ι =
∂
∂zκ,ι
Djkj as the per-
unit fixed leg and per-unit floating leg sensitivity of a particular swap j, respectively.
Then for any swap j, using the vector of fixed-leg sensitivities uj = (uj,κ,ι)κ∈Kι,ι∈I
and the vector of floating leg sensitivities vj = (vj,κ,ι)κ∈Kι,ι∈I , one can calculate the





(kjuj − vj) qj j ∈ J P
(vj − kjuj) qj j ∈ J R.
Given the vector of risk sensitivities of all the swaps intermediated by the dealer,
the delta ladder by the end of day t looks like
st = st−1 +
∑
j∈J P
(kjuj − vj) qj +
∑
l∈J R
(vl − klul) ql.
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kjxj − yj j ∈ J P
yj − kjxj j ∈ J R.
(1.5)
In the above expression, m̃j represents the per unit notional marginal collateral for
any swap product j. Finally, based on the intuition in the single-product case, one can
write the marginal cost of intermedation for a swap product j as cj = (SD +$λ) m̃j,
or equivalently c = (SD +$λ) m̃. By stacking up the expressions in equation (3.5) for





































v1 v2 · · · vJP
]>
, xP = (xj)j∈J P , yP =
(yj)j∈J P , and UR,VR,xR and yR are defined correspondingly.
1.5.5 Competition Among Dealers
I define a competitive equilibrium for a set of swap products J with a vector of quan-
tities (qP,qR) and fixed rates (kP,kR) where each dealer decides the price of each IRS
contract from the set of incoming demands for products J , to maximize the NPV of
the swap portfolio. Assuming a pure strategy Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in prices ex-
ists, then the price vector must satisfy the first-order condition of each dealer for the
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where cemc is the effective marginal cost of capital per unit of margin for the dealer
defined as
cemc = SD +$λ.
I should emphasize that the effective marginal cost of capital is a composite param-
eter that includes the funding spread of the dealer S, as well as the shadow cost of
regulatory capital $λ. In essence, for deviation of the fixed rates from their fair value,
we do not necessarily need a binding regulatory constraint. The former resembles the
funding cost component of Andersen et al. (2019), where the CDS spread of the dealers
is used as the funding spread. The latter is related to the idea of shadow cost of capital
for the life insurers in the structurally estimated models of Koijen and Yogo (2015) and
Koijen and Yogo (2021). Using the equations (1.6) and (1.7), one can solve for the





































When cemc = 0 this expression boils down to a regular Bertrand pricing rule repre-
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senting the role of market power











To link these optimality conditions to the observed data and get an estimate of
the cost parameters, we need to consistently estimate the parameters of price elasticity
of demand in ΩPand ΩR. To this end, I follow the approach from the discrete choice
literature, and particularly, the random coefficient logit model, as described in the next
section.
1.5.6 Discrete Continuous Model of Demand for Interest Rate Swaps
Suppose that at each period t, there is a set It = {1, 2, ..., It} of clients and a set
Jt = {1, 2, ..., Jt} of interest rate swap contracts. In this section, I assume that IPt and
IRt are disjoint sets, that is, there is no client that participates in both “paying-for-fixed”
and “receiving-for-fixed” sides of the IRS market. Therefore, I suppress the superscript
P and R as I model both segments the same way.20 Each client i, by selecting a swap j,
obtains a utility
Uijt = X>jtβ0 + ξjt︸ ︷︷ ︸
δ̃jt
+X>ijtβ̃ + ωci + αkijt + σvi + ζ̃ijt (1.10)
where Xjt is a vector of contract-day determinants of demand, kijt is the fixed rate for
traded swap j to client i at time t, Xijt is a vector of contract-day-client observable
characteristics, ωi is a client-specific determinant of demand that is observable by all
the dealers but not the econometrician,21 ξjt represents the swap’s unobservable (to the
20The estimations, however, will be implemented separately for each segment.
21One can interpret this as the dealer’s perception about the likelihood of the client’s demand, based
on the relationship the dealer has made with that client over the time, or a sufficient statistics of all
the client characteristics that can help the dealer predict the likely demands of the client, beyond the
type of the client (which is the only client characteristic I observe in my data).
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econometrician) characteristics of the swap , ζijt represents the unobserved shocks to
the i’s demand for contract j, and vi is the propensity to choose a swap that is known
to the client but unknown to the dealers. Also, the utility for choosing the outside
option j = 0, is normalized to Ui0t = ζi0t. Conditional on choosing contract j, the log
notional (quantity) ln qijt of that contract is given by
ln qijt = α0,q + Y Tijtβq + αqkijt + σv
q
it,
where kijt is the fixed rate, Yijt is a vector of contract-day-client characteristics for
quantity, and vqit is the propensity to demand a swap that is known to the client but
unknown to the dealers.
In essence, there two stages for the client’s demand for a swap. First, there is a
discrete choice problem in which the client answers the question of “which” swap to
buy among several available swaps. Second, once the client chooses a particular swap,
she makes a decision on “how much” of that swap to trade. The latter is a continuous
choice problem. The use of a hybrid discrete-continuous choice problem dates back to
Train (1986). Among more recent papers, Crawford et al. (2018) and Benetton (2021)
have used the same framework for their estimations.
To close the model, I assume a covariance structure for the propensity to demand
swaps as








As shown in the discrete choice model, estimation of the discrete choice model relies on
knowing the price (fixed rate) that a client is offered for every counterfactual product
available in the same trading day. However, I only observe the set of fixed rates for those
trades the client actually chose to trade.22 This is similar to the challenge Crawford
et al. (2018) faced in implementing their estimation model. I follow their strategy
to tackle this issue by running predictive regressions of prices on an increasing set
of control variables and select the best model in terms of its ability to explain the
variation in prices that clients are offered for any given swap product. Finally, I use
these predicted prices as a proxy for the counterfactual prices that clients would receive
had they decided to chose products other than the ones they actually chose.
1.6.1 Predictive Model of the Fixed Rates
Table (1.4) reports the results of these predictive regressions. Perhaps a natural choice
for predicting prices is a proxy for the riskiness of a swap. Therefore, I include PV 01
in all the specifications for price regressions. The coefficient on this variable is always
positive, which is consistent with the intuition that to compensate for the riskiness
of the underlying yield curve, the fixed payer should pay more at the payment days.
Though not reported in the tables, I include trade-level controls such as log tenor and
starting-date group dummies (in four groups of spot starting, 1 IMM, 2 IMM and 3
IMM dates).
The first (last) four columns of Table (1.4) represent the results for trades in which
the client pays (receives) the fixed rate. In columns (1) and (5) of Table (1.4), I include
the client type, trade date, and index and bucket fixed effects as the first set of fixed
22This is not the case for the continuous choice estimation, where I can simply use the actual
transaction prices.
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effects. The client type controls for the possibility that the dealers can differentiate
prices across different client groups based on a variety of reasons. Client groups might
have different information about the intrinsic value of the swap following the intuition
from the extensive literature on informed trading (Kyle (1985); Glosten and Milgrom
(1985); Back and Baruch (2004)). Moreover, one may expect considerable heterogeneity
across different client types in their bargaining power and search costs (Duffie et al.
(2005), Duffie et al. (2007)). The trade date fixed effects control for the unobserved
factors that are common across different clients on the same day, while the bucket
(respectively, floating index) fixed effect controls for those unobserved factors that are
common across the clients demanding a certain maturity buckets (respectively, yield
curve). In columns (2) and (6), I move to the case in which I use day-index-bucket fixed
effect to further control for the heterogeneity in unobserved shocks in a more granular
way. This leads to a notable increase in R2, from 0.917 to 0.970 for paying-fixed and
from 0.931 to 0.983 for receiving-fixed trades.
In columns (3) and (7), I try “client” fixed effects instead of “client-type” fixed
effects. This change has a marginal effect on R2 for the receiving-fixed case (column
(7)) and a moderate, if not small, increase for the paying-fixed case (column (3)). In
the next step, columns (4) and (8), I control nonparametrically for the amount of
transaction notional value (USD equivalent) using notional bucket dummies for a set of
percentiles (20%, 40%, 60% and 80%), following Crawford et al. (2018). This change has
no effect on the fit of the model based on R2 (even though coefficients are significantly
positive the for paying-fixed case in Table 1.4).
Based on the results of Table 1.4, I adopt the specification of columns (3) and
(7), which includes the transaction controls (log tenor, starting date dummies and
PV 01), client and index-bucket-day fixed effects as my preferred predictive model.
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Table 1.4: Price Regression
Clients Paying Fixed Clients Receiving Fixed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
PV01 0.031∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
20th Percentile −0.807∗∗∗ −0.138
(0.147) (0.131)
40th Percentile −1.602∗∗∗ −0.310
(0.265) (0.218)
60th Percentile −2.202∗∗∗ -0.309
(0.325) (0.302)
80th Percentile −2.029∗∗∗ 0.740∗
(0.441) (0.410)
Client Type Fixed Effects Y Y N N Y Y N N
Time Fixed Effect Y N N N Y N N N
Index Fixed Effect Y N N N Y N N N
Bucket Fixed Effect Y N N N Y N N N
Index-Bucket Fixed Effect N N N N N N N N
Index-Bucket-Day Fixed Effect N Y Y Y N Y Y Y
Client Fixed Effect N N Y Y N N Y Y
Observations 1,288,322 1,288,322 1,288,322 1,288,322 1,182,140 1,182,140 1,182,140 1,182,140
R2 0.917 0.970 0.980 0.980 0.931 0.983 0.984 0.984
Adjusted R2 0.917 0.967 0.978 0.978 0.931 0.981 0.982 0.982
More specifically
kijt = γ>1 Xijt + ϕjt + ωi + εijt, (1.11)
where kijt is the fixed rate to client i for swap product j at day t, Xijtis the vector of
transaction controls, ϕjt is the index-bucket-day fixed effect, ωi is the client fixed effect,
and εijt is the prediction error.
1.6.2 Discrete Choice and Continuous Choice Demand Models
Using the price prediction model (1.11), one can predict the fixed rates offered to the
clients for a counterfactual choice. More formally, I use the predicted values for the
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counterfactual fixed rates as
k̂ijt = X>ijtγ̂1 + ϕ̂jt + ω̂i,
where γ̂1, ϕ̂jt and ω̂i are estimated coefficients from the price regression. The measure-
ment error of this prediction is ε̂ijt = kijt − k̂ijt. By plugging these expressions into
equation (3.7) we get
Uijt = δ̃jt +X>ijtβ̃ + ωci + αkijt + σvi + ζ̃ijt
= δ̃jt +X>ijtβ̃ + ωci + α
(
X>ijtγ̂1 + ϕ̂jt + ω̂i + ε̂ijt
)
+ σvi + ζ̃ijt.
I assume that the vector of contract-day-client characteristics of demand, X̃ijt in-
cludes a client specific component, that is known to the dealers but not observed by
the econometrician, that is, X̃ijt = (Xijt, ωci ). Following the intuition from Crawford
et al. (2018), I assume ωci can be controlled by the client-specific fixed effects in the
price prediction model, that is,
ωci = ηωω̂i.
It follows that













+ (ηω + α̃)︸ ︷︷ ︸
η







= δjt +X>ijtβ + ηω̂i + σvi + ζijt .
One should interpret the coefficients present in specification (1.12) with caution.
For example, β reflects not only the direct effect of observable characteristics Xijt on
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the demand (i.e. β̃) but also the indirect effect that any of these observables have on
the demand through the prices. I cannot identify the price coefficient α from estimating
the model (1.12), as it does not show up separately. I follow a two-stage estimation
strategy borrowed from the literature on IO structural estimation following the seminal
work of Berry et al. (1995). In the first stage, I estimate the demand parameters
θ1 = (δ, β, σc, βq, αq, σq, ρ), and using the panel of estimated product-time fixed effects
δ = (δjt)1≤j≤Jt,1≤t≤T , I estimate the demand coefficient (together with β0) in the second
stage from this equation
δjt = αϕ̂jt +X>jtβ0 + ξjt (1.13)
through the variation in estimated product-day average fixed rates, ϕ̂jt. To tackle the
endogeneity issue inherent in linear model (1.13), between the unobservable product-
time shocks ξjt and the product-time average ϕ̂jt, I use an instrumental variable (IV)
method for the second stage. Section 1.6.3 explains the details of identification and the
choice of cost shifters.
As is standard in discrete choice models, I assume ζijt in equation (3.7) is indepen-
dently and identically (across i, j, and t) distributed as a type I extreme value random
variable. The probability of choosing j by client i at day t, who has an unobservable





1 +∑k eδkt+XTiktβ+σcvit .
I further assume that vit and vqit are jointly normal and independent across different
clients. Conditional on choosing swap product j > 0 at time t, client i with an unob-
servable propensity to buy a swap vit = v decides to trade q units of notional (in US
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dollar equivalents) with likelihood













Therefore, the likelihood of observing the client i, at time t, choosing swap j > 0 from











1 +∑k eδkt+XTiktβ+σcvφ (v)︸ ︷︷ ︸
discrete choice
×φ
 ln qijt − α0,q − Y
T
ijtβq − αqkijt − σqρv
σq
√




where φ is the probability density function for standard normal distribution, and θ1 =





1 +∑k eδkt+XTiktβ+σcvφ (v) dv.




1ijt log Lijt (θ1) , (1.16)
where 1ijt is a dummy variable that identifies the chosen swap product of client i in time
t. That is 1ijt = 1 if and only if client i chooses swap product j in market t. It is common
in the literature to use the maximum simulated likelihood to estimate θ1 by using a
randomly generated sample to approximate integral (1.15). However, I found it more
convenient computationally, to adopt the numerical integration method first proposed
by Goodwin (1949), where one can evaluate integrals of the form
∫∞
−∞ f (x) e−x
2
dx (also
known as normal integrals), with an arbitrary level of accuracy, using only the first few
terms of the numerical quadrature h∑Nn=−N e−n2h2 , where h is a tuning parameter that
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determines the step size of the numerical integration. One can show that the first eight
terms (i.e. N = 8) of the Goodwin quadrature with h = 0.5 leads to more accurate
approximations of the integral above compared to the normally distributed random
sample of size 1000.23 To implement my estimation method, I set the values N = 12
and h = 0.5 for the Goodwin quadrature approximation.
1.6.3 Identification
In this section, I explain the identifying assumptions for the estimation of the demand
side. As a usual identifying assumption, I assume that the observed characteristics other
than the fixed rates (in both the choice and the quantity equations), are exogenous.
To address the endogeneity in the estimation of the price coefficient of choice, α, and
quantity, αq, I use a set of cost shifters as instruments, as the goal is to find variables that
only impact the choice of the clients indirectly through their effect on the prices (fixed
rate). As such, I construct a proxy for the change in the initial margin requirement
caused by a marginal swap trade. In essence, a dealer with a current position in interest
rate swaps is asked to post a certain amount of initial margin at the CCP. If the dealer
wants to add a new swap on his position, that new swap requires an additional change
in the initial margin required by the CCP. The marginal amount of this margin depends
on the risk profile of the dealer’s current exposure as well as the risk profile of the new
swap. If one believes that providing the initial margin is costly, one can expect that the
marginal amount of margin for a new swap would proxy for that cost. In what follows,
I describe this intuition more formally.
Before delving into details, I define the contract-level fair marginal collateral of
23This is a critical step for my estimation as there are above 100,000 product-time fixed effects, δjt
to be estimated in both the “paying-fixed” and “receiving-fixed” segments.
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where uf,j,t and vf,j,t represent the fixed-leg and floating-leg sensitivity of swap product
j, respectively; sf,t−1 is the delta ladder of the dealer at the end of prior trading date; Υ
is the matrix of constants from the modified ISDA SIMM described in Section 1.5.4, and
nj,t represents the number of dealers offering swap product j at time t. The product-
level fair marginal collateral is simply the average of the contract-level counterpart over
the set of dealers that offer the swap j at time t. Note the definition for κf,j,t is slightly
different from the actual marginal collateral defined in equation (3.5). On the one hand,
I use fair coupon rate, kj,t, instead of the actual coupon rate of the swap, kj,t; on the
other hand, I use the prior date’s risk sensitivities measured by the delta ladder sf,t−1
instead of today’s end-of-the day sensitivities sf,t. As discussed earlier, the marginal
collateral is directly related to the amount of additional margin a dealer needs to add a
new swap to his current positions, which goes hand in hand with the marginal cost of
issuing a new swap (relevance of the instrument). By using the fair value of the swap
and the former date’s delta ladder, I ensure that the instrument is not associated with
the demand beyond its impact on the fixed rates (exclusion of the instrument). In what
follows, I explain the identification strategy in detail.
Swap Choice Equation. As mentioned earlier, ξjt represents swap j’s unobservable
(to the econometrician) characteristics at time t. This can be interpreted as the common
knowledge of the true value of a particular swap product at a specific time, which is
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known by all the market participants but not observed by the econometrician. For
example, given certain macroeconomic news, the value of certain parts of the yield
curve might deviate temporarily from the ones suggested by the interpolated fair values.
I start with including day and index-bucket fixed effects in the second stage of the
demand estimation. The day fixed effects control for time-varying aggregate shocks
that alter pricing decisions across all products, while index-bucket fixed effects control
for time-invariant product-specific shocks that affect pricing decisions. Finally, I assume
the swap’s product level fair marginal collateral is a valid instrument that influences
the marginal cost of providing the swap for the dealers but does not show up in the
clients’ demand directly. The results of the first-stage IV regressions, confirm the
relevance of this instrument: higher product-level fair marginal collateral is associated
with a (statistically significantly) higher product-level average fixed rate in paying-
fixed contracts and a (statistically significantly) lower product-level average fixed rate
in receiving fixed contracts.
Quantity Equation. To tackle the endogeneity bias in the price coefficient of the
quantity equation (1.14), I take three steps. First, I estimate the discrete choice of
the swap product and the continuous choice of quantity simultaneously by maximizing
the joint likelihood expressed in equation (1.16). This will make the estimates immune
to the possibility of simultaneity bias that might arise if one estimates the discrete
choice of the swap product (equation (1.12)) separately from the continuous choice of
quantity (equation (1.14)). Benetton (2021) took a similar strategy. Finally, I address
the possible endogeneity bias in the price coefficient, I instrument the fixed rates in the
quantity equation with the contract-level fair marginal collateral. The results of the
first-stage IV regressions confirm the relevance of this instrument: higher contract-level
fair marginal collateral is associated with a (statistically significantly) higher fixed rate
in paying-fixed contracts and a (statistically significantly) lower fixed rate in receiving
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fixed contracts.
As the instrumented fixed rates show up nonlinearly in the joint likelihood (1.15),
I adopt a control function approach (Train 2009) similar to the estimation strategy in
Crawford et al. (2018). In particular, in the first-stage IV regression for the quantity
equation, I regress the observed fixed rates on the exogenous covariates in the quantity
equation (1.14) as well as the instrument (marginal collateral). Next, I use the residuals
of this regression as an additional control in the quantity equation (1.14). In fact, I
include these residuals as another covariate in the continuous-choice component of joint
likelihood shown in expression (1.15).
1.7 Estimation Results
The estimation of cost parameters relies partly on the ability of the ISDA SIMM model
to reliably predict the actual initial margin required by the CCP from the dealers. In
this section, first, I explore this ability of the ISDA SIMM model. Next, I report the
estimation results for the demand and supply side of the model.
1.7.1 Initial Margin Prediction
In Figure (1.3), the dashed line depicts the weekly average initial margins imposed by
the LCH on the house accounts (for proprietary trades of the account holders) for the
dealers active in the D2C interest rate swap market. The solid line shows the predicted
initial margin from the modified ISDA SIMM model I presented in Section 1.5.4 via
equation (1.3). The predicted levels appear to capture the time variation in the actual
levels properly, especially in the periods of time where there are abrupt shocks in the
required initial margins. Perhaps the main difference is the scale. In other words, the
time variations in the predicted model are overstated versions of those of the actual
margins. For this reason, I adopt a constant ω in equation (1.3) that is absent in the
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Figure 1.3: Initial Margin For Proprietary Trades of the Dealers – Actual vs. Modified
ISDA SIMM (Million Dollars)
ISDA SIMM. I estimate this constant in this section.
Table (1.5) reports the results of the panel regressions of the actual initial margins
at the account-day level on the initial margins predicted by the ISDA SIMM model.
The first six columns (All Accounts) show the results for all 44 dealers who have at
least one trade in the D2C interest rate swaps over the sample, while the rest (Main
Accounts) show the results of the subsample of the 30 dealers who have at least 10,000
trades over the sample period. In the first column, I include only the predicted margins
on the right-hand side with no fixed effects. The estimates show that the actual margins
are statistically significantly associated with the predicted margins, and the model fit
measured by R2 implies that, by including only predicted margins, we can explain a
notable amount of variation in the panel of initial margins (R2 is 0.81 for All Accounts
and 0.84 for Main Accounts). By including dealer fixed effects and day fixed effects, not
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Table 1.5: The Ability of ISDA Margin Method To Predict Initial Margins
All Accounts Main Accounts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Modified ISDA Margin Model (m) 0.559∗∗∗ 0.534∗∗∗ 0.567∗∗∗ 0.538∗∗∗ 0.567∗∗∗ 0.542∗∗∗ 0.564∗∗∗ 0.546∗∗∗ 0.567∗∗∗ 0.538∗∗∗ 0.567∗∗∗ 0.542∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.035) (0.025) (0.037) (0.025) (0.036) (0.026) (0.037) (0.025) (0.037) (0.025) (0.036)
Dealer CDS Spread 0.444 −0.357 0.228 −0.123 0.444 −0.357 0.228 −0.123
(0.508) (0.487) (0.599) (0.451) (0.508) (0.487) (0.599) (0.451)
MOVE Index 1.690 1.808∗ 1.690 1.808∗
(1.056) (0.915) (1.056) (0.915)
LIBOR-OIS Spread 1.770∗∗∗ 1.947∗∗∗ 1.770∗∗∗ 1.947∗∗∗
(0.663) (0.661) (0.663) (0.661)
Dealer Fixed Effect N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y
Time Fixed Effect N Y N Y N N N Y N Y N N
R2 0.810 0.896 0.846 0.911 0.849 0.896 0.842 0.911 0.846 0.911 0.849 0.896
Adjusted R2 0.810 0.893 0.846 0.907 0.849 0.896 0.842 0.908 0.846 0.907 0.849 0.896
Num. obs. 59001 59001 30867 30867 30867 30867 42491 42491 30867 30867 30867 30867
∗∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗p < 0.1.
Two-way clustered (by time and dealer) standard errors are reported in parentheses.
surprisingly, even more of this variation is explained, however, the estimated coefficients
on the predicted margins do not vary much.
Using data on daily open positions and posted margins in the cleared credit default
swap market, Capponi et al. (2020), study the relationship of the posted margins both
with portfolio characteristics and with market conditions. In the spirit of their paper, I
use the dealers’ CDS spread as a composite measure of both the riskiness of the dealer
and his funding spread. In addition, I use two market-level variables, the MOVE index
(which measures the implied volatility of the Treasury yields, as a proxy for the aggre-
gate riskiness of the fixed income sector) and the Libor-OIS spread (which measures the
difference between the Libor rate and OIS rate, as a proxy for the aggregate funding
spread of the banking sector). First, the CDS spreads are available only for the main
dealers subsample, so columns (3)–(6) of the two panels of Table (1.5) are essentially
identical. The new columns, further confirm the robustness of the estimated coefficients
on the predicted margin as the estimates look stable across the model. In order to fix
the assumptions, I set ω = 0.55 in the predictive model of margin (1.3).
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1.7.2 Demand Parameters
As the only client-level characteristic I observe is client type, I use the interaction
of the type dummies with product characteristics (level, slope, and curvature of the
underlying curve, PV01, and Log Tenor) as the vector of contract-day-client observable
characteristics Xijt. In addition, I use type dummies with the same set of product
characteristics as the vector of contract-day-client observable characteristics Yijt. In
Tables 1.6,1.7 and 1.8, I report the estimates of the structural demand model for the
two market segments: “paying-fixed” and “receiving-fixed.”
Table 1.6 shows the estimates of the swap choice (discrete choice) part of the model.
This table first shows that even with a limited knowledge of the clients’ characteristics,
we are able to explain a noticeable amount of heterogeneity in the clients’ taste for
the swap both across the two segments and across the product characteristics in one
segment. For example, based on the results of Table 1.6, an increase in the slope of
the yield curve makes “paying fixed” less attractive for all client types (although the
effect is different in magnitudes across the types). However, the same event increases
the attractiveness of receiving-fixed only for central and municipal banks, nonfinancial
corporations, and hedge funds. In other words, a flatter yield curve increases the
need for a swap in GSEs, banks and insurance/pension funds for both paying-fixed
and receiving-fixed (extensive margin), while it shifts part of the demand of the other
groups from receiving-fixed to paying-fixed (intensive margin).
We can use the estimated coefficients on the interaction of type dummies with
PV 01 to analyze the duration risk hedging motives across different client types. For
example, nonfinancial corporations have shown significant interest in receiving fixed
rates. This is contrary to the view that has been held in the literature that considered
nonfinancial corporations as natural fixed rate payers in the IRS market (Li and Mao
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(2003), Saunders (1999), Chernenko and Faulkender (2011), Jermann and Yue (2018)).
The unconventional demand for the fixed rates, suggested by my estimates, is consistent
with the recent rise in the corporate debt issuance followed by the duration risk hedging
needs of the debt issuing companies. Besides, insurance companies, pension funds, and
GSEs have been more passionate about receiving floating rates.
1.7.3 Cost Parameters
In this section, I study the determinants of the marginal cost of capital for the dealers
in the D2C IRS market. First, I use equations (1.8) and (1.9) to back out the effective
effective marginal cost of capital at the dealer-client type-product-day level. By doing
so, I control for possible omitted variable bias in the optimal pricing equations (1.8)
and (1.9). In particular, there might be a residual cost due to the heterogeneity of the
perception of the fair coupon value across different client types (following the informed
trading literature of Kyle (1985), Glosten and Milgrom (1985), and the vast literature
thereafter). In fact, the dealer’s marginal cost of trade (due to information asymmetry)
with an informed client might be different from a less informed client. As such, I
calculate the effective marginal capital cost at the level of dealer-client type-product-
day using the estimates from the demand model and use these calculated costs as the
dependent variable in a regression on a variety of determinants of the capital costs. The
estimation results are reported in Table 1.9. In all the specifications, I use dealer fixed
effects, day fixed effects, client type fixed effects, and product fixed effects to control
for the unobservable heterogeneity in various dimensions.
In column (1) of Table 1.9, I show the effect of the dealer’s 5-year CDS spread (as a
measure for funding spread) on the marginal cost per unit of margin. The average level
of m̃ (k) in my sample is 0.022 for paying-fixed swaps and −0.020 for receiving-fixed
swaps. In fact, the receiving-fixed swaps have helped the dealers offset their positions
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Table 1.6: Structural Demand Estimates – Swap Choice (Discrete Choice)
Panel A: Client Paying Fixed
Mean Interactions
Hedge Fund GSE Bank Insurance/Pension Central/Municipal Nonfinancial
Constant 1.757∗∗∗ 2.400∗∗∗ −1.251 2.539∗∗∗ 1.664∗∗∗ 2.839∗∗
(0.678) (0.886) (1.878) (0.978) (0.217) (1.368)
Level −0.125∗∗ 0.006 0.074∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ −0.123∗∗∗ −0.153∗∗∗ −0.050∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.015) (0.018) (0.015) (0.016) (0.019) (0.019)
Slope 0.076∗∗∗ −0.233∗∗∗ −2.110∗∗∗ −0.170∗∗∗ −0.453∗∗∗ −0.392∗∗∗ −0.391∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.040) (0.153) (0.041) (0.040) (0.047) (0.048)
Curvature −0.907∗∗∗ 1.729∗∗∗ 4.793∗∗∗ −0.109 1.728∗∗∗ 1.398∗∗∗ 1.615∗∗∗
(0.183) (0.094) (0.260) (0.089) (0.095) (0.106) (0.115)
PV01 −0.224 −2.594∗∗∗ 12.573∗∗∗ 2.407∗∗∗ −1.720∗∗∗ 0.975∗ 1.077
(2.064) (0.469) (0.934) (0.483) (0.482) (0.592) (0.660)
Log Tenor 0.384 −0.185∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ −0.023 −0.096∗∗ −0.007 0.080
(0.268) (0.038) (0.060) (0.039) (0.039) (0.046) (0.050)
Fixed Rate −5.134∗∗∗
(1.973)
Panel B: Client Receiving Fixed
Mean Interactions
Hedge Fund GSE Bank Insurance/Pension Central/Municipal Nonfinancial
Constant 25.745∗∗∗ 6.557 4.685 36.978∗∗∗ 15.714∗∗∗ 10.978∗∗
(3.986) (4.011) (4.002) (3.987) (4.328) (4.399)
Level 0.018 −0.048∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗ −0.175∗∗∗ −0.157∗∗∗ −0.047∗∗
(0.055) (0.017) (0.022) (0.018) (0.018) (0.022) (0.023)
Slope −0.034 0.116∗ −1.658∗∗∗ −1.583∗∗∗ −0.180∗∗∗ 2.264∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.062) (0.091) (0.067) (0.063) (0.104) (0.072)
Curvature −0.614∗ 1.010∗∗∗ 5.495∗∗∗ −0.379∗∗∗ 1.015∗∗∗ 11.627∗∗∗ −0.454∗∗∗
(0.356) (0.127) (0.177) (0.130) (0.129) (0.427) (0.155)
PV01 7.818∗∗∗ 4.522∗∗∗ −0.690 −14.097∗∗∗ −6.226∗∗∗ 2.698∗∗∗ 6.190∗∗∗
(1.895) (0.832) (1.313) (0.883) (0.855) (0.965) (0.935)
Log Tenor −0.994∗∗∗ −0.165∗∗∗ −0.173∗∗ 0.683∗∗∗ 0.840∗∗∗ 0.378∗∗∗ 0.113∗
(0.375) (0.052) (0.074) (0.054) (0.054) (0.062) (0.066)
Fixed Rate 7.399∗∗∗
(2.395)
Structural demand estimates of the swap choice model of Section 1.6.2. The Mean column
shows the choice coefficients for the second-stage regression (equation 1.13). The Interaction
columns show the choice coefficients of the first-stage joint likelihood (equation 1.15) for the
interactions between the type dummies and the product characteristics. For the first-stage
specification error robust standard errors are reported. For the second stage, bootstrapped
standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 1.7: Structural Demand Estimates – Quantity (Continuous Choice)
Client Paying Fixed Client Receiving Fixed
Characteristics










Log Tenor -0.872*** -0.948***
(0.006) (0.016)
Type Dummies












Other Financials 18.280*** 18.124***
(0.011) (0.246)
Structural demand estimates of the swap quantity model of Section 1.6.2.
Hedge Fund, GSE, Bank, Insurance/Pension, Central/Municipal, Nonfinan-
cial and Other Financials show the coefficients of the first-stage joint likeli-
hood on the type dummies. The rest of the rows show the coefficients of the
first-stage joint likelihood on product characteristics. The standard errors
reported in parentheses are specification error robust standard errors from
the maximum likelihood estimation.
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Table 1.8: Structural Demand Estimates – Covariance Structure Between Discrete and
Continuous Choice








Structural demand estimates of the covariance structure between the discrete and continuous
choice following equation (1.15). The standard errors reported in parentheses are specification
error robust standard errors from the maximum likelihood estimation.
at the CCP and reduce the posted margin. I find that a one percentage point increase
in the 5-year CDS spread increases the cost of capital by more than 2.204% per unit
of margin. The specification of column (1) suffers from omitted variable bias if, for
example, dealer banks face a binding regulatory constraint with a positive shadow cost.
In columns (2)–(5) of Table 1.9, I narrow my focus to the trades that are intermediated
by regulated entities. More specifically, I pick a subsample of the trades by dealers
who are required to report their SLR and LCR. There has been a heated debate, both
in academic literature and among practitioners, on the relevance of these regulatory
ratios for the dealer’s ability to provide liquidity in the swap market (Goulding (2019);
Boyarchenko et al. (2018); Haynes et al. (2018)). By LCR rule, since early 2013, banks
must hold at least as much high quality liquid assets (HQLA) as their projected cash
outflows during a specific stress scenario of typically 30 days. By SLR rule, large US
banks are required to hold 3% of common equity capital against their on-balance sheet
assets and off-balance sheet exposures, whereas GSIFI must hold an extra 2% buffer.
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Table 1.9: Marginal Cost of Capital For IRS Dealers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dealer CDS Spread 2.204∗∗∗ 1.137∗∗∗ 0.398∗ 1.239∗∗∗ 1.074∗∗∗
(0.375) (0.181) (0.214) (0.193) (0.185)
Log Assets −12.146∗∗∗ −12.551∗∗∗ −12.599∗∗∗ −12.152∗∗∗
(0.722) (0.720) (0.755) (0.721)
Supplementary Leverage Ratio (SLR) 1.089∗∗∗ 1.073∗∗∗ 1.127∗∗∗ 1.090∗∗∗
(0.118) (0.119) (0.119) (0.118)
Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) 0.089∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
CDS x SLR 0.873∗∗∗
(0.144)
CDS x LCR 0.039∗∗∗
(0.014)
CDS x End of Quarter 0.594∗∗
(0.271)
Client Type Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y
Time Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y
Dealer Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y
Bucket-Index Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y
Leg Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y Y
Adjusted R2 0.155 0.176 0.178 0.177 0.176
Num. obs. 795, 032 555, 968 555, 968 555, 968 555, 968
An observation is a swap product-client type-dealer-leg. Dependent variable is the marginal
cost per unit of margin in percents. Dealer CDS Spread is the 5-year CDS spread of the dealer
in percents. Log Assets is the logarithm of total assets if the dealer is a bank. Supplementary
Leverage Ratio and Liquidity Coverage Ratio are the corresponding ratios (in percents) if the
dealer is a regulated bank. End of Quarter is a dummy equal to 1 if the trade date lies within
the last two weeks of a reporting quarter. Two-way clustered (by time and dealer) standard
errors are reported in parentheses.
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More than 91% of the trades in IRS market go through GSIFI or one of their affiliates.
Consequently, we should expect these ratios to be natural determinants of the shadow
cost of capital for the intermediaries in the D2C IRS market. On top of these ratios, I
include the logarithm of total assets as a natural choice for the shadow cost of capital,
following the literature on intermediary asset pricing (He and Krishnamurthy (2013);
He and Krishnamurthy (2018)).
In column (2) of Table 1.9, I report the regression of marginal capital costs on the
CDS spread, logarithm of assets, SLR, and LCR. The estimates show that a 1 unit in-
crease in logarithm of the total assets decreases the marginal cost by 12 percents. Even
though the magnitude of the effect of CDS spread is smaller compared to the uncondi-
tional case of (1), it is still statistically and economically significant. Furthermore, recall
that the effective marginal cost per unit of margin can be written as cemc = SD + $λ.
The coefficient on the 5-year CDS spread in column (2) is 1.137, which confirms the
relevance of the dealer’s funding spread for explaining the marginal cost of capital. I
also find that a 1 percentage point increase in the SLR translates into a 1.09% increase
in the marginal cost of capital per unit of margin. This is in line with the intuition
that a tighter SLR makes the intermediation of interest rate swaps more costly for the
dealers. Furthermore, the results shed light on the magnitude of the shadow cost of
regulatory constraints for the bank-affiliated dealers. Andersen et al. (2019) estimate
a shadow cost of 30 basis points per dollar of assets for regulatory constraints. For the
sake of comparison, recall that the shadow cost of regulatory capital in my model is
λ. From column (2), I get λ̂ = 1.089, which is orders of magnitude larger than those
suggested by Kisin and Manela (2016). I find a much smaller impact of LCR constraint
on the shadow cost: a 1 percentage point increase in the LCR is associated with 8.9
percentage points increase in the shadow cost.
To see how these estimates relate to the realized fixed rates of the clients, first
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recall that the effective marginal cost can be written as c (k) = (SD +$λ) m̃ (k). A
one percentage-point increase in the SLR results in an increase of 2.2 basis points in
the fixed rates for paying-fixed swaps, equivalent to a 1.3% increase in the end users’
hedging costs. The same change would lead to a 1.2% reduction in the end-users’
hedging costs for receiving-fixed swaps. This amounts to $1.5 billion additional annual
costs of hedging for the clients in my sample.
In column (3)–(5) of Table 1.9, I study the heterogeneity of the effect of cost de-
terminants across dealers (columns (3) and (4)) and across time periods (column (5)).
In column (3), I use the interaction between the (demeaned) CDS spread with the (de-
meaned) SLR, whereas in column (4), I use the interaction between the (demeaned)
CDS spread and the (demeaned) LCR. I find that the effect of the SLR constraint
is more pronounced for those dealers whose external funding is more expensive. For
higher levels of LCR, the shadow cost of capital increases.
As the last exercise, for the specification of column (5) of Table 1.9, I interact the
CDS spread with an End of Quarter dummy, which is an indicator of a trade’s being
executed at any time during the last two weeks of a quarter. Du et al. (2019) and
Goulding (2019) show that covered interest rate parity deviations exhibit a pronounced
increase toward the quarter-ends, and they find this as evidence of balance sheet con-
straints especially due to the quarterly regulatory filings. In the spirit of these papers,
I set the End of Quarter dummy equal to 1 if and only if the trading date lies within
the last two weeks of a reporting quarter. The results of column (5) of Table 1.9 show
that the effect of the funding spread is about 35% more pronounced during the last two
weeks of the reporting quarter. This implies that, as the need for liquidity increases at
the quarter ends, the cost of external funding is also higher. This conclusion adds to the
debate on the drivers of quarter end anomalies (Du et al. (2019)), as it reminds us that
it is not only the balance sheet constraints that are more binding closer to the reporting
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deadlines, but the sources of funding might be less abundant during those times as well,
which makes the capital-intensive business of intermediaries more constrained at the
quarter ends.
1.8 Conclusion
In this paper, I study the market structure for dealer-to-client cleared interest rate
swaps. The exploratory analysis shows that the market making activity is concentrated
among a few dealers who are mostly regulated banks. Recent clearing mandates and
their inevitable margin requirements have increased the demand by these dealers for
highly liquid collateral. At the same time, a series of regulatory capital requirements has
caused the market making activity for regulated bank-affiliated dealers more challenging
in that they have increased the balance sheet costs of taking new swap trades.
I model the demand for swaps in this market using a differentiated demand frame-
work. By structurally estimating this model, I find a notable heterogeneity in the taste
for swaps among different client types. Further, I use these estimates to control for the
price elasticity in a optimal pricing equation for the dealers. This allows me to decom-
pose the deviations of the fixed rates from the fair coupon rates into marginal cost and
markups. Finally, using the estimates of the marginal cost, I find that both the funding
spread of the dealers and the regulatory constraints of the dealers are relevant factors
for determining the marginal cost of intermediation.
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Chapter 2: Trading Against the Random Expiration of
Private Information: A Natural Experiment
Mohammadreza Bolandnazar, Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Wei Jiang, Joshua Mitts12
2.1 Introduction
For more than two decades, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has pro-
vided investors with access to securities filings containing market-moving information
through its Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval, or EDGAR, system,
which is available through the SEC’s website. And for years – unbeknownst to law-
makers and the public – a small group of private investors has been given early access
to these filings before they were widely released via EDGAR. A government contractor
operating a platform known as the Public Dissemination Service, or PDS, distributed
SEC filings to a small number of paying subscribers moments before they reached the
1Wei Jiang is from Columbia Business School. Joshua Mitts is at Columbia Law School and
Columbia Business School. Robert J. Jackson Jr. is at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.
This paper subsumes a previously distributed working paper entitled “How Quickly Do Markets Learn?
Private Information Dissemination in a Natural Experiment.” The authors thank two anonymous
referees, and Associate Editor, the Editor (Stefan Nagel), Jennifer Arlen, Ian Ayres, Lucian Bebchuk,
Emiliano Catan, John Coffee, Martijn Cremers, Slava Fos, Merritt Fox, Lawrence Glosten, Jeffrey
Gordon, Kevin Haeberle, Scott Hemphill, Charles Jones, Peter Koudijs, Jonathan Macey, Roberta
Romano, Sarath Sanga, Richard Squire and Paul Tetlock for helpful discussions and suggestions. This
project has benefited a great deal from feedback at seminars and conferences at the AFA, Columbia,
Harvard, NYU, Peking University, Pittsburgh, and Yale. We are grateful to the Ira M. Millstein Center
for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership for financial support that made our PDS subscription,
and this research, possible. We thank Brian Benvenisty, Like Chen, Yiting Xu, and especially Cong
Liu for excellent research assistance. Jackson is on public service leave from the New York University
School of Law and completed his work on this study before taking office as a Commissioner at the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The views expressed here are solely his own and do not
necessarily reflect those of the other commissioners or the SEC’s staff.
2This paper has been published in the Journal of Finance, 2020, 75, 5–44,DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12844.
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public. In October 2014, the Wall Street Journal exposed the issue,3 drawing immediate
demands from Members of Congress that the SEC examine the problem. Two months
later, SEC Chairman Mary Jo White pledged to Congress that the Commission would
quickly eliminate PDS subscribers’ advantage.4
There is no evidence that either the SEC, or the government contractor, was acting
opportunistically. Instead, the issue apparently reflected a lack of engineering coordina-
tion between the public website and the PDS feed (for more details, see Section 2.2.1).
Nevertheless, the episode provides a rare lab-like setting for studying how speculators
trade on, and how the stock market processes, private information which expires at a
random time. Moreover, the informed traders can form an expectation about the length
of the delay based on factors that are also exogenous to the traders’ behavior, allowing
us to identify the causal impact of expected delay on trading patterns. Specifically, the
setting gives us the following two features that are typically not available to researchers.
First, we can observe both the arrival time and the content of private informa-
tion. While the theoretical literature (pioneered by Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Kyle
(1985)) has developed a standard framework for how securities prices incorporate pri-
vate information through the work of informed traders, there have been relatively few
empirical tests of these important theories based on private information with well-
identified content and timing. That is because private information is, by definition, not
public knowledge; thus, neither the timing of its arrival, nor its content, is generally
observable by econometricians.5 In our setting, we observe the exact time when the
3A Wall Street Journal article published on October 30, 2014 entitled “Fast traders are getting
data from SEC seconds early: studies show lag in posting to website” (by Scott Patterson and Ryan
Tracy) was the first to reveal the PDS advantage to the public. Before this issue was revealed, Jackson
and Mitts subscribed to the PDS service in order to study the effects of the early dissemination of
market-moving information. They provided a detailed analysis of the timing of the delivery of filings
through the SEC’s systems that was featured in that article.
4Chairman White’s letter, sent in December 2014, specified that the SEC would, by early 2015,
“implement an enhancement to our system...to ensure that EDGAR filings are available to the public
on the SEC website before such filings are made available to PDS subscribers.”
5Cornell and Sirri (1992) is an exception, providing a clinical study of an illegal insider trading case
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information arrives to a small group of investors (the time at which the filing reaches
PDS subscribers) and the exact content of the information (the filings) the investors
receive.
Second, we can measure how long informed traders have the information before the
filings reach the public. As explained in detail below, the duration of the “private win-
dow” in our setting varies randomly purely due to technical limitations of the EDGAR
system. Our data confirm that the only factor that explains a significant portion of
the variance in the length of the delay is the time of day, presumably because it is
correlated with the volume of traffic on the servers. Critically, the delay was beyond
the control of both the filers and the speculators and is not correlated with the variables
of interest. This unique source of exogenous variation allows us to draw causal infer-
ences about both the trading process of speculators and how market prices incorporate
private information based on the expected length of the delay.
To provide a unified framework for our empirical tests, we develop a model of in-
formed trading with a random stopping time–but a known hazard rate from an expo-
nential distribution. The model is closely related to Caldentey and Stacchetti (2010),
with modifications designed to fit the institutional features of our setting. In Caldentey
and Stacchetti (2010), an insider has perfect knowledge of the real-time value of the
security, which follows a diffusion process. In contrast, our model features an insider’s
attempt to learn about the fixed liquidation value over time. Such a variation fits our
setting more closely because the fundamental value of a security is unlikely to change
during an interval of a few minutes and insiders may keep refining their estimation
of the true value by processing the leaked filings, knowing that the privilege of the
private information could end at a random time over which the insiders can form an
expectation.
using ex post court records.
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We next develop several empirical measures that closely track the parameters in our
model. Expected delay is the predicted delay in which time (hour) of the day is the
primary determinant. Trading intensity is captured by total trades and by directional
trades (buying or selling in the “right” direction based on both the dollar value and the
trade count). Consistent with the model’s predictions, we find that when the expected
delay is longer, insiders trade less, both in terms of the dollar value of the trades and
the number of trades. In addition, when the expected delay is longer, insiders take
more time to submit the first trade after the leakage. Moreover, both the information
content and the ease of information processing of the different types of filings affect
trading speed and intensity. Schedule 13D filings6, which tend to generate more sizable
abnormal returns upon public announcement (as compared to, e.g., Form 4 filings) and
which are relatively straightforward to process (as compared to, e.g., Form 8-K filings),
induce the fastest and most intense trading during the private window.
Finally, we take advantage of this unique opportunity to test the standard insider
trading models. Consistent with Kyle (1985), we find that speculators trade more ag-
gressively when the value-price divergence is larger, when the filing entails high informa-
tion content (measured ex ante or ex post), and when the market is deeper (measured
ex ante or in real time). We also observe that trading via limit orders is preferred to
trading via market orders when there is more time (that is, when the expected delay is
longer), and when the market-wide trading volume is high and volatility is low. Though
insiders attempt to smooth out the price impact of their trading, we find that informa-
tion disseminates faster among large cap, high turnover stocks, and when the overall
market experiences more trading activities.
Our study makes a distinct contribution to the vast literature on information trans-
mission and asset pricing (for comprehensive surveys, see Easley and O’Hara (2003),
6Schedule 13D provides disclosure of beneficial ownership greater than 5% by investors with an
intention to influence corporate policies and control.
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Biais et al. (2005), and Tetlock (2014)) by making usually unobservable private in-
formation the subject of our empirical tests. Financial markets play a fundamental
role in the aggregation of information and the allocation of investment capital (Bond
et al. (2012)). Our study offers a peek into the microstructure of how the stock market
performs these roles.
Importantly, our study complements, but is distinct from, several recent papers that
assess the relationship between the distribution of information to investors through the
internet and price discovery (Bauguess et al. (2013), Drake et al. (2015), Loughran and
McDonald (2017)). Most notably, the subject of our study is private – rather than
public – information. Two other recent working papers analyze market responses to
private information before its public release (Hu et al. (2017) and Rogers et al. (2017)).
The latter, in particular, was motivated by the same episode, covers a larger sample but
only one type of SEC filing (Form 4), and focuses on the abnormal returns associated
with the leakage. Unlike our study, the papers do not develop or test microstructure
theories using trade-level data. Moreover, none of these studies incorporates or explores
the random variations in the duration of the private-information window.
The recent work most relevant to our study is Collin-Dufresne and Fos (2015) and
Koudijs (2015a,b), both of which adopt ingenious research designs to identify the path
of private information and its effect on stock prices. Our design differs from that of
Collin-Dufresne and Fos (2015) in that the private information in our study relates to
the financial and operational – that is, the fundamental – condition of the firm itself.
By contrast, the private information studied in Collin-Dufresne and Fos (2015) is about
the trader’s intention to intervene. As a result, both the creation and duration of
the private information are endogenous to the informed trader, which imply critically
different strategic behaviors in trading on private information as theoretically modeled
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by Back et al. (2018).7
Our study complements work by Koudijs (2015a,b), which uses boats carrying mail
between London and Amsterdam during the 18th century as the conduit for informa-
tion flow to the stock exchanges in both cities to uncover the strategic behavior of
informed traders. In that setting, the exogenous variation in expected delay was driven
by weather conditions, while today, electronic information dissemination is the 21st-
century equivalent of boats carrying news. In both settings, information dissemination
slows down with long expected delays. Therefore, the two papers support each other.
The novel contribution of our study lies in that we observe both the actual content
of the private information as well as the trading patterns at the individual securities
level and at a high frequency (by seconds). We are thus able to study how information
reaches and is processed by markets via trades at a level that is infeasible using his-
torical data. Finally, we believe that studying similar episodes from these two distant
eras offers new and complementary insights on the fundamentals of informed trading
as well as how stock markets have evolved.
2.2 Institutional Background, Sample Data, and Summary Statistics
2.2.1 Institutional background and data sources
U.S. securities laws impose rigid rules on publicly traded companies, requiring these
firms to disclose material information about themselves to investors in a timely manner.
These disclosures are typically provided in the form of securities filings submitted to the
SEC. As a result, the SEC has become a central repository for information that moves
markets. Specifically, the SEC’s EDGAR system is the central portal through which
7The duration of the private window is largely endogenous to the informed trader, the activist, in
their setting for two reasons. First, the informed trader can stay just below 5% if they do not wish to
disclose, and will choose when to cross the 5% threshold strategically. Second, after crossing 5%, the
disclosure time remains a choice to the informed trader within the ten-day window. Bebchuk et al.
(2013) show empirically the heterogeneity of disclosure timing by the activists.
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firms can disclose, and investors can retrieve, new information which could potentially
affect a firm’s fundamental value.
Prior to the discovery of the discrepancy studied here, when a company electronically
submitted a securities filing to the SEC, the filing was distributed to three locations.
The first one is the SEC’s file transfer protocol (FTP) server. The FTP system is
simply a repository of files which can be downloaded on demand once located. Each
filer has its own “directory,” and new filings are deposited there immediately. But with
tens of thousands of filers (directories), it was impossible to know where the next filing
would appear, and the effort required to scrape all directories would likely have defeated
the lead in time the FTP server provided over the EDGAR website. The PDS system
solved this problem; it was intentionally engineered to rapidly “push” new filings to
subscribers in real time.
Upon the submission of a new filing, the private contractor operating the PDS
service distributed the filing to a small group of about forty subscribers at a cost of
approximately $15,000 per year.8 Then, the filing was uploaded to the SEC’s EDGAR
system, which is available to the investing public through the SEC’s website. While
in theory these systems should have operated simultaneously, technical limitations led
to random delays between the time when filings reached the SEC’s FTP server, the
time they were distributed to PDS subscribers, and when they were made available
to the public on EDGAR. In particular, the length of the delay before filings reached
the EDGAR website over the period we study ranged from a few seconds to as long as
several minutes.
The principal data, containing the exact timestamps of filings arriving at different
portals, is from Jackson and Mitts (2014)9 and covers the period from June 25 to
8As is standard for government-provided services, the contractor is expected to price close to costs,
which explains the seemingly modest subscription fee.
9We obtained the EDGAR website timestamp by monitoring the RSS version of the “Latest Filings”
feed that the SEC provides to the public. The FTP timestamp was obtained by querying the FTP
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October 15, 2014. Our data for delivery to PDS subscribers begins on August 1, 2014,
and continues through October 15, 2014. Using the overlapping part of the sample, we
found that the FTP and PDS timestamps were almost identical, featuring differences
of no more than a few seconds and a median absolute difference of one second. As such,
we use the FTP timestamp as a proxy for the time advantage of the “early informed”
in order to preserve a larger sample.
The closeness of the two timestamps (FTP vs. PDS) is not a coincidence but is
the outcome of the infrastructure of the system. Neither FTP nor PDS involves an
“intermediary” (a public website). On the other hand, the EDGAR website is the
only place where the general public can find new securities filings (without knowing
in advance which firms have filed); but because the website contains an entire user
interface, it is systematically slower. When a high number of filings are submitted
within a very short time, the exact order in which they appear online is as good as
random from the standpoint of each user. Even if some issuers choose the time of day
when they upload their filings–which, as explained below, is correlated with the average
delay–the actual delay is beyond the control of the speculators, who are the key players
in our analyses. The Appendix 2.6.3 provides more technical details.
Our sample period ends immediately before the public revelation of the PDS-public
time gap, which shrank precipitously afterwards (though it did not completely disap-
pear). Figure 1 shows the percentage of filings released to PDS before EDGAR from
August 2014 to May 2015 using a “heatmap” that monitored the situation in real time
during that period.
Our study builds on the premise that some of the early-informed traded to their
server for the last modified date of the filing. The PDS timestamp was obtained by recording the exact
time a filing was delivered to the PDS subscription.
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Figure 2.1: PDS-EDGAR Delay Heatmap: August 2014 to May 2015
This heatmap monitors the percentage of filings released to PDS before EDGAR from August
2014 to May 2015. The continuous monitoring was maintained by two of the authors (Jackson
and Mitts).
advantage. Anecdotal evidence suggests that a few hedge funds were among the PDS
subscribers, including the fact that Rogers et al. (2017) obtained their data from an
anonymous hedge fund. Moreover, both Jackson and Mitts (2014) and Rogers et al.
(2017) document abnormal returns prior to the public release of filings, for which in-
formed trading is the most likely cause. We further strengthen this premise in Section
2.2.3 by documenting the abnormal trading volume at the second-by-second level during
the private window. Throughout our analysis of this unique setting, we also maintain
the standard assumption in the insider trading literature that the early-informed trade
monopolistically, rather than competitively. In reality, including our setting, it is rea-
sonable to expect that at least a few players will have access to private information and
will trade with the knowledge that they are not the sole recipients of the information.
Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) shows that informed trades become more aggressive
quickly even with modest competition. We believe that the competition does not lead
to near-instant revelation of private information for at least two reasons.
First, the group of early-informed investors is expected to be small relative to the
number of all market participants. The PDS service had about forty paying subscribers
during this period. There is anecdotal evidence suggesting that a few of these PDS sub-
scribers were wire services;10 however, the end-users of the wire services likely did not
10The SEC declined to provide a list of subscribers. According to news reports, the group of PDS
subscribers includes a few financial news and data providers, see “Gap narrows in access to SEC filings”
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have real-time access to the original filings. These wire services disseminate brief sum-
maries of the original filing quickly, but by the time these services are able to write
and post news articles, the filings are typically available on the EDGAR website. Al-
ternatively, utilizing the FTP server to detect unexpected filings is technically difficult.
An interested investor would be required to navigate, without any delay, to the server
directory associated with a particular firm. Because it is difficult to know ex ante which
firms will file unexpected or unscheduled filings – which constitute about 95% of our
sample – we think that the number of investors who had early access to filings via FTP
was relatively small.11 Finally, the few informed traders in our setting were clearly
aware of both the circumstance which afforded them the advantage and size of the
informed group (even though they did not necessarily know the identities of the other
members). In what is essentially a repeated game, they may also have an incentive to
trade less aggressively as the models of competition suggest.
Second, in our model the insiders gradually learn about the true value, about which
their estimates likely differ at any given time, even based on the same leaked filing.
Therefore, though Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) predicts that “common private
information” will be incorporated into prices very quickly with competition, the in-
formed trading in our setting will be more gradual and prolonged given the potentially
(by Andrew Ackerman, Scott Patterson, and Ryan Tracy), Wall Street Journal, November 3, 2014.
One explanation for the low number of subscribers may simply be that it was not public knowledge
that the PDS channel was systematically faster than the EDGAR website; there is, after all, no reason
to expect that a government-contracted service would create such an advantage, and, for the same
reason, there was no marketing effort to promote PDS on the basis of its time advantage. Moreover,
the surprise with which the public reacted to its revelation is consistent with our hypothesis that the
advantage was not well-known. Please see Appendix 2.6.3 for more discussions.
11It is possible, however, to observe, ex post, the time that a filing is deposited on the FTP server.
Indeed, the authors used this process to identify the FTP timestamps used in this study. After the
public revelation of the delay in posting filings to the EDGAR website, however, the authors’ requests
to FTP servers were frequently denied during the trading day. The SEC’s servers responded to these
requests with an error message stating that the maximum number of clients allowed on the FTP
server (50) were already connected. By contrast, similar requests before the public revelation of this
issue were never denied due to server overload. These facts suggest that relatively few investors were
attempting to access the FTP server during the period that we study – and that more investors started
to pursue access via FTP after the PDS advantage was revealed to the public.
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different interpretation of the information embedded in the filings.
2.2.2 Sample
To set the stage for sample construction, we define the following key points in the
timeline of events with respect to each individual filing:
t1: The PDS/FTP timestamp, or the time when the “early informed” receive the
information.
t2: The EDGAR timestamp, or the time when the filing becomes public. The
difference (t2 − t1) is thus the length of the “private window,” or the time lag during
which the information remains private. We take note that companies occasionally issue
press releases prior to formal SEC filings. Importantly, this possibility would make it
less likely to find any results, as the incremental information content of some filings
may have already been reduced by the time the filing reaches PDS subscribers. In any
event, for robustness we use the Dow Jones Newswires database to verify whether there
are newswires featuring the filing firms with timestamps ahead of the public release on
EDGAR on the same day, and we found this to be true for less than 0.1% of the filings.
Setting t2 to be the later of the newswire and EDGAR timestamps does not change our
results in any noticeable way, as discussed in Appendix 2.6.3.
t3: A time proxy for the end of the period (t2, t3) during which public investors are
given adequate opportunities to trade on the information revealed by the SEC filing. We
set t3 to be t1 +15 min, a time that is independent of the delay (t2−t1) and incorporates
over 10 minutes of time during which the information could be publicly digested. The
full information contained in the filing may or may not be fully revealed in price by
t3; for example, Huang et al. (2016) show that the full day after a news release is the
day during which institutional investors exhibit significant abnormal trading volume.
However, because privately-informed status is not necessary for trading on information
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post t2, the firm’s stock price shortly after public release, i.e., at t3, is a plausible proxy
for the relevant “terminal value” for speculators. This is also consistent with the view
of Foucault et al. (2016) that “fast traders” do not care about the long-term effects of
information, but just want to trade against the market reaction to the public release of
news.
Our entire dataset includes 101,555 securities disclosures that public companies
electronically filed with the SEC from June 25 to October 15, 2014, with the exception
of July 15, 2014, as technical difficulties with connecting to the SEC’s systems prevented
us from collecting data on that day. We limit our sample to only those filings made
by publicly-traded firms by linking a filer’s CIK identifier and its exchange ticker to its
entry in CRSP/Compustat. In addition, we remove filings that arrived on the EDGAR
website prior to the FTP server, i.e., when there is no private window, which occurred
occasionally due to the random nature of the delay. These filters reduce our sample to
42,619 filings, which constitute our “Initial Sample.”
The distribution of Delay, or t2−t1, is highly right-skewed in the Initial Sample. The
median delay is 26 seconds, with an interquartile range of 7 to 172 seconds. We impose
an additional filter for sample inclusion that Delay must not exceed 466 seconds, or the
90th percentile value. Trimming these outliers not only limits the influence of extreme
observations but also takes into account the possibility that the monitoring script may
have periodically “hung” due to server overload, introducing erroneous and implausible
delays into the data. We believe that the top decile reflects a conservative estimate
of delays that are likely to be erroneous, but our results are robust using a reasonable
lower cutoff. Such trimming leaves us with the “Trimmed Sample” of 38,352 filings,
which we will refer to broadly as “our sample.” The exact number of observations in
the regressions are slightly lower and varying depending on the matching of the filings
to the Trade and Quote (TAQ) database and individual variable availability.
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Our sample consists of 18% Form 8-K filings (involving disclosure of material corpo-
rate events); 51% Form 4 filings (disclosure of insiders’ trades in the company’s stock;
current U.S. securities law requires insiders to provide such disclosure within 48 hours of
each trade); 1% Schedule 13D filings (disclosure of beneficial ownership of 5% or more;
current law requires this Schedule to be filed within 10 days after the investor crosses
the 5% threshold); and 30% other, miscellaneous types (such as 10-Q filings). A great
majority (over 95%) of the filings in this sample are non-scheduled: that is, they are
contingent on unanticipated events rather than a predetermined filing date. This is not
surprising because scheduled filings, such as Forms 10-Q and 10-K, are relatively few by
construction per year/quarter while the number of non-scheduled filings is potentially
unlimited. Thus, investors could not have anticipated the arrival of the overwhelming
majority of the filings we study.
2.2.3 Summary statistics
The key variable in our analyses is Delay, the time difference between the private and
public release of filings. While it is largely random in the sense that the exact delay is
out of the control of the informed traders as well as the issuers, its aggregate statistics
does seem to be affected by the total volume of submissions to, and the traffic on, the
SEC’s EDGAR servers at each point in time. As a result, there is a distinct pattern of
expected delay in relation to the time of day of the filing. Figure 2 demonstrates this
daily pattern with a plot of the average (t2−t1) by hourly bins from 6:00am to 11:00pm
as well as the intensity of filings throughout the day. The average delay reaches its peak
(over 150 seconds) right after 4:00pm EST, the close of the trading day on the formal
market – presumably a time with high filing traffic, causing delays in the transmission
of filings to the public EDGAR servers.
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Figure 2.2: Average FTP-Public Delay and Filing Intensity throughout the Trading
Day
On the left vertical axis, this figure shows the average delay in the public release of all filings
with the SEC during the sample period of June 25, 2014 to October 15, 2014 (excluding
July 15, 2014) by hourly intervals in the Trimmed Sample. The delay is calculated as the
difference in time, in seconds, between the SEC’s file transfer protocol (FTP) timestamp
for the filing—a proxy for the actual time that filings reach the subscribers to the Public
Dissemination Service (PDS)—and the SEC’s Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and
Retrieval System (EDGAR) timestamp (the actual time when filings are released to the
public). On the right vertical axis, the figure shows the percentage of all filings in the
Trimmed Sample that occur during each hour. The Trimmed Sample contains all filings
censored at the 90th percentile of delay, or 466 seconds, as longer delays could be due
measurement errors due to “server hang.”
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Trades take place before the market opens at 9:30am and continue after the close
of the market at 4:00pm. These after-hours trades, including pre-open (8:00–9:30am)
and post-close (4:00–6:30pm), are not a recent phenomenon; trades have been exe-
cuted regularly during these hours on electronic communications networks (ECNs) for
decades. For example, Barclay and Hendershott (2003) document that, among the 250
highest-volume stocks on the Nasdaq exchange in 2000, about 2.5% of the trading vol-
ume occurs pre-open and another 5.5% post-close. After-hours trades account for 9.6%
of the trades in our sample.
Table 1 Panel A reports the summary statistics of the filing and security character-
istics. The main variables capturing the leakage events are: length of delay, abnormal
return during the private time window, and bid-ask spread just prior to t1 (the begin-
ning of the private time window). We further report the following three firm variables:
Market capitalization, which is the market capitalization of the issuer at the end of
June 2014; Idiocyncratic vol, the annualized idiosyncratic volatility of the stock cal-
culated as the residual volatility from the Fama and French (1992) three-factor model;
and Share turnover, the daily average share turnover rate. The last two variables
are built using daily data over the 252 trading days prior to June 30, 2014, and are
commonly adopted proxies for the ex ante informativeness of signals, and the level of
noise trading from standard microstructure models.
Finally, we also report three more variables capturing real-time general market con-
ditions. Both market trading volume (in billions of dollars) and the volatility (at the
minute-level frequency, in basis points) of SPY, the ETF that tracks the S&P 500 and
the most actively traded ETF that tracks a major index, are recorded during the hour
to which t1 belongs. The number of SEC filings uploaded during the 20-minute interval
prior to t1 measures both the quantity of new information arrival at the market place
as well as the traffic level of the SEC server.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Panel A: Summary statistics of main variables (based on 36,782 files from the Trimmed Sample)
Mean St. Dev. 25% Median 75% Placebo Mean
Delay 78 111 7 21 108 77
AR (t1, t2) -0.0007% 0.2000% -0.0040% 0.0000% 0.0050% -0.0031%
Spread at t1 2.802 4.638 0.11 0.452 3.349 3.758
Idiosyncratic volatility (Ω0) 0.311 0.220 0.163 0.241 0.380 0.286
Market capitalization 10,234 31,960 287 1,270 5,449 9,689
Share turnover (σy) 0.793 0.885 0.277 0.546 0.931 0.794
Market trading volume 21 20 1 20 31
SPY volatility 2.144 3.576 0.749 1.208 2.018
# filings in the previous 20 minutes 26 17 13 22 35
Panel B: Absolute abnormal returns (|AR(t1, t3)|) by filing types
Trimmed Sample (36,782 filings) Subsample with Price Changes (19,363 filings)
Form Type N Mean Std 25% Median 75% N Mean Std 25% Median 75%
4 18,606 0.17% 1.04% 0.01% 0.04% 0.13% 8,715 0.34% 1.51% 0.06% 0.13% 0.30%
8-K 6,493 0.62% 2.29% 0.02% 0.07% 0.35% 3,812 1.13% 3.06% 0.10% 0.30% 0.90%
13D 456 0.56% 1.94% 0.02% 0.08% 0.46% 235 0.99% 2.53% 0.13% 0.38% 0.92%
Other 11,227 0.29% 1.23% 0.02% 0.07% 0.21% 6,601 0.47% 1.58% 0.07% 0.15% 0.39%
Test for the differences (t-statistics)
Form Type Difference t-statistics Difference t-statistics
(8-K) – (4) 0.45% (19.40) 0.79% (17.54)
(13D) – (4) 0.39% (6.88) 0.65% (5.89)
(Other) – (4) 0.12% (8.32) 0.13% (4.80)
This table reports summary statistics (mean, standard deviation, and the quartile values) describing
the delay in the public release of filings by public companies during the sample period of June 25, 2014
to October 15, 2014 (excluding July 15, 2014) in the Trimmed Sample (defined in Figure 2). Delay
is calculated as the difference in time, in seconds, between the posting of the filing to the SEC’s file
transfer protocol (FTP) server (a proxy for the actual time that a filing reaches subscribers to the Public
Dissemination Service (PDS)) and the posting of that filing to the SEC’s Electronic Data Gathering,
Analysis, and Retrieval System (EDGAR) (the actual time at which the filing is publicly released).
Spread at t1 is the bid-ask spread in percentage points just prior to t1, the beginning of the private
window. Idiosyncratic volatility is the annualized residual volatility from the Fama-French three-factor
model using daily return data over all trading days from July 2013 to June 2014 (a 12-month period
prior to the event, or the “training period”). Market capitalization is the market capitalization of the
issuers in millions of dollars, as of the end of June 2014. Share turnover is the average daily share
turnover rate in percentage points during the training period. Market trading volume is the aggregate
trading volume covered by TAQ during the hour to which t1 belongs, and the unit is in billions of
dollars. SPY volatility is the minute-level return volatility of SPY, the ETF that tracks the S&P 500
index, during the hour to which t1 belongs, and the unit is in basis points. # filings in the previous
20 minutes is the number of SEC filings uploaded during the 20-minute interval prior to t1. The
placebo mean column reports the same summary statistics for the placebo sample (defined in Figure
3). Form 8-K provides timely disclosure of material corporate events, Form 4 discloses transactions in
the company’s stock by insiders, and Schedule 13D discloses 5% or greater beneficial ownership with
an intention to influence corporate control or policies, within 10 days after the investor crosses the
5% threshold. Panel B reports the summary statistics of the absolute return, |AR(t1, t3)|, as a proxy
for the value-relevant information content of filings sorted by different filing types, in the Trimmed
Sample and the subsample with price changes during the window [t1, t3], where t1 is the beginning of
the private window and t3 is 15 minutes afterwards.
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Panel B reports the summary statistics of |AR(t1, t3)|, a proxy for the potential
informativeness of the filings, by filing type for both the Trimmed Sample and a sub-
sample requiring a non-zero price change from t1 to t3. In terms of sample means,
Form 8-K filings induce the largest price changes, and Form 4 filings the least. For the
Trimmed Sample, the average Form 8-K will generate an absolute abnormal return of
0.62% 15 minutes after the early release. By contrast, the same number for a Form
4 filing is 0.17%. The standard deviation of the abnormal returns follows the same
pattern. The order of the statistics is preserved if we focus on the subsample with
non-zero price changes during [t1, t3]. Therefore, Form 8-K (Form 4) provides the most
(least) value for trading by early-informed speculators, and the differences between all
other form types and Form 4 is statistically significant at the 1% level.
Since we study informed trading associated with SEC filing leakage, it is important
to establish that there was unusually high trading volume during the private windows.
To this end, we plot the number of trades and dollar value of trades per second, starting
from the first second right after the private release of filings, averaged over all filings in
the Trimmed Sample with kernel smoothing. Figure 3 plots the two graphs with 95%
confidence intervals. The “normal” level of trades, or the benchmark, is set to be the
average from a “placebo sample:” Because the SEC largely fixed the leakage in February
2015 (see Figure 1), the period afterwards provides a valuable out-of-sample venue to
gauge the “counterfactual” trade patterns under the null of no leakage. We generate
the placebo sample by examining all EDGAR filings in March 2015 by publicly traded
companies. For each placebo filing, we randomly sample (with replacement) a delay
from the distribution of t2 − t1 in our Trimmed Sample. This way, the distribution of
delay is identical between the event and placebo samples. Figure 3 shows that trading
volume during the private window is significantly higher than the benchmark in terms
of dollar value of trades, and significant for most part of the delay in terms of number
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of trades. This corroborates the findings of Rogers et al. (2017) that the recipients of
leaked filings enjoyed a potential trading advantage during the period we study.
Lastly, we analyze the determinants of Delay, and show that market-condition
variables, as captured by trading or filing activities or by the hour of the day, are the
most important factors. Table 2 reports regressions for which Delay (in seconds) is the
dependent variable. Columns (1) and (2) analyze the Trimmed Sample while columns
(3) and (4) the “non-zero price change” subsample, i.e., |Pt3 − Pt1| > 0. Moreover,
columns (2) and (4) employ hourly fixed effects. In the Trimmed Sample, hour of
the day alone explains an incremental of 5% of the variation in Delay, while all other
factors combined explain 14.1%. Column (2) shows that, conditional on time of the
day and with the exception of market capitalization, firm characteristics–idiosyncratic
volatility and share turnover–are not related to the length of the private window in any
meaningful way. When a stock rises in market capitalization by one decile, the expected
delay lengthens by about 1.2 seconds. Our best explanation for this relationship is that
large firms are more likely to file in clusters (e.g., via professionals such as law firms)
during busy server times. Nevertheless, this effect is modest relative to the variation in
Delay. File types do not matter, either, once hour of the day is controlled for. However,
market-wide conditions seem to matter. More trading (proxied by total market trading
volume during the hour) and filing (proxied by the number of SEC filings during the last
20 minutes) are both positively related to Delay, presumably because internet traffic is
directly related to filings and is also positively correlated with market trading activities.
However, these factors are exogenous to individual firms, and, more importantly, to the
speculators.
To summarize, the FTP-public delay, conditional on the time of day of the filing,
appears to be largely random. However, the early-informed, i.e., the recipients of the
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Figure 2.3: Trading Volume during the Private Window
Panel A: Number of trades
Panel B: Trades in dollar volume
This figure plots a kernel regression of the number and dollar value of trades in the Trimmed
Sample at the second-level interval during the FTP-public delay, as reported in the TAQ
Trade data. The regression adopts the Gaussian kernel with a bandwidth of 11.33 and
15.35 for Panels A and B, respectively. The dotted lines represent 95% confidence intervals
based on local polynomial approximations. The flat “Benchmark” line shows the average
number of trades per second during March 2015, the placebo period after the PDS gap was
fixed. That is, for each filing in March 2015, we sample a “pseudo delay” drawn from the
distribution of the timing and length of delays in the Trimmed Sample. We then obtain the
number and dollar value of trades over this pseudo time window and plot the unconditional
average number and dollar value of trades per second.
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leaked reports, can form some expectations about the length of private window they
will enjoy. In the later analyses, we will use the model in column (2) of Table 2 to
construct the predicted delay as our proxy for Expected delay.
2.3 A Model of Informed Trading with Random Expiration of Private In-
formation
In this section, we set up a parsimonious model in order to provide a unified structure
for our empirical tests.
2.3.1 Set-up
Our model builds on Caldentey and Stacchetti (2010), which studies strategic trading by
an insider in a security whose value is publicly revealed at a random time, but we modify
the setting in several ways to fit our context more closely. To start, we assume that the





Following the literature, we call speculators who have access to prematurely leaked
SEC filings “insiders.” Moreover, we normalize the private window to [0, τ ], where the
insiders receive the filing at time 0, and τ is a random stopping time triggered by the
public posting of the filing. τ follows an exponential distribution with a hazard rate of
µ. We assume that insiders are perfectly informed about µ. This assumption reflects
the fact that insiders know the factors (notably time of day) that affect the length
of the delay when receiving the leaked report, and, assuming they have knowledge of
the publicly observable predictors in Table 2, they can form an expectation about the
delay.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the insider can form an estimation of
V , the true value of the security, in a two-step process: First, upon receiving the
leaked report at t = 0, the insider immediately obtains a lumpy signal that is partially
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Table 2.2: Predicting the FTP-Public Delay
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Idiosyncratic volatility (Ω0) 5.3554* 2.0781 4.8576 3.0552
(1.69) (0.72) (1.20) (0.78)
Share turnover (σy) -0.4622 -0.8330 -0.3267 -0.9768
(-0.64) (-1.26) (-0.37) (-1.19)
Market cap decile 1.1603*** 1.0213*** 1.5564*** 1.2755***
(3.75) (3.59) (4.10) (3.42)
Market trading volume 4.5507*** 3.7169* 1.9959** 3.9637
(8.33) (1.75) (2.34) (1.32)
SPY volatility 1.0167 0.4292 0.5048 -0.1636
(1.30) (0.91) (0.82) (-0.23)
Number of filings 2.3719*** 1.2195*** 2.1307*** 1.3703***
(25.46) (9.17) (16.37) (9.05)
Form 4 -6.5863*** -2.4902 0.5183 2.3764
(-2.78) (-1.19) (0.22) (1.02)
Form 8-K 5.3629** 2.7125 0.6136 2.9199
(2.07) (1.35) (0.24) (1.27)
Schedule 13D 11.4051 7.2800 1.1423 -0.2964
(1.52) (1.04) (0.18) (-0.05)
Constant -94.3068*** -43.2283 -39.4823* -65.9442
(-7.57) (-0.89) (-1.91) (-0.94)
Hourly fixed effects N Y N Y
Observations 33,318 33,318 18,544 18,544
R-squared 0.141 0.19 0.093 0.124
The dependent variable is Delay, the number of seconds between the time when a filing appears
on FTP and its EDGAR timestamp. All independent variables are as defined in Table 1, except
Market cap decile, which is the market capitalization decile of the issuer, as of the end of June 2014.
Columns (1) and (2) examine all fillings from the Trimmed Sample. Columns (3) and (4) examine the
subsample with price changes. Columns (2) and (4) incorporate hourly fixed effects. T-statistics based
on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered at the filing date level are reported
below the coefficients in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% level, respectively.
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revealing. Second, by investing more time in processing the report, the insider gradually
improves her knowledge, and obtains an estimate of the value that asymptotes toward
the truth with time. Our setup reflects the reality that a trader can often “glance”
at the report (either with human eyes or machine learning) to immediately obtain a
high-level signal such as whether the news is positive or negative; and, with more time,
she can process the signals contained in the report and can continuously refine her
estimate. With the model it is straightfoward to consider the special setting where all
information in the leaked report may be processed instantly at t = 0, but the “gradual
learning” model yields more nuanced predictions as to how trading activities evolve
over time.
Let V̂t denote the insider’s estimation of V at time t ≥ 0. At t = 0+, by “glancing”
at the report, the insider receives a lumpy signal about the true value S ∼ N (V,ΣS),
and updates her belief to V̂0 = ΣSΩ0+ΣS V̄0 +
Ω0
Ω0+ΣS
S. The precision of her belief is denoted







. Moreover, the insider learns the true value gradually: at
each time t ∈ (0, τ), the insider receives a continuous signal, vt, whose dynamic process
is characterized by:
dvt = V dt+ σ̂v (t) dBvt , (2.1)
where Bvt is a Wiener process adapted to natural filtration (not observed by the insider).
As is standard in the literature, we assume that the noisiness of the signal σ̂v (t), is a
deterministic function known to all the market participants. We further assume that
this function is positive and continuous on [0,∞).
The filtration associated with the evolution of insider’s information is denoted by
FI = (F It )t≥0. It is worth noting that the interpretation of the information flow in
our setting differs from that in Caldentey and Stacchetti (2010) in order to better
fit the setting we study. In Caldentey and Stacchetti (2010), the fundamental value
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of the asset per se evolves over time following a Martingale process and the insider
perfectly observes the value of the asset at any point in time. Because we are analyzing
a relatively short time window (mostly a few minutes), we assume that the true value
of the asset is fixed at V , but may or may not be instantly observable by the insider. In
her own eyes, the insider’s best subjective estimation follows an arithmetic Brownian
motion. 12
Other features of our model follow from, or are analogous to, those of Caldentey
and Stacchetti (2010). Specifically, the position or the cumulative trade by the insider
at time t is denoted by Xt. Moreover, we assume that the aggregate demand process
for liquidity traders, follows a Brownian motion Yt = σy (t)Byt where Byt is independent
of Bvt . Also, at each time t ≥ 0, market maker sets a price Pt given his information FMt
which consists of the full history of the price movements as well as the total order flow
Zt = Xt + Yt. We naturally assume that the price process is adapted to the market
maker’s filtration FM = (FMt )t≥0. Finally, a strategy profile is defined as a pair (X,P )
of insider’s trading strategy Xt and market maker’s pricing decision Pt.
The insider’s expected payoff is given by





Pt−dXt − [X,P ]τ
]
. (2.2)
where [X,P ] represents an optional quadratic covariation process, or dPdX.13 The
first term on the right hand side of (2.2) is the value of insider’s holding upon public
announcement, and the two other terms represent the price paid by the insider to
acquire the position as well as total price impact of her orders over time.
On the other side of the trade, the market maker sets the price Pt rationally, con-
12This is isomorphic to the evolution of the fundamental value of the asset in Caldentey and Stac-
chetti (2010) given by Vt = σvBvt .
13The square brackets term accommodates the jump component of a semimartingale so as to preserve
the generality of our admissible trading processes. For more detail on the formal derivation of this
expression, refer to Back (1992) and references therein.
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ditional on his information at any time t. That is, given a trading rule X, the pricing




V |FMt , X
]
. (2.3)
Equation (2.3) indicates that the market maker should set the price to be her best
estimate of the true value V . Because there is no bias in the insider’s estimate, this














Given the pricing rule P , the trading rule X is optimal if it maximizes the insider’s
payoff, given by (2.3). The equilibrium is thus defined as a pair of (X,P ) in which the
trading rule X is optimal given P and that the pricing rule P is rational given X.
2.3.2 Insider trading strategy






as the variance of the insider’s estimation error at time t ≥ 0. A direct application of












= −d[V̂t V̂t]t. (2.5)









, ∀t > 0. (2.6)
Equation (3.3) reflects the intuition that the precision of the insider’s knowledge
about the true value at any time t is the cumulative precision of the gradual signals
plus the precision of the initial signal. This enables us to analyze the dynamics of the
remaining uncertainty in the insider’s estimation based on the amount of information
she has received so far and the amount that is left to be revealed.
At each point in time, the total uncertainty of the market maker consists of two
components: first, the uncertainty the insider has about the true value of the asset
and second, the uncertainty the market maker has about the insider’s best estimation






as the variance of the







as the time-t uncertainty of the market marker about the true value.
It follows by variance decomposition that Ωt = Σt+Γt. Next, by focusing on the pricing
and learning decision by the market maker, we can see how the composition of the total
uncertainty evolves over time.
We restrict our attention solely to a linear Markovian equilibrium analogous to the
framework in Caldentey and Stacchetti (2010) (Section 5). More specifically, the price
and trading dynamics follow







We assume that βt and λt are continuous on [0,∞), which represent trading intensity
in response to expected price-value gap, and the price impact of incremental order
flow, respectively. The inverse of λ thus proxies for market depth. Furthermore, we
require that λt be differentiable on (0,∞). The following Proposition I characterizes
the equilibrium.














Proof. Please see Appendix 2.6.1.
It is worth noting that in our setting, Γt is the amount of uncertainty in the true
value that remains to be resolved by the insider as she receives additional signals going
forward. In comparison, the insider in Caldentey and Stacchetti (2010) observes the
true value in real time, but faces uncertainty about the ultimate asset value. Vt, which
14This is a technical condition to ensure that the insider learns “early enough” to rule out another
class of equilibrium (Caldentey and Stacchetti (2010) and Bolandnazar (2018)) in which the insider
trades overly impatiently. Note that in our model the time path of insider’s information prevision is
exogenous to his trading behavior, hence Γt does not bear an inherent relation with Ω0. As a result,
this condition is external to the mechanism of the model.
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represents the dynamically evolving fundamental value of the asset in Caldentey and
Stacchetti (2010), plays a similar role to V̂t in our setup, i.e., the insider’s best prediction
of the true value. The proposition reveals several interesting and testable implications.
Prediction One: Trading intensity, βt, is increasing in µ, or decreasing in the length
of expected delay.
Proof. Please see Appendix 2.6.1.
Intuitively, with a higher hazard rate to the expiration of private information, the
insider runs a higher risk of losing her information advantage, and hence trades more
aggressively on her information at any given time. Before deriving other implications
of Proposition I, it is useful to let Ξt = ΣtΩt denote the insider’s relative informational
advantage over the market, recalling that Σt and Ωt are the variance of the market
maker’s estimation error of the insider’s valuation and of the true value, respectively,
at time t ≥ 0. In other words, this ratio measures the market maker’s informational
disadvantage to the insider, relative to her total uncertainty about the true valuation.
The standard model of Kyle (1985) corresponds to the extreme case in which the insider
observes the true value perfectly at every moment, i.e. Γt ≡ 0, hence the ratio is
identical to 1.







The above equation characterizes how the insider tries to camouflage her information
among noise trades. The effect of noise in order flow (σ2y) remains the same as in the
Kyle (1985) model: Additional noise trades makes it easier for the insider to conceal the
intention of her trades, and hence, the insider will be more eager to trade. The relation
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between the total uncertainty at time t (Ωt) and the insider’s trading intensity is more
nuanced, as one should take into account the market maker’s response to the informed
trades as the market maker infers the value from the order flow, with two sources of
noise that hinder her from perfectly observing the true value of the asset. The first
is the amount of uninformative trade, which is indistinguishable by the market maker
from the informative portion of the trade. This source of noise is quite standard in all
the variations of the Kyle model. The second source of noise, a defining feature of the
“gradual learning” in our model, comes from the informed trades placed by the insider
who does not perfectly observe the true asset value, either, but instead places orders
based on her best estimation. In equilibrium, therefore, the market maker assigns a
higher weight to times when she believes the insider has greater information, i.e., the
insider’s orders are more likely to be driven by a purer, less noisy signal. This also
leads the insider to reduce the intensity of her trading as the strength of her private
signal increases, because her trades are subject to greater scrutiny by the market maker.
This equilibrium leads to a somewhat counterintuitive result that an insider trades less
aggressively on her private information when she gains a greater relative informational
advantage, conditional on the level of noise trading.
Prediction Two: Trading intensity, βt, is increasing in noise trading σ2y, and decreasing
in the insider’s informational advantage over the market, Ξt.
Based on the discussion above, we can now understand the ambiguous relation be-
tween trading intensity, βt and the time elapsed, t, as opposed to being monotonically
positive as in Kyle (1985). In our model, the ambiguity comes from the rate of change
in the relative information advantage, ∂
∂t
Ξt. Trading intensity could decrease over time
if ∂
∂t
Ξt is positive and large enough. To elaborate more, one may rewrite (3.11) as
β̇
β
= µ − Ξ̇Ξ , where the dot above the variable reflects the standard notation denoting
76
the first-order derivative. Because the second term on the right hand side is absent
in models with instantaneous, full learning, βt is an unambiguously increasing func-
tion of t in such models. Because we accommodate gradual learning, the evolution of
trading intensity over time is ambiguous depending on the evolution of the insider’s
informational advantage. If it grows fast enough, trading intensity, βt, may decline over
time.15
Proposition I also allows us to characterize the dynamics of market depth. We see
from (2.9) that market depth, the inverse of λt, now becomes time-dependent – a new
property relative to the Kyle (1985) model. Consistent with Kyle (1985), λt depends
on the total uncertainty of the market maker about the true value (Ω0) and the volume
of noise trades (σ2y). New to our model is that λt is a decreasing function of the time
elapsed since the initial leakage, and bears a nonmonotonic relation with the expected
arrival rate of public announcement, µ.
The fact that λt is time-varying as opposed to being constant in the Kyle model,
not a product of gradual learning but an artifact of a random stopping time. More
specifically, λt increases with µ when t < 12
1
µ
and vice versa. Note that 1
µ
is equal to the
expected delay, τ . Hence, market liquidity increases (decreases) with the expected delay
during the time window of [0, τ/2] ([τ/2, τ ]). The intuition for the nonmonotonicity is as
follows: with a fixed amount of total uncertainty, the speed of information dissemination
is higher at the beginning for the cases in which the half-life of the private information
is shorter. But since the uncertainty must resolve in the limit for any rate of decay,
the speed of dissemination for smaller rates of decay must eventually dominate those
of larger rates of decay. This implies that at some point in time, the sensitivity of the
market depth (as proxied by the inverse of λt) to the rate of decay must change sign.
15Note that this relationship is not inconsistent with the original Kyle (1985) model. In Kyle (1985),
the insider knows the true valuation from the very beginning, hence his relative informational advantage
does not change (the ratio is constant at one), leading to a clear increase of trading intensity over time.
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On the other hand, the fact that the relation between market depth and expected delay
changes sign at τ̄2 is an artifact of the exponential hazard model: In this special case,
the mean duration of the uncertainty is, in fact, τ̄2 .
2.3.3 Price dynamics
Equation (2.10) in Proposition I indicates that the rate at which the true value is
revealed by the market maker, i.e. 1− ΩtΩ0 , depends only on the expected arrival rate of
the deadline (public announcement), µ. A high hazard rate (or shorter expected delay)
is associated with faster information dissemination. On the other hand, the rate of
information dissemination depends neither on the initial uncertainty Ω0 nor the market
depth λt, which echoes Kyle (1985). Empirically, information dissemination is usually
measured by price convergence to value. Hence, this section analyzes price dynamics
in more depth.
As the early-informed strategically trades based on their private information and the
market maker reacts strategically to them, the price of the asset continually converges
to the true value of the asset. Due to the normal distribution of the model, conditional
on the initial price P0 and the final value of the asset V , the expected level of the
price at time t, Pt, is a weighted average of the two, with weights proportional to the
amount of precision of the market maker’s information at the moment. In particular, the
dependence of the expected level of price on the initial price diminishes exponentially
at the rate that uncertainty resolves. This result is characterized in the following
proposition.
Proposition II. In an equilibrium of the type described in Proposition I, the
dynamics of expected price at each time t is as follows:
E[Pt|V, P0] = (1− e−2µt)V + e−2µtP0. (2.13)
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Proof. Please see Appendix 2.6.1.
Prediction Three: Information dissemination or price convergence follows:
E[Pt|V, P0]− P0
V − P0
= 1− e−2µt = 1− e−2t/τ , (2.14)
Equation (2.14) indicates that the ratio of “information dissemination” as captured by
price convergence is a simple function of the elapsed time and expected delay. More
specifically, the expected rate of price convergence at each point of time relative to
the initial gap is increasing in the elapsed time and decreasing in the expected delay.
Notably, the relation does not depend on the initial uncertainty Ω0 nor the market
depth λt. This result echoes (2.10) in Proposition I.
2.3.4 Special case of immediate learning
We complete the model by considering the special case where the insider receives all
information about the true value of the asset at the outset. In this case we simply have
Γt = 0 and Σt = Σ0e−2µt for all t. Market depth λt is not affected by this simplification.








Here the superscripts represent the specifications of the model under the special
case of immediate learning.
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2.4 Empirical Tests
The dataset described in Section 2.2 allows us to test predictions derived in Section2.3.
For additional variables, firm-level data are from CRSP and trade-level data are from
TAQ, both accessible from WRDS.
2.4.1 Inferring insider trading strategies from trades
Propensity to trade
We first test Predictions One and Two using a panel of trading and price data at the
security (i)-second (t) level within the private window. We construct the following
proxies for the variables in the Predictions:
Trades: Various proxies for trades made by the speculator on filing i during the
t-th second, as proxies for Xt (and βt) in our model. We consider both total trades
and directional trades. Total trades sum up buys and sells without signing them.
“Directional trades” are trades that are in the “right” direction during the second given
the sign of current price relative to the liquidation value (proxied by Pt3 or Pt1+15 min).
That is, Directional buy = ∑ni,tj=1(xi,j,t > 0) · (Vi − Pi,t > 0), where j = 1, ..., ni,t is
an index for all the trades belonging to the i − t pair. Directional sell is analogously
defined. Both buy- and sell-initiated trades are classified by the Lee and Ready (1991)
algorithm.16 Finally, we consider Trades per 1% price− value gap, which is the ratio
of trades and 100 ∗ |Pt1+15 min − Pt|/Pt. Following the literature, we explore both the
dollar value of trades (Panel A of Table 3) and the number of trades (Panel B) for each
proxy, resulting in eight different variables capturing the intensity of trading.
Expected delay: The predicted delay for the i’s filings using the full-sample predic-
tion with hourly fixed effects as shown in column (2) of Table 2. It is a proxy for the
16We apply the Lee and Ready test with 0-second lag, as recommended by the TAQ documentation
based on current practice, e.g., Peterson and Sirri (2003) and Bessembinder (2003).
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inverse of the hazard rate µ in our model. Its estimation is described in Section 2.2.3.
Unexpected delay: The difference between the actual and predicted delay for the i’s
filings. Because of its unexpected nature, it should not be used strategically by insiders.
We put this variable in the regression as a placebo test.
Time since t1: The difference between the current time t and t1, corresponding to
t in the model.
Absolute deviation from value: Calculated as 100 ∗ |Pt1+15 min − Pt|/Pt, or the
percentage absolute difference between the stock price at t1 + 15 min, and the price
at the beginning of the t-th second. It corresponds to |V̄ − Pt| in the model, and
approximates |V̂ − Pt| since we do not observe the insider’s valuation.
Deviation from value: Calculated as 100 ∗ (Pt1+15 min − Pt)/Pt, or the percentage
signed difference between the stock price at t1 + 15 min and the price at the beginning
of the t-th second. The signed difference is used when directional trades, buy or sell in
the direction of mispricing, are analyzed.
Idiocyncratic vol: Idiosyncratic volatility of the stock during the previous 12 months,
a proxy for Ω0 in the model.
Share turnover: Average daily share turnover rate (in percentage points) during
the previous 12 months, a proxy for σy in the model.
Spread: The bid-ask spread (in percentage points), recorded at the beginning of
each second. In some regressions, this serves as a control for the real-time trading
liquidity of the security, related to λ in the model.
For the dependent variables, we note that Trades is not directly a proxy for trading
intensity (β in the model), but is a function of both trading intensity and price-value
gap. For this reason, we always control for |V − P | or V − P in the regressions so that
the estimated coefficients reflect the determinants of trading intensity.17 In addition,
17If we adopt a log-linear model, then trading intensity (β) and value-price gap (|V − P |) becomes
linearly additive. We present this specification to replicate our main Table 3 Panel A in Table 2.7.
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we always control for firm size (Market capitalization decile) in every regression.
Because the key variable, Expected delay, is driven by time (hour) of the day, its
effect might be potentially confounded by the varying market conditions at different
times of the day. We thus add the following common variables to the regressions to
control for real time, general, market conditions as much as we can: The market-wide
trading volume during the hour to which t1 belongs (in log billion dollars); the minute-
level return volatility (in basis points) of SPY during the hour; the number of SEC
filings uploaded during the 20-minute window prior to t118; and a dummy variable for
after-market. Finally, in some regressions we further include dummy variables for filing
types including Form 4, Form 8-K, and Schedule 13D.
Table 3 reports the regression results that relate Trades to the underlying variables.
We focus on Panel A, which is based on the Trimmed Sample and analyzes intensity
of trades in dollar terms (in the unit of $1, 000). Results based on numbers of trades
are all consistent. A robustness check using the subsample with non-zero price changes
during [t1, t1 + 15min] is reported in the Appendix Table 2.8. Results are qualitatively
similar.
Our results are consistent under a log-linear specification as well.
18We chose the 20-minute window to be slightly longer than the period of [t1, t3] so that there is a
potential time overlap for speculators as well as the market to process these filings. The results are
robust to the use of shorter time windows
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Table 2.3: Trading Intensity in Relation to Expected Delay: Panel Analysis
Panel A: Trades in dollars
Dependent variables All trades All trades Directional buy Directional sell Trades per 1% price-value gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Expected delay (1/µ) -0.0754*** -0.0758*** -0.2260*** -0.2757*** -0.0064***
(-10.97) (-8.81) (-4.34) (-7.31) (-6.76)
Unexpected delay 0.0020 0.0021 0.0194 -0.0000 0.0003
(1.39) (1.48) (1.41) (-0.01) (1.63)
Time since t1 (t− t1) -0.0016 -0.0020* -0.0049 0.0004 -0.0001
(-1.30) (-1.65) (-0.43) (0.05) (-0.30)
Absolute deviation from liquidation value (|V−P |/P) 8.0034*** 8.3154*** 0.5339***
(14.85) (15.29) (7.93)
Deviation from liquidation value ((V−P )/P) 83.6964*** -68.9831***
(15.95) (-17.25)
Idiosyncratic volatility (Ω0) 2.6091** 3.5493*** -16.3740 -10.7064 0.7639***
(2.10) (2.88) (-1.42) (-1.30) (4.20)
Share turnover (σy) 3.3843*** 3.1203*** 21.9427*** 13.8663*** 0.3543***
(10.84) (10.27) (6.59) (8.56) (8.87)
Market cap decile 4.0350*** 3.9300*** 20.2800*** 16.4217*** 0.5321***
(47.17) (47.53) (16.44) (19.33) (38.59)
Market trading volume 5.4900*** 5.8520*** 29.9152*** 26.1038*** 0.6057***
(20.66) (19.74) (11.65) (10.76) (14.82)
SPY volatility -0.3614*** -0.3553*** -2.5358*** -1.8827** -0.0615***
(-2.96) (-2.97) (-2.66) (-2.29) (-3.24)
Number of filings 0.0328** 0.0290** 0.2480** 0.0385 0.0047**
(2.47) (2.21) (2.24) (0.42) (2.50)
After market -14.8707*** -11.4201*** -91.1646*** -73.3933*** -1.7458***
(-22.88) (-12.69) (-12.78) (-16.43) (-17.22)
Form 4 -0.5206 -0.3810 -4.2875 -3.4728 -0.0245
(-1.41) (-1.04) (-1.28) (-1.38) (-0.47)
Form 8-K 2.5978*** 2.7699*** 11.5628** 2.6026 0.2835***
(4.19) (4.48) (2.22) (0.67) (3.60)
Schedule 13D 8.2535*** 8.4445*** 33.5006*** 38.9157*** 0.9443***
(5.12) (5.12) (2.81) (4.66) (4.55)
Spread -1.1016***
(-8.44)
Constant -184.9960*** -192.5734*** -1,081.4618*** -912.6159*** -21.7663***
(-28.02) (-26.49) (-14.91) (-14.04) (-21.15)
Observations 2,533,095 2,484,801 2,533,095 2,533,095 1,111,294
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.175 0.178 0.140 0.142 0.130
F -tests for Expected delay = Unexpected delay
F -statistic 133.20 84.31 23.37 56.63 52.37
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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—Continued
Panel B: Number of trades
Dependent variables All trades All trades Directional buy Directional sell Trades per 1% price-value gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Expected delay (1/µ) -0.0151*** -0.0150*** -0.0267*** -0.0332*** -0.0013***
(-11.18) (-8.88) (-5.23) (-7.79) (-6.75)
Unexpected delay 0.0004 0.0004 0.0020 -0.0001 0.0001
(1.34) (1.42) (1.49) (-0.11) (1.60)
Time since t1 (t− t1) -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0007 0.0001 -0.0000
(-1.22) (-1.57) (-0.63) (0.12) (-0.15)
Absolute deviation from liquidation value (|V−P |/P) 1.5978*** 1.6634*** 0.0981***
(15.15) (15.63) (7.35)
Deviation from liquidation value ((V−P )/P) 8.4155*** -7.3952***
(21.66) (-20.69)
Idiosyncratic volatility (Ω0) 0.6246** 0.8364*** -1.1881 -0.9145 0.1474***
(2.57) (3.47) (-1.12) (-1.06) (4.20)
Share turnover (σy) 0.6683*** 0.6129*** 2.1672*** 1.5289*** 0.0710***
(11.08) (10.43) (9.34) (8.57) (9.08)
Market cap decile 0.7682*** 0.7456*** 1.9777*** 1.7016*** 0.1019***
(52.05) (51.94) (21.88) (23.96) (39.70)
Market trading volume 1.0955*** 1.1643*** 3.0643*** 2.8337*** 0.1183***
(20.62) (19.68) (12.47) (11.87) (14.86)
SPY volatility -0.0729*** -0.0714*** -0.2726*** -0.1851** -0.0122***
(-2.93) (-2.95) (-2.70) (-2.03) (-3.26)
Number of filings 0.0062** 0.0054** 0.0242** 0.0021 0.0009**
(2.36) (2.08) (2.22) (0.22) (2.43)
After market -3.0006*** -2.3060*** -9.3033*** -7.8794*** -0.3451***
(-23.28) (-13.00) (-13.89) (-17.58) (-17.42)
Form 4 -0.1022 -0.0746 -0.3850 -0.2937 -0.0051
(-1.40) (-1.03) (-1.14) (-1.13) (-0.50)
Form 8-K 0.4904*** 0.5243*** 0.9669** 0.2414 0.0550***
(4.03) (4.33) (1.99) (0.58) (3.58)
Schedule 13D 1.6221*** 1.6620*** 3.7232*** 4.8174*** 0.1824***
(4.87) (4.88) (2.81) (4.25) (4.41)
Spread -0.2343***
(-8.78)
Constant -36.6039*** -38.0343*** -108.8483*** -97.6785*** -4.2360***
(-28.15) (-26.50) (-17.02) (-16.09) (-21.30)
Observations 2,533,095 2,484,801 2,533,095 2,533,095 1,111,294
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.219 0.223 0.184 0.186 0.194
F-tests for Expected delay = Unexpected delay
F-statistic 137.86 85.39 33.24 63.67 52.18
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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The first column of Table 3 Panel A runs a tobit regression of dollar value of all
trades on the set of regressors listed above. The second column repeats the same
analysis except adding Spread. Because the spread, related to λt in the model, is
jointly determined with trading, we include the variable as additional control only in
this one specification as a sensitivity check. Columns (3) and (4) analyze directional
trades, i.e., buy (sell) trades when the current price is below (above) the terminal value.
While all trades (unsigned) are related to the absolute difference between the current
price and the terminal value, the directional trades are related to the signed difference.
Finally, because our theoretical model finds the number of trades as proportional to
the price divergence from insider’s estimate of value (which is not observable), the last
column (5) uses its approximation, Trades per 1% price− value gap, as the dependent
variable.
Prediction One, stating that trading intensity is decreasing in expected delay (in-
verse of µ), is well supported by all specifications. Every ten-second increase in the
expected delay is associated with about $750 decrease in total trading, or $2,260 to
$2,760 decrease in directional trading, or $64 less trading for a 1% price-value gap, dur-
ing a given second. The significantly higher magnitude with directional trading proxies
suggests that they seem to capture informed trading more accurately.19 All effects are
significant at the 1% level. In contrast, the magnitude of the coefficients associated
with Unexpected delay are an order-of-magnitude smaller, and are not significant. The
F− tests comparing the two coefficients conclude that they are different with less than
the 1% significance levels.
The other regression results are broadly consistent with the standard predictions
from insider trading models, including the one studied in this paper. All specifications
19This effect is overall economically small because insiders respond to the gap between the current
price and their own valuation, while empirically we can only approximate the gap with the difference
between the current price and the price that will prevail 15 minutes after the start of the leakage.
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show that trading quantity is positively proportional to the price-value divergence,
for total trades as well as directional buy trades and sell trades. For a one-percent
increase in the price-value gap, total trades increase by about $8,000 in a given second.
If price is below (above) the terminal value by one additional percentage point, then
buy (sell) trades increase by $84,000 ($69,000). All effects are significant at the 1%
level. Trades are positively and significantly (at the 1% level) related to proxies for
the volume of noise trading and trading liquidity, Share turnover, Market cap decile,
and Spread, supporting Prediction Two. However, there is not a consistent empirical
relation between trades and our proxy for ex ante uncertainty, Idiosyncractic vol. The
relation is negative (but not significant), if we use signed trades (directional buy or
sell); but the opposite is true for all trades (sum of buy and sell).
Empirically we find the relation between trading and time elapsed to be largely neu-
tral, both economically and statistically. Note that the “gradual learning” model pre-
dicts that trading intensity could be either increasing or decreasing with time elapsed.20
However, when we separately consider different filing types (reported in the Appendix
Table 2.9), we see that trades tend to decrease over time for Form 4 and Schedule 13D,
from which information is relatively straightforward to extract, but the opposite is true
for Form 8-K, where trades continue to be motivated by new information via gradual
learning. Relatedly, Form 8-K and Schedule 13D are associated with significantly higher
trading volume relative to Form 4 and other filings. Such a difference in trading motive
is consistent with the differences in the average information value associated with these
forms as shown in Table 1.
The relation between trades and market conditions are as expected: Individual
securities trading co-moves with that of the market, and drops significantly during
20While standard models such as Kyle (1985) predicts that trading intensity (given mispricing)
increases over time, the amount of trades may not increase monotonically because the value-price gap
is expected to shrink over time, cutting down on the incentives to trade.
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after-market trading; and high volatility is associated with sparse trading. Interestingly,
trading volume in a given stock tends to be positively correlated with the number of
filings (by all firms) during the last 20 minutes, indicating that in this setting speculators
do not face a binding constraint in allocating their attention among different filings. 21
We conduct three additional tests to ensure robustness. First, we reconstruct
Expected delay using time fixed effects at the half-hour interval to capture finer varia-
tions in delay due to time of the day, especially during the high delay period in the late
afternoon. Second, we exclude observations that fall into the last quarter-hour before
the market close so as to filter out the potential effect from any rush to trade toward the
end of the trading day. Third, we repeat the analysis on the subsample of filings using a
more aggressive trimming at a 331-second delay (or the 85th percentile from our Initial
Sample, as compared to the 90th percentile cut-off adopted for the default Trimmed
Sample). Results, which are qualitatively similar, are reported in the Appendix Tables
2.10 to 2.12.
Because we do not know the identities of the traders, it is not possible to estimate the
total trading profits reaped by the early informed. However, we can estimate a kind of
upper bound of profitability for the early informed. More specifically, if we assume that
all “directional trades” classified in this section are committed by the early informed,
and if we further assume that these positions unwind at the “liquidation value,” or
Pt1+15min, the total potential profit amounts to $6.5 million during a time period that
is slightly shorter than four months. However, while we characterize this as an upper
bound to profits on trading during the private window, it is important to remember
that the liquidation value of Pt1+15min is not necessarily the true fundamental value
of the firm, and insiders may make greater profits by waiting to sell later on. Those
21It seems that many activities in the market place, trading, filing, news writing, etc., tend to go
together. For example, we find that both trading and filings activities have a noticeable “lunch break”
dip during the day; and trading activities tend to be low on days when filings are sparse.
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additional profits, however, are also available to the non-privately informed.
Time to first trade
An alternative way to assess trading intensity is to analyze the time to the first trade
in the cross section. Table 4 presents the results from this specification.22 Here the
dependent variables are: (1) Time (in number of seconds) to the first trade (the first
four columns), and (2) Time to the first “directional” trade (the last four columns), that
is, the first trade that is a buy (sell) when V = Pt1+15min > Pt (V < Pt). If we assume
that the privately informed trader is able to predict the sign of price-value divergence
and that the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm classifies orders into buy- or sell-initiated
significantly above chance, then the second definition captures informed trading more
closely. On the other hand, the first specification maintains a more robust definition of
potentially informed trading. Both dependent variables are always censored at zero and
at t2 (or the end of the private window, if no trading occurs during the private window),
so we apply censored regression (i.e., a two-sided tobit model) for the estimation.
22A sensitivity check on the subsample with price changes between t1 and t1 + 15 min is reported in
the Appendix Table 2.13.
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Table 2.4: Trading in Relation to Expected Delay: Time to the First Trade
Dependent variables Time to the first trade Time to the first directional trade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Expected delay 0.834*** 0.842*** 0.769*** 0.731*** 0.552*** 0.592*** 0.910*** 0.877***
(13.65) (14.24) (10.53) (10.19) (6.71) (6.98) (9.10) (8.91)
Unexpected delay 0.129*** 0.119*** 0.116*** 0.111*** 0.266*** 0.262*** 0.267*** 0.263***
(13.44) (12.50) (13.01) (12.93) (14.63) (14.52) (14.57) (14.58)
|AR(t1, t1 + 15min)| -36.705*** -38.157*** -34.818*** -39.432***
(-14.65) (-13.18) (-7.89) (-8.49)
Idiosyncratic volatility (Ω0) -23.433*** -9.081 -30.773*** -10.974* -22.467*** -9.550 -32.609*** -12.561
(-4.82) (-1.51) (-4.84) (-1.79) (-2.66) (-0.84) (-3.30) (-1.14)
Share turnover (σy) -21.796*** -20.388*** -19.478*** -19.461*** -24.331*** -23.001*** -21.557*** -21.495***
(-15.25) (-14.25) (-13.13) (-13.63) (-9.97) (-8.91) (-9.13) (-8.79)
Market cap decile -20.253*** -20.852*** -19.104*** -19.815*** -21.879*** -22.544*** -21.309*** -22.193***
(-39.29) (-36.74) (-31.80) (-32.40) (-29.65) (-27.67) (-26.81) (-26.91)
Market trading volume -37.002*** -35.482*** -42.532*** -40.672*** -44.129*** -42.573*** -47.779*** -45.779***
(-15.00) (-13.74) (-15.66) (-15.03) (-19.58) (-18.94) (-18.29) (-18.28)
SPY volatility 1.892*** 2.140*** 1.978*** 2.229*** 3.665*** 3.905*** 3.453*** 3.734***
(3.94) (4.76) (3.84) (4.70) (3.93) (4.30) (3.87) (4.31)
Number of filings -0.387** -0.349** -0.430*** -0.433*** -0.396** -0.354** -0.254 -0.257
(-2.51) (-2.31) (-2.85) (-2.98) (-2.17) (-1.99) (-1.43) (-1.49)
After market 141.207*** 139.084*** 122.938*** 125.485*** 175.090*** 171.051*** 112.933*** 116.075***
(19.33) (18.86) (13.26) (13.86) (21.38) (19.31) (9.23) (9.73)
Form 4 -2.485 -2.257 -3.910* -4.025* -5.502 -5.276 -4.938 -5.224
(-1.01) (-0.95) (-1.69) (-1.77) (-1.28) (-1.25) (-1.16) (-1.25)
Form 8-K -18.977*** -13.079*** -19.876*** -13.839*** -15.755*** -10.606** -20.299*** -14.409***
(-6.01) (-4.15) (-6.09) (-4.40) (-2.95) (-2.01) (-3.73) (-2.72)
Schedule 13D -49.883*** -42.529*** -42.377*** -36.197*** -44.308*** -38.814*** -48.273*** -42.276***
(-5.16) (-4.45) (-4.09) (-3.51) (-3.02) (-2.67) (-3.31) (-2.93)
Spread 4.495*** 4.770*** 4.680*** 4.996***
(5.92) (6.30) (4.69) (4.86)
Constant 1,063.785*** 1,030.518*** 1,192.476*** 1,156.993*** 1,393.240*** 1,357.229*** 1,446.948*** 1,408.941***
(18.07) (16.81) (18.54) (18.09) (24.26) (24.01) (22.65) (23.06)
Observations 33,318 30,004 28,531 28,508 33,318 30,004 28,531 28,508
F -tests for Expected delay = Unexpected delay
F -statistic 131.99 147.04 81.30 75.45 11.86 14.92 39.88 37.63
P -value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
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Consistent with Table 3, results in Table 4 support the hypothesis that insiders
are in less of a rush to trade when they anticipate a longer delay. For every 100-
second increase in the expected delay, the time to first trade increases by 55 − 91
seconds.23 The coefficients of Unexpected delay also tend to come in significant. It
could be due to the fact that insiders have a more refined model to form expected delay
than we do, and could also be driven by the censored (no trade during the window)
observations where longer actual delays are associated with higher lower bound of the
time to first trade. It is important to note that the F -tests for the differences between
the coefficients of expected and unexpected delay reject equality at the 1% level in 14
out of 16 specifications.
The coefficients on the covariates are also intuitive and consistent with the cor-
responding coefficients in Table 3. Overall, more trading liquidity and noise trading
(proxied by Share turnover, Market cap decile, and Spread) prompt trading, and so
does higher value of information contained in the filing (proxied by Idiosyncratic vol
and |AR(t1, t1 + 15 min)|). While |AR(t1, t1 + 15 min)| is an ex post outcome that is
affected by trading, we present additional specifications acknowledging that this vari-
able is potentially endogenous. Among all filing types, Schedule 13D, the type which
both allows rapid information processing (as it simply reveals the presence of an ac-
tivist blockholder) and entails a high average level of information (see Table 1 Panel
B), generates the fastest first trades: about 20 − 50 seconds faster than Forms 4 and
8-K. Traders’ attention does not seem to be diverted by recent filings, but in fact they
trade faster at a time when more filings are coming out, consistent with Table 3.
23Note that insiders continue to be able to trade after t2, the public release, and will continue to
enjoy an informational advantage at or shortly after public release if it takes the public some time
to digest the information. Therefore, insiders who wait to trade do not risk completely missing their
opportunity even if the private window ends short of their expectation.
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Market vs. limit orders
Standard microstructure theory assumes that speculators use market orders to take
advantage of their private information. However, empirical studies (notably Kaniel and
Liu (2006) and Collin-Dufresne and Fos (2016) show that the privately informed may
trade in such a way that limit orders are more informative than market orders. To test
the choice of limit versus market orders, we classify all trades during the private window
into limit or market orders following the same methodology as in Collin-Dufresne and
Fos (2016).24 We then run an unordered multinomial logit model to predict the use
of limit orders and market orders (relative to the base state of no trade during each
filing-second). If there are both market and limit order trades in a security-second, we
code the order type with higher trading volume. Results are reported in Table 5.
24The intuition of the algorithm is that, if the price paid by the speculator is above the volume-
weighted, buy-initiated transactions for the trading day, then the trade is classified as a market order
and vice versa. The classification for sell trades follows analogously.
91
Table 2.5: Limit vs. Market Orders
(1) (2)
Limit order Market order Difference χ2 and p-Value Limit order Market order Difference χ2 and p-Value
(i) (ii) (iii) (i) (ii) (iii)
Expected delay -0.0092*** -0.0093*** 0.03 -0.0069*** -0.0091*** 11.47***
(-9.81) (-10.98) (0.8722) (-6.43) (-8.54) (0.0007)
Time since t1 (t− t1) 0.0001 -0.0000 0.85 0.0001 -0.0001 1.75
(0.51) (-0.27) (0.3568) (0.56) (-0.57) (0.1856)
Absolute deviation from liquidation value (|V−P |/P) 1.0204*** 0.9591*** 1.67 1.0728*** 1.0246*** 0.98
(14.52) (13.22) (0.1968) (14.94) (13.93) (0.3221)
Idiosyncratic volatility (Ω0) 0.1045 0.1800 0.50 0.2629** 0.3517*** 0.74
(0.71) (1.46) (0.4816) (1.99) (3.23) (0.3885)
Market cap decile 0.4869*** 0.4723*** 2.11 0.4659*** 0.4540*** 1.33
(43.48) (40.82) (0.1462) (42.32) (39.43) (0.2493)
Share turnover (σy) 0.4210*** 0.4233*** 0.01 0.3802*** 0.3801*** 0.00
(10.20) (10.81) (0.9134) (9.52) (10.07) (0.9982)
Market trading volume 0.7876*** 0.7241*** 3.12* 0.8077*** 0.7104*** 7.11***
(19.00) (19.43) (0.0773) (18.26) (17.99) (0.0077)
SPY volatility -0.0761*** -0.0497** 5.57** -0.0719*** -0.0460** 5.51**
(-3.40) (-2.41) (0.0182) (-3.21) (-2.33) (0.0190)
Number of filings 0.0031* 0.0041** 0.49 0.0029* 0.0033* 0.06
(1.82) (2.40) (0.4854) (1.71) (1.93) (0.8037)
After market -1.8950*** -2.1266*** 7.81*** -1.6102*** -1.5170*** 1.26
(-18.37) (-20.27) (0.0052) (-11.82) (-11.12) (0.2615)
Form 4 -0.0531 0.0060 1.58 -0.0356 0.0156 1.19
(-1.01) (0.13) (0.2095) (-0.68) (0.35) (0.2744)
Form 8-K 0.2434*** 0.3364*** 2.31 0.2512*** 0.3672*** 3.66*
(3.04) (4.22) (0.1289) (3.11) (4.62) (0.0557)
Schedule 13D 0.9632*** 0.9584*** 0.00 0.9498*** 0.9853*** 0.11
(4.21) (4.21) (0.9638) (4.08) (4.31) (0.7371)
Spread -0.2491*** -0.2503*** 0.00
(-7.87) (-7.68) (0.9704)
Constant -25.5889*** -24.0997*** 2.88* -26.0562*** -23.5942*** 7.56***
(-25.61) (-26.75) (0.0896) (-24.44) (-24.84) (0.0060)
Observations 2,533,095 2,533,095 2,484,801 2,484,801
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Table 5 shows that longer expected delay favors limit orders but only when Spread
is controlled for. This is intuitive in that limit orders take longer to be executed than
market orders, and therefore are a luxury to be used in cases involving a long delay.
Limit orders exhibit similar sensitivity as market orders to the divergence of price from
value (proxied by |V −P |) at each point of time. However, Appendix Table 2.14 shows
that among the subsample of filings that are accompanied by price changes during
[t1, t3], wider price-value divergence are significantly (at the 10% level) more likely to
generate limit orders as opposed to market ones, broadly consistent with Kaniel and
Liu (2006) and Collin-Dufresne and Fos (2016)). Finally, the choice between the two
types of orders depends on the general market conditions, as indicated by aggregate
market trading volume, market-wide volatility, and the after-market status.
2.4.2 Pace of information dissemination and trading liquidity
We now test Prediction Three about the dynamics of information dissemination. Pre-
diction Three models the expected price change from t0 at a given time, relative to
the initial value-price gap, |V − P0|. The empirical tests rely on the observed price Pt
instead. Moreover, because the proxy for the initial value-price gap, Pt3 − Pt1 is zero
for most of the observations in our sample, we rescale price change with Pt1 instead.25
The empirical analog to the ratio of information dissemination thus becomes |Pt−Pt1 |
Pt1
if Pt lies in the same direction from Pt1 as Pt3 , or (Pt − Pt1) ∗ (Pt3 − Pt1) > 0 (where
t3 = t1+15 min). It is zero otherwise. That is, if the price moves in the wrong direction,
the amount of information dissemination is considered zero. We use a tobit model to
accommodate the censoring. Table 6 reports the regression results. Appendix Table
2.15 conducts a robustness check in which “negative information dissemination” is not
censored.
25This procedure effectively rescales the left side of equation (2.14) with (Pt3 − Pt1)/Pt1 . The
regression controls for the empirical proxy for the scaling variable, which becomes AR(t1, t3).
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Table 2.6: Information Dissemination
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Expected delay -0.0868*** -0.0886*** -0.1013*** -0.1334***
(-6.27) (-6.41) (-7.31) (-7.83)
Time since t1 (t− t1) 0.0668*** 0.0668*** 0.0649*** 0.0635***
(18.56) (18.63) (19.01) (18.73)
Idiosyncratic volatility (Ω0) 11.9907*** 6.0496* 5.7423*
(3.63) (1.86) (1.79)
Market cap decile 2.4191*** 2.8419*** 2.7842*** 2.6650***
(17.34) (16.25) (16.56) (16.11)
Share turnover (σy) 4.9280*** 3.7405*** 3.7088*** 3.7562***
(9.49) (6.29) (6.53) (6.74)
Market trading volume 7.0737*** 7.1103*** 6.8851*** 7.5791***
(14.01) (14.29) (14.56) (14.72)
SPY volatility -0.2820* -0.2911* -0.2687 -0.2400
(-1.65) (-1.70) (-1.64) (-1.49)
Number of filings 0.0451 0.0463 0.0338 0.0266
(1.39) (1.43) (1.11) (0.87)
After market -19.1025*** -19.1386*** -17.3393*** -11.6445***
(-13.74) (-13.81) (-12.37) (-6.58)
Form 4 -0.1360 -0.0309 0.3239 0.6532
(-0.15) (-0.03) (0.36) (0.74)
Form 8K 6.9635*** 6.7865*** 6.1929*** 6.9423***
(4.86) (4.74) (4.37) (4.84)
Schedule 13D 12.8261*** 12.1332*** 12.6532*** 13.1738***
(3.19) (3.08) (3.31) (3.38)




Constant -217.2452*** -222.7493*** -214.1154*** -227.2480***
(-17.15) (-17.83) (-18.02) (-17.90)
Observations 2,640,656 2,637,773 2,532,825 2,484,557
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.0878 0.0883 0.0925 0.0937
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Consistent with Prediction Three, the rate of information dissemination is slower
when insiders enjoy a longer expected delay. For a 100-second increase in expected
delay, the rate of information dissemination (or the convergence of the price-value gap)
is lowered by about 8-14 basis points, significant at the 1% level. Also consistent with
the Prediction is that information dissemination progresses with time; for every 100
seconds since t1, the price converges to value by an increment of 6−7 basis points. The
qualitative inferences are similar in the uncensored version in Appendix Table 2.15.
Though the model predicts that the speed of price dissemination should bear no
relation to ex ante uncertainty, Ω0, the coefficient of its proxy, Idiosyncratic vol, when
included, is significantly and positively associated with the pace of information dissemi-
nation.26 Moreover, price convergence is faster when the market-wide trading activities
are high and is slower during the after-market. Finally, Schedule 13D enjoys the fastest
rate of information dissemination, consistent with results in Tables 3 and 4 that trades
on this type of disclosure are the most forthcoming and front-loaded.
Our model predicts that inverse market depth, as captured by λt, is nonmonotonic
in the expected delay. However, as discussed in Section 2.3.2, this is an artifact of the
random stopping time with constant hazard and not of gradual learning. Empirically,
we were not able to consistently estimate such a nonmonotonic relation or provide a
clear test for market depth as the outcome of insider’s strategic trading. Table 2.16 in
the Appendix reports the determinants of trading liquidity at the security-second level,
where the dependent variables are spread and the absolute price change. While expected
delay is positively associated with spread, it is negatively associated with absolute price
change, where the relation could conflate the market depth effect and the information
dissemination effect. Other factors, such as shocks to uninformed volume, can also shape
26This relation is consistent with the view that firm-specific return variation gauges the extent to
which information about the firm is quickly and accurately reflected in share prices via informed trading
(Morck et al. (2000)).
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the relation between liquidity, price volatility, and trading volume (Collin-Dufresne and
Fos (2016)).
2.5 Conclusion
Using data from an unusual episode in which SEC filings containing market-moving
information were disseminated to a small group of investors before the public release of
that information, we examine a quasi-natural experiment that provides tests of insider
trading strategies against a random deadline and the process through which private
information is impounded into stock prices. The study serves as a counterpart to
Koudijs’s (2015a) analysis of insider trading during the eighteenth century, with the
benefit from the privilege of the more granular trading information afforded by modern
data to help reveal the process through which private information is traded into stock
prices. Our results are consistent with the hypotheses that trading intensity and the
pace at which prices incorporate information decrease with the expected delay until
public release, while noise trading and relative information advantage play similar roles
as in standard microstructure theories assuming a fixed time window.
2.6 Appendix
2.6.1 Proofs
Proof of Proposition I
In order to characterize the equilibrium, we first solve the learning problem of the
market maker, then we derive the optimality conditions for insider’s maximization
problem. Similar to the learning problem of the insider, we assume that the market
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maker also uses the optimal estimate (in the mean square sense27) of the true asset





























provided that βt, λt ∈ L2 ([0, T ]) for any T < ∞. Recall that rational pricing rule
requires Pt = V̄t. By the first equation
Σtβt = λtσ2y . (2.16)






, which leads to
Ω̇t = −λ2tσ2y . (2.17)
One observation is that Ωt is decreasing and bounded from below by zero. Therefore,
there exists Ω∞ ≥ 0, such that limt→∞Ωt = Ω∞. Also, by our assumption that Γt <
Ω0e−2µt, we have limt→∞ Γt = 0, which implies that
lim
t→∞
Σt = Ω∞. (2.18)




among FMt -measurable vt with Ev2t < ∞.
For more detail on the optimal filtering, refer to Liptser and Shiryaev (2013).
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. For the ease of
exposition let χt := V̂t − Pt. It follows that the insider’s expected payoff at any time
t ≥ 0 can be written as








We continue with deriving the dynamics of price deviation χt. Recall that, in a linear
equilibrium dPt = λtdZt and dXt = βtdt. Also, using equation (2.4), one can rewrite the
dynamics of insider’s valuation as dV̂t = Γtσ̂v(t)dB
v,I
t , where Bv,It is a Wiener process with
respect to the insider’s filtration, which is independent of Byt . Therefore the dynamics




+ λ2tσ2y and Bt
represents a Weiner process adapted to informed trader’s filtration28 Two observations





























In equilibrium, where market marker’s learning requires (3.23) and (2.17), one can
simplify the second term of the inner integral as
∫ t
t0
Φ−2s w2sds = ΣtΦ−2t −Σt0Φ−2t0 . To see































t is equivalent to wtdBt for some Brownian motion
Bt adapted to FI .
98
of integral by parts implies that
∫ t
t0












for any t > t0.
Since, in its current form, the drift of the controlled process χt does not satisfy the
Lipschitz property, one cannot directly derive a dynamic programming equation for the
value function associated with the insider’s expected payoff (2.20). However, a simple
change of variables can be applied to obtain an appropriate formulation. Take two state
variables xt := χtΦ−1t and yt := Φ−1t . Also take a control variable ut := βtΦ−1t . It follows
that dxt = ytwtdBt and dyt = λtutdt. We assume that λt and wt are bounded functions,
i.e. there exist constants Kλ > 0 and Kw > 0 such that functions |λt| ≤ Kλ and |wt| ≤
Kw for all t ∈ [0,∞). This assumption is without loss of generality, since following
the results of market maker’s learning problem limt→∞ λt = 0 which together with the
continuity of λt and σ̂t (t) results in boundedness of λt and wt in equilibrium. Hence,
the Lipschitz property holds for drift and diffusion coefficents of our state variables.29
Next, we rewrite the insider’s expected payoff, given by (2.20) using our new variables
and define the gain functional











Our goal is to solve the stochastic control problem
V (t, xt, yt) := sup
u
J (t, xt, yt, u) .
In order to describe the local behavior of the value function V by means of Hamilton-
29Specifically, | (y1 − y2)wt| ≤ Kw |y1 − y2| and |ywt|+ |λtu| ≤ (Kλ +Kw) (1 + |y|+ |u|).
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Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations, we need to restrict the set of admissible control pro-
cesses to30
U0 :=



























This is without loss of generality, since in equilibrium, by the results of market maker’s























(µ+3λrβr)dr |us| ds <∞
iv. J (t, xt, yt, u) <∞
To show (i), note that from (3.23) we have λtβt ≥ 0 hence e−
∫ s
t








































The second equality follows from (2.21). We can show both terms of the last expression
are finite: the second term is finite since Φs ≤ 1 for all s ≥ 0, and the first term is finite
30For more detail on why these conditions are sufficient for our purpose refer to Touzi (2012). To
follow the notations of chapter 2, we choose f (t, x, y, u) = ux2 and k (t, x, y, u) = µ+ 3λt uy .
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But by (2.15) and (3.23)we have that Σ̇sΣs≥ − λsβs which implies that
Σs




−µ(s−t)Φ2s |βs| ds ≤ 1Σ0
∫∞
t e






The last integral is finite since both λsand Σs are bounded functions. Thus (iii) holds
in equilibrium. Finally, in equilibrium, the gain functional can be simplified as





































The first term in the latter expression is finite since λs is bounded and the second term
is finite by condition(iii).











V + λtuVy +
1
2y
2w2tVxx + ux2 = 0.
The left hand side is linear in u, thus we must have 3λt 1yV−λtVy+x





2w2tVxx = 0. The former equation implies that V (t, x, y) = x
2y
2λt + κty
3 for some κt.























sds. It follows that κt = eµt
(



















= 0. After substituting
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for the value function we get limt→∞Σt + Φ2t (χ20 − Σ0) = 0 for any initial condition














Proof of Prediction One










2µ − t + 2t = t +
1
2µ > 0. The first inequality holds
since Γt ≥ 0.
Proof of Proposition II
First of all note that Γt is nonnegative, continuous and decreasing. If Γ0 = 0 then for
every t ≥ 0 we haveΓt = 0 (that is, the case of immediate learning). However if Γ0 > 0,
since σ̂v (t) is assumed to be positive and continuous on any bounded closed interval







ds < ∞, that is Γt > 0 for any t ≥ 0. We proceed by
considering two cases.
Case 1. Γt > 0, for all t ≥ 0. To simplify the exposition, define a new process













Γ0 which is finite for any t ≥ 0. Thus W1,t is a martingale. Since the noise process

















S where S ∼ N (V,ΣS) is a noisy
























where Φt = e−
∫ t
0 λsβsds as defined in the proof







−µtΦ−1t dByt . It is not





−µtΦ−1t are square integrable on





= W2,0. Using the results we obtained earlier one can show that















, we obtain V − E [Pt|V, P0] = ΩtΩ0 (V − P0) which concludes the proof.
Case 2. Γt = 0, for all t ≥ 0. Recall that in this case V̂t = V . Define W3,t :=
e2µt (Pt − V ) and observe that dW3,t = λ0σyeµtdByt . Therefore, W3,t is a martingale
with respect to the natural filtration, and hence E [W3,t|V, P0] = W3,0. It follows that




V + e−2µtP0. (2.22)
2.6.2 Additional Figures and Tables
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Table 2.7: Trading in Relation to Expected Delay: Panel Analysis, Log-Linear Version
Panel A: Trades in dollars
Dependent variables All trades All trades Trades per 1% price-value gap
(1) (2) (3)
Expected delay (1/µ) -0.7981*** -0.6283*** -0.7232**
(-5.93) (-3.80) (-2.53)
Unexpected delay 0.0228 0.0213 0.0342
(0.83) (0.80) (0.64)
Time since t1 (t− t1) -0.0254 -0.0290* -0.0301
(-1.54) (-1.79) (-0.91)
Absolute deviation from liquidation value (|V−P |/P) 2.7340*** 2.9121*** 3.2501***
(13.44) (14.29) (8.51)
Idiosyncratic volatility (Ω0) 0.6325 1.4677*** 2.6152***
(1.44) (3.44) (2.83)
Share turnover (σy) 2.2034*** 1.8606*** 3.8389***
(12.79) (11.22) (11.41)
Market cap 1.0562*** 0.9876*** 2.0454***
(53.84) (51.60) (53.63)
Market trading volume 1.1870*** 1.2066*** 2.0559***
(17.17) (15.80) (13.84)
SPY volatility -0.5670*** -0.5206*** -1.1015***
(-4.62) (-4.22) (-4.26)
Number of filings 0.1698** 0.1578** 0.2975**
(2.25) (2.12) (2.00)
After market -3.4337*** -2.5711*** -5.9397***
(-23.14) (-12.20) (-16.47)
Form 4 -0.1159 -0.0657 -0.1470
(-1.52) (-0.87) (-0.97)
Form 8-K 0.4988*** 0.5359*** 0.9203***
(3.54) (3.85) (3.43)




Constant -40.6574*** -41.0595*** -76.0254***
(-24.15) (-22.72) (-21.55)
Observations 2,032,317 1,996,144 885,592
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.235 0.240 0.119
F-tests for Expected delay = Unexpected delay
F-statistic 36.56 15.24 6.81
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
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—Continued
Panel B: Number of trades
Dependent variables All trades All trades Trades per 1% price-value gap
(1) (2) (3)
Expected delay (1/µ) -0.4003*** -0.3097*** -0.0521**
(-6.00) (-3.77) (-2.07)
Unexpected delay 0.0105 0.0097 0.0020
(0.77) (0.72) (0.41)
Time since t1 (t− t1) -0.0112 -0.0130 -0.0006
(-1.37) (-1.62) (-0.20)
Absolute deviation from liquidation value (|V−P |/P) 1.3704*** 1.4633*** 0.2002***
(13.53) (14.43) (5.46)
Idiosyncratic volatility (Ω0) 0.4341** 0.8738*** 0.3085***
(1.99) (4.12) (3.72)
Share turnover (σy) 1.0759*** 0.8975*** 0.3124***
(12.63) (10.87) (10.42)
Market cap 0.5127*** 0.4770*** 0.1790***
(56.18) (52.63) (26.22)
Market trading volume 0.5905*** 0.5981*** 0.1723***
(17.04) (15.68) (12.68)
SPY volatility -0.2854*** -0.2605*** -0.1089***
(-4.66) (-4.25) (-4.66)
Number of filings 0.0811** 0.0746** 0.0288**
(2.14) (2.00) (2.11)
After market -1.7227*** -1.2866*** -0.5220***
(-23.18) (-12.26) (-14.65)
Form 4 -0.0599 -0.0349 -0.0054
(-1.56) (-0.91) (-0.39)
Form 8-K 0.2389*** 0.2583*** 0.0830***
(3.42) (3.75) (3.50)




Constant -20.1042*** -20.2606*** -6.5699***
(-23.89) (-22.41) (-18.42)
Observations 2,032,317 1,996,144 885,592
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.263 0.268 0.193
F -tests for Expected delay = Unexpected delay
F -statistic 137.20 14.88 4.48
P -value 0.000 0.000 0.034
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Figure 2.4: Average FTP-Public Delay Time and Filing Intensity throughout the Trad-
ing Day (Half-Hour Interval)
This figure repeats the analysis in Figure 2 except that it uses half-hour time interval.
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Table 2.8: Trading in Relation to Expected Delay: Panel Analysis, Subsample with Price Changes
Dependent variables All trades All trades Directional buy Directional sell Trades per 1% price-value gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Expected delay (1/µ) -0.0529*** -0.0567*** -0.1203* -0.2235*** -0.0062***
(-6.51) (-5.48) (-1.89) (-4.84) (-6.55)
Unexpected delay 0.0020 0.0020 0.0176 -0.0014 0.0003
(1.28) (1.27) (1.18) (-0.15) (1.50)
Time since t1 (t− t1) -0.0013 -0.0017 -0.0010 0.0042 -0.0000
(-1.00) (-1.25) (-0.08) (0.51) (-0.00)
Absolute deviation from liquidation value (|V−P |/P) 6.6618*** 7.2717*** 0.5523***
(12.27) (13.20) (8.56)
Deviation from liquidation value ((V−P )/P) 81.9020*** -71.1013***
(15.29) (-17.06)
Idiosyncratic volatility (Ω0) 3.7399** 4.6062*** -17.6218 -14.8016 0.7161***
(2.57) (3.18) (-1.30) (-1.47) (3.88)
Share turnover (σy) 3.2060*** 2.9350*** 22.2127*** 14.7059*** 0.3419***
(9.55) (8.89) (6.16) (7.92) (8.71)
Market cap decile 4.0329*** 3.9372*** 20.5396*** 17.6474*** 0.5166***
(45.08) (45.34) (15.07) (20.01) (37.98)
Market trading volume 4.8382*** 5.3027*** 26.5346*** 26.2776*** 0.5668***
(15.16) (15.17) (9.19) (8.95) (14.27)
SPY volatility -0.3548** -0.3617*** -2.6168** -2.3264** -0.0571***
(-2.55) (-2.64) (-2.28) (-2.15) (-3.01)
Number of filings 0.0299** 0.0281** 0.2516** 0.0257 0.0045**
(2.08) (1.99) (2.06) (0.26) (2.42)
After market -13.3135*** -9.3385*** -90.6904*** -73.4363*** -1.7090***
(-16.50) (-7.98) (-10.05) (-12.22) (-16.87)
Form 4 -0.4490 -0.3389 -3.8001 -2.3646 -0.0113
(-1.15) (-0.87) (-1.03) (-0.88) (-0.22)
Form 8-K 2.6780*** 2.7651*** 13.2087** 3.7443 0.2888***
(4.14) (4.31) (2.42) (0.90) (3.75)
Schedule 13D 8.7707*** 9.1561*** 35.2336*** 44.8705*** 0.9481***
(4.89) (5.00) (2.71) (4.94) (4.68)
Spread -1.4416***
(-7.16)
Constant -170.4654*** -180.3939*** -1,008.1353*** -931.2474*** -20.5905***
(-21.82) (-21.24) (-12.68) (-12.17) (-20.62)
Observations 1,115,497 1,081,992 1,115,497 1,115,497 1,065,211
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.0943 0.0949 0.0859 0.0888 0.1342
F-tests for Expected delay = Unexpected delay
F-statistic 47.80 32.90 4.92 24.19 49.10
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.000
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Table 2.9: Trading in Relation to Expected Delay: Panel Analysis by Filing Type
Dependent variables All trades All trades Directional buy Directional sell
Filing types Form 4 Form 8-K Schedule 13D Others
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Expected delay (1/µ) -0.1024*** -0.0540*** -0.1542*** -0.0491***
(-13.95) (-3.16) (-4.27) (-3.35)
Unexpected delay 0.0028* -0.0049 -0.0084 0.0036
(1.68) (-1.17) (-1.22) (1.25)
Time since t1 (t− t1) -0.0032** 0.0089*** -0.0182** -0.0039*
(-1.97) (2.99) (-2.33) (-1.71)
Absolute deviation from liquidation value (|V−P |/P) 6.3885*** 9.2559*** 6.7222*** 7.4512***
(11.66) (9.42) (3.88) (8.06)
Idiosyncratic volatility (Ω0) 9.9109*** 0.6320 -6.5367 -0.8562
(5.31) (0.20) (-1.18) (-0.52)
Share turnover (σy) 2.0425*** 4.5201*** 7.3305*** 3.4147***
(5.38) (5.99) (5.87) (9.19)
Market cap decile 4.2557*** 4.2093*** 3.0562*** 3.6123***
(42.84) (13.65) (7.37) (26.54)
Market trading volume 6.3138*** 4.1009*** 3.3437*** 5.9539***
(18.15) (7.55) (3.46) (9.05)
SPY volatility -0.7128*** -0.0326 0.3617 -0.6531***
(-5.84) (-0.20) (0.98) (-2.65)
Number of filings 0.0158 0.0280 0.1007 0.0319
(1.16) (0.61) (0.82) (1.09)
After market -15.7467*** -13.8337*** -16.3028*** -15.3271***
(-20.10) (-10.32) (-6.03) (-11.13)
Constant -203.7200*** -157.3783*** -112.6482*** -193.0402***
(-23.88) (-11.03) (-4.66) (-11.96)
Observations 1,379,364 456,051 34,026 663,654
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.179 0.178 0.242 0.168
F-tests for Expected delay = Unexpected delay
F-statistic 215.20 8.86 15.38 13.93
P-value 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000
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Table 2.10: Trading in Relation to Expected Delay: Panel Analysis, Expected Delay Predicted by Half-Hour Fixed Effects
Panel A: Trades in dollars
Dependent variables All trades All trades Directional buy Directional sell Trades per 1% price-value gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Expected delay (1/µ) -0.0660*** -0.0617*** -0.1942*** -0.2073*** -0.0046***
(-9.76) (-7.33) (-3.64) (-5.33) (-4.62)
Unexpected delay 0.0019 0.0021 0.0190 -0.0009 0.0003
(1.33) (1.43) (1.38) (-0.10) (1.53)
Time since t1 (t− t1) -0.0014 -0.0018 -0.0042 0.0016 -0.0000
(-1.16) (-1.47) (-0.36) (0.21) (-0.14)
Absolute deviation from liquidation value (|V−P |/P) 7.9782*** 8.2760*** 0.5298***
(15.13) (15.54) (7.97)
Deviation from liquidation value ((V−P )/P) 83.4833*** -68.9617***
(15.96) (-17.49)
Idiosyncratic volatility (Ω0) 2.6113** 3.6495*** -16.4555 -10.5276 0.7662***
(2.11) (2.97) (-1.43) (-1.27) (4.22)
Share turnover (σy) 3.3464*** 3.0669*** 21.7920*** 13.7413*** 0.3505***
(10.85) (10.24) (6.61) (8.47) (8.83)
Market cap decile 4.0195*** 3.9030*** 20.1907*** 16.3469*** 0.5295***
(47.02) (47.13) (16.39) (19.32) (38.51)
Market trading volume 5.4667*** 5.7782*** 29.8642*** 25.9729*** 0.5929***
(20.01) (18.95) (11.64) (10.60) (14.27)
SPY volatility -0.3700*** -0.3581*** -2.5827*** -1.9400** -0.0629***
(-3.00) (-2.98) (-2.72) (-2.37) (-3.32)
Number of filings 0.0254* 0.0227* 0.2240** -0.0006 0.0037**
(1.95) (1.76) (2.04) (-0.01) (2.01)
After market -15.3718*** -12.3879*** -92.8380*** -77.3326*** -1.8626***
(-23.12) (-13.53) (-12.63) (-16.88) (-17.68)
Form 4 -0.2401 -0.1143 -3.3995 -2.5306 -0.0035
(-0.64) (-0.31) (-1.01) (-0.99) (-0.07)
Form 8-K 2.3425*** 2.5066*** 10.5954** 1.5422 0.2543***
(3.76) (4.03) (2.02) (0.40) (3.23)
Schedule 13D 7.9112*** 8.0739*** 32.3527*** 37.0394*** 0.9022***
(4.89) (4.89) (2.71) (4.40) (4.34)
Spread -1.1776***
(-9.10)
Constant -184.8940*** -191.5129*** -1,081.3303*** -913.0482*** -21.5459***
(-27.33) (-25.64) (-14.91) (-13.91) (-20.60)
Observations 2,533,095 2,484,801 2,533,095 2,533,095 1,111,294
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.174 0.177 0.140 0.142 0.129
F-tests for Expected delay = Unexpected delay
F-statistic 106.37 59.23 16.95 29.83 25.26
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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Panel B: Number of trades
Dependent variables All trades All trades Directional buy Directional sell Trades per 1% price-value gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Expected delay (1/µ) -0.0132*** -0.0121*** -0.0230*** -0.0260*** -0.0009***
(-9.89) (-7.29) (-4.36) (-5.96) (-4.62)
Unexpected delay 0.0004 0.0004 0.0020 -0.0002 0.0001
(1.27) (1.36) (1.46) (-0.20) (1.50)
Time since t1 (t− t1) -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0007 0.0002 0.0000
(-1.07) (-1.38) (-0.56) (0.28) (0.02)
Absolute deviation from liquidation value (|V−P |/P) 1.5939*** 1.6571*** 0.0973***
(15.42) (15.88) (7.38)
Deviation from liquidation value ((V−P )/P) 8.3963*** -7.3956***
(21.67) (-21.05)
Idiosyncratic volatility (Ω0) 0.6238** 0.8551*** -1.1991 -0.8933 0.1479***
(2.57) (3.55) (-1.13) (-1.03) (4.21)
Share turnover (σy) 0.6613*** 0.6027*** 2.1514*** 1.5154*** 0.0702***
(11.08) (10.39) (9.37) (8.49) (9.04)
Market cap decile 0.7653*** 0.7403*** 1.9683*** 1.6947*** 0.1014***
(51.88) (51.45) (21.82) (23.90) (39.61)
Market trading volume 1.0911*** 1.1490*** 3.0604*** 2.8221*** 0.1158***
(19.97) (18.88) (12.50) (11.68) (14.31)
SPY volatility -0.0748*** -0.0720*** -0.2782*** -0.1911** -0.0124***
(-2.99) (-2.96) (-2.76) (-2.11) (-3.34)
Number of filings 0.0047* 0.0041 0.0214** -0.0021 0.0007*
(1.81) (1.62) (1.98) (-0.23) (1.94)
After market -3.1055*** -2.5082*** -9.5119*** -8.2933*** -0.3680***
(-23.45) (-13.83) (-13.57) (-18.42) (-17.86)
Form 4 -0.0459 -0.0220 -0.2806 -0.1780 -0.0010
(-0.62) (-0.30) (-0.82) (-0.68) (-0.10)
Form 8-K 0.4389*** 0.4718*** 0.8551* 0.1217 0.0493***
(3.59) (3.88) (1.74) (0.29) (3.20)
Schedule 13D 1.5524*** 1.5873*** 3.5881*** 4.6072*** 0.1742***
(4.65) (4.66) (2.71) (4.04) (4.21)
Spread -0.2502***
(-9.43)
Constant -36.5945*** -37.8154*** -108.9049*** -97.8013*** -4.1931***
(-27.43) (-25.64) (-17.05) (-15.91) (-20.74)
Observations 2,533,095 2,484,801 2,533,095 2,533,095 1,111,294
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.218 0.222 0.184 0.185 0.193
F-tests for Expected delay = Unexpected delay
F-statistic 108.65 58.34 23.94 36.79 25.17
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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Table 2.11: Trading in Relation to Expected Delay: Panel Analysis, Without the Last 15 Minutes Before Market Close
Panel A: Trades in dollars
Dependent variables All trades All trades Directional buy Directional sell Trades per 1% price-value gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Expected delay (1/µ) -0.0903*** -0.1019*** -0.3062*** -0.3392*** -0.0080***
(-12.92) (-11.49) (-5.83) (-9.02) (-9.29)
Unexpected delay 0.0006 0.0006 0.0019 0.0004 0.0001
(0.42) (0.49) (0.16) (0.04) (0.84)
Time since t1 (t− t1) 0.0010 0.0004 0.0119 0.0107 0.0003**
(1.08) (0.51) (1.38) (1.56) (2.33)
Absolute deviation from liquidation value (|V−P |/P) 8.4597*** 8.8976*** 0.4978***
(14.26) (14.87) (7.67)
Deviation from liquidation value ((V−P )/P) 86.6568*** -66.5222***
(15.55) (-16.79)
Idiosyncratic volatility (Ω0) 2.8340** 3.4647*** -20.1946* -8.2791 0.7151***
(2.16) (2.68) (-1.68) (-1.01) (4.23)
Share turnover (σy) 3.3977*** 3.1446*** 21.4890*** 13.2641*** 0.3239***
(10.47) (9.94) (5.91) (8.82) (8.90)
Market cap decile 4.1356*** 4.0406*** 20.6165*** 15.7273*** 0.4877***
(46.95) (48.19) (15.83) (19.76) (39.38)
Market trading volume 4.3742*** 4.7283*** 23.9663*** 17.3225*** 0.3788***
(20.50) (19.20) (10.81) (11.54) (12.74)
SPY volatility -0.2167** -0.1978* -1.4015* -0.9540 -0.0336**
(-1.99) (-1.88) (-1.66) (-1.38) (-2.24)
Number of filings 0.0147 0.0095 0.1298 -0.0758 0.0019
(1.09) (0.72) (1.16) (-0.90) (1.14)
After market -14.2781*** -9.8933*** -86.4750*** -65.8928*** -1.4679***
(-21.22) (-10.30) (-11.79) (-16.06) (-15.80)
Form 4 -0.1114 0.0371 0.3585 -1.6774 0.0315
(-0.32) (0.11) (0.13) (-0.73) (0.72)
Form 8-K 3.2872*** 3.5391*** 16.4168*** 4.5559 0.3438***
(5.19) (5.63) (3.10) (1.25) (4.84)
Schedule 13D 9.5258*** 9.9260*** 38.7876*** 43.9749*** 1.0063***
(5.51) (5.61) (2.96) (5.40) (5.00)
Spread -0.9717***
(-7.53)
Constant -159.6267*** -166.2432*** -942.8904*** -689.4580*** -15.6837***
(-29.47) (-27.65) (-14.32) (-16.56) (-21.05)
Observations 2,471,477 2,423,183 2,471,477 2,471,477 1,057,456
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.174 0.177 0.140 0.143 0.131
F-tests for Expected delay = Unexpected delay
F-statistic 175.73 134.82 34.58 87.06 91.51
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
111
—Continued
Panel B: Number of trades
Dependent variables All trades All trades Directional buy Directional sell Trades per 1% price-value gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Expected delay (1/µ) -0.0181*** -0.0202*** -0.0350*** -0.0417*** -0.0016***
(-13.21) (-11.69) (-6.78) (-9.37) (-9.31)
Unexpected delay 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0000 0.0000
(0.43) (0.49) (0.17) (-0.03) (0.85)
Time since t1 (t− t1) 0.0002 0.0001 0.0009 0.0011 0.0001**
(0.97) (0.41) (1.09) (1.50) (2.39)
Absolute deviation from liquidation value (|V−P |/P) 1.6749*** 1.7647*** 0.0941***
(14.59) (15.25) (7.21)
Deviation from liquidation value ((V−P )/P) 8.6298*** -7.3693***
(22.59) (-19.02)
Idiosyncratic volatility (Ω0) 0.6477** 0.7947*** -1.5317 -0.7195 0.1389***
(2.54) (3.15) (-1.43) (-0.80) (4.18)
Share turnover (σy) 0.6626*** 0.6101*** 2.0863*** 1.5075*** 0.0653***
(10.74) (10.14) (8.54) (8.72) (9.07)
Market cap decile 0.7840*** 0.7639*** 1.9942*** 1.6975*** 0.0950***
(51.64) (52.72) (22.73) (22.67) (39.96)
Market trading volume 0.8571*** 0.9238*** 2.4034*** 1.9481*** 0.0745***
(20.66) (19.26) (12.04) (11.90) (12.67)
SPY volatility -0.0426* -0.0386* -0.1442* -0.0910 -0.0068**
(-1.95) (-1.84) (-1.67) (-1.14) (-2.27)
Number of filings 0.0028 0.0018 0.0125 -0.0082 0.0004
(1.07) (0.69) (1.17) (-0.88) (1.18)
After market -2.8578*** -1.9837*** -8.7339*** -7.3703*** -0.2949***
(-21.55) (-10.56) (-13.07) (-16.13) (-15.97)
Form 4 -0.0252 0.0039 0.0922 -0.1399 0.0057
(-0.37) (0.06) (0.35) (-0.56) (0.66)
Form 8-K 0.6164*** 0.6653*** 1.4267*** 0.4227 0.0673***
(5.04) (5.48) (2.98) (1.05) (4.80)
Schedule 13D 1.8675*** 1.9486*** 4.2906*** 5.5376*** 0.1981***
(5.25) (5.36) (2.94) (4.78) (4.85)
Spread -0.2039***
(-7.85)
Constant -31.0700*** -32.3030*** -93.0118*** -76.2214*** -3.0809***
(-30.13) (-28.03) (-17.63) (-17.69) (-21.04)
Observations 2,471,477 2,423,183 2,471,477 2,471,477 1,057,456
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.218 0.221 0.184 0.185 0.194
F-tests for Expected delay = Unexpected delay
F-statistic 183.40 139.48 46.56 92.98 92.00
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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Table 2.12: Trading in Relation to Expected Delay: Panel Analysis, 85% Percentile Delay Cut-Off
Panel A: Trades in dollars
Dependent variables All trades All trades Directional buy Directional sell Trades per 1% price-value gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Expected delay (1/µ) -0.0826*** -0.0787*** -0.2718*** -0.2986*** -0.0075***
(-11.64) (-8.44) (-4.59) (-8.23) (-7.44)
Unexpected delay 0.0042** 0.0043** 0.0027 0.0236* 0.0007***
(2.38) (2.44) (0.18) (1.84) (2.66)
Time since t1 (t− t1) -0.0007 -0.0012 0.0169 -0.0064 0.0001
(-0.47) (-0.79) (1.36) (-0.53) (0.39)
Absolute deviation from liquidation value (|V−P |/P) 7.4362*** 7.7645*** 0.4986***
(16.74) (16.49) (7.95)
Deviation from liquidation value ((V−P )/P) 82.1163*** -69.0166***
(14.88) (-19.31)
Idiosyncratic volatility (Ω0) 3.7871*** 4.6349*** -5.8814 -10.0046 0.9346***
(2.87) (3.51) (-0.49) (-1.11) (4.72)
Share turnover (σy) 3.1569*** 2.9070*** 19.9937*** 14.3359*** 0.3310***
(9.84) (9.13) (5.13) (8.43) (7.89)
Market cap decile 4.0332*** 3.9283*** 20.3493*** 16.6369*** 0.5416***
(51.20) (50.62) (15.77) (19.83) (36.86)
Market trading volume 5.4481*** 5.8187*** 29.2791*** 28.0478*** 0.6275***
(18.91) (17.75) (11.56) (9.54) (13.67)
SPY volatility -0.3046** -0.2982** -2.7520*** -1.4551 -0.0597***
(-2.38) (-2.34) (-3.36) (-1.51) (-2.80)
Number of filings 0.0258* 0.0207 0.2392** 0.0409 0.0037*
(1.90) (1.53) (2.11) (0.42) (1.80)
After market -14.5514*** -11.3203*** -87.0515*** -75.5500*** -1.7715***
(-21.92) (-11.81) (-11.33) (-16.99) (-16.66)
Form 4 -0.4970 -0.3241 -4.2775 -3.8520 -0.0287
(-1.35) (-0.88) (-1.37) (-1.44) (-0.53)
Form 8-K 2.6089*** 2.8427*** 10.8273* 3.4953 0.3103***
(4.21) (4.53) (1.94) (0.90) (3.83)
Schedule 13D 9.5926*** 9.9091*** 41.2793*** 43.0308*** 1.1290***
(6.21) (6.24) (3.44) (4.97) (5.80)
Spread -1.1333***
(-7.56)
Constant -183.2308*** -191.3075*** -1,062.7651*** -960.9131*** -22.3359***
(-26.27) (-24.34) (-14.69) (-12.39) (-19.33)
Observations 1,792,068 1,749,954 1,792,068 1,792,068 830,584
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.172 0.174 0.136 0.142 0.131
F-tests for Expected delay = Unexpected delay
F-statistic 158.02 81.39 23.28 89.35 68.09
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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Panel B: Number of trades
Dependent variables All trades All trades Directional buy Directional sell Trades per 1% price-value gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Expected delay (1/µ) -0.0166*** -0.0156*** -0.0322*** -0.0365*** -0.0015***
(-11.93) (-8.57) (-5.61) (-8.76) (-7.51)
Unexpected delay 0.0008** 0.0008** 0.0001 0.0026* 0.0001**
(2.36) (2.41) (0.08) (1.95) (2.56)
Time since t1 (t− t1) -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0012 -0.0007 0.0000
(-0.40) (-0.72) (1.01) (-0.52) (0.50)
Absolute deviation from liquidation value (|V−P |/P) 1.4949*** 1.5676*** 0.0892***
(16.69) (16.56) (7.26)
Deviation from liquidation value ((V−P )/P) 8.2366*** -7.5431***
(23.03) (-24.33)
Idiosyncratic volatility (Ω0) 0.8415*** 1.0340*** -0.0406 -0.8787 0.1770***
(3.25) (3.99) (-0.04) (-0.91) (4.68)
Share turnover (σy) 0.6347*** 0.5823*** 1.9528*** 1.6317*** 0.0664***
(10.18) (9.41) (8.04) (8.57) (8.13)
Market cap decile 0.7684*** 0.7459*** 1.9804*** 1.7483*** 0.1025***
(57.01) (55.45) (24.83) (26.83) (38.28)
Market trading volume 1.0952*** 1.1663*** 2.9823*** 3.0764*** 0.1215***
(18.68) (17.55) (12.97) (10.78) (13.77)
SPY volatility -0.0608** -0.0594** -0.2819*** -0.1401 -0.0115***
(-2.31) (-2.27) (-3.51) (-1.30) (-2.79)
Number of filings 0.0049* 0.0039 0.0229** 0.0023 0.0007*
(1.84) (1.46) (2.12) (0.23) (1.82)
After market -2.9434*** -2.2903*** -8.9454*** -8.2321*** -0.3465***
(-22.32) (-12.06) (-12.37) (-19.72) (-16.86)
Form 4 -0.0974 -0.0642 -0.3568 -0.3528 -0.0058
(-1.32) (-0.88) (-1.15) (-1.29) (-0.56)
Form 8-K 0.4882*** 0.5340*** 0.8243 0.3687 0.0597***
(3.99) (4.31) (1.63) (0.87) (3.81)
Schedule 13D 1.8930*** 1.9585*** 4.5711*** 5.4119*** 0.2179***
(5.92) (5.97) (3.39) (4.54) (5.79)
Spread -0.2426***
(-7.79)
Constant -36.4737*** -38.0197*** -106.4599*** -104.1025*** -4.3052***
(-25.94) (-23.98) (-18.61) (-14.61) (-19.55)
Observations 1,792,068 1,749,954 1,792,068 1,792,068 830,584
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.216 0.219 0.179 0.185 0.196
F-tests for Expected delay = Unexpected delay
F-statistic 164.16 83.23 32.61 98.76 68.74
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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Table 2.13: Trading in Relation to Expected Delay: Time to the First Trade, Subsample with Price Changes
Dependent variables Time to the first trade Time to the first directional trade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Expected delay 0.360*** 0.460*** 0.461*** 0.466*** 0.112 0.266*** 0.724*** 0.731***
(5.27) (7.36) (6.50) (6.61) (1.14) (2.66) (5.99) (6.14)
Unexpected delay 0.073*** 0.059*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.263*** 0.260*** 0.262*** 0.262***
(9.68) (8.03) (7.94) (8.14) (14.17) (14.32) (14.62) (14.82)
|AR(t1, t1 + 15min)| -11.362*** -13.323*** -11.391*** -15.513***
(-8.01) (-8.02) (-3.50) (-4.50)
Idiosyncratic volatility (Ω0) -21.202*** -11.925** -22.683*** -12.941** -20.451** -13.126 -24.993** -13.699
(-4.25) (-2.24) (-4.23) (-2.47) (-2.24) (-1.21) (-2.53) (-1.30)
Share turnover (σy) -13.903*** -12.630*** -11.503*** -11.937*** -17.908*** -16.824*** -14.950*** -15.436***
(-13.32) (-13.15) (-11.81) (-12.48) (-8.73) (-8.11) (-7.62) (-7.84)
Market cap decile -14.005*** -13.988*** -12.757*** -13.323*** -17.089*** -17.383*** -16.616*** -17.309***
(-32.67) (-31.27) (-27.73) (-27.65) (-22.57) (-21.86) (-21.63) (-21.77)
Market trading volume -18.616*** -13.313*** -19.902*** -20.118*** -25.753*** -22.608*** -28.219*** -28.308***
(-9.83) (-6.52) (-8.17) (-8.42) (-9.03) (-7.13) (-7.32) (-7.45)
SPY volatility 1.770** 1.882** 1.456* 1.701** 3.942*** 4.070*** 3.652** 3.961***
(2.07) (2.26) (1.77) (2.18) (3.09) (3.24) (2.57) (2.89)
Number of filings -0.378*** -0.259** -0.267*** -0.266*** -0.412** -0.326* -0.200 -0.200
(-3.42) (-2.52) (-2.73) (-2.78) (-2.25) (-1.82) (-1.19) (-1.20)
After market 108.108*** 99.645*** 74.508*** 76.672*** 145.587*** 131.918*** 52.500*** 55.301***
(15.20) (15.66) (8.59) (9.18) (14.23) (12.54) (3.51) (3.86)
Form 4 -2.894 -2.154 -2.978* -3.114* -5.216 -4.799 -4.409 -4.587
(-1.55) (-1.24) (-1.69) (-1.81) (-1.25) (-1.18) (-1.09) (-1.16)
Form 8-K -12.882*** -11.546*** -14.047*** -11.414*** -11.281** -9.941* -15.517*** -12.543**
(-5.08) (-4.53) (-5.56) (-4.64) (-2.17) (-1.91) (-2.94) (-2.43)
Schedule 13D -35.808*** -31.193*** -31.547*** -29.666*** -35.253** -33.906** -43.750*** -41.994***
(-5.36) (-5.16) (-5.37) (-4.96) (-2.52) (-2.46) (-3.24) (-3.15)
Spread 4.531*** 5.315*** 4.734*** 5.632***
(4.73) (5.44) (3.58) (4.04)
Constant 588.417*** 448.089*** 597.815*** 606.986*** 920.320*** 832.373*** 926.668*** 933.569***
(13.11) (9.24) (10.35) (10.71) (13.25) (10.79) (10.15) (10.37)
Observations 18,544 15,402 14,362 14,362 18,544 15,402 14,362 14,362
F-tests for Expected delay = Unexpected delay
F-statistic 131.99 147.04 81.30 75.45 11.86 14.92 39.88 37.63
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
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Table 2.14: Limit vs. Market Orders: Subsample with Price Changes
(1) (2)
Limit order Market order Difference χ2 and p-Value Limit order Market order Difference χ2 and p-Value
(i) (ii) (iii) (i) (ii) (iii)
Expected delay -0.0069*** -0.0069*** 0.00 -0.0053*** -0.0078*** 11.1***
(-6.45) (-7.05) (0.9825) (-4.23) (-6.23) (0.0009)
Time since t1 (t− t1) 0.0001 -0.0001 2.52 0.0001 -0.0002 3.97**
(0.72) (-0.62) (0.1122) (0.74) (-0.96) (0.0463)
Absolute deviation from liquidation value (|V−P |/P) 0.5633*** 0.5087*** 3.17* 0.6334*** 0.5844*** 2.88*
(14.43) (11.16) (0.0750) (14.87) (11.77) (0.0900)
Idiosyncratic volatility (Ω0) 0.2424* 0.3199*** 0.58 0.4225*** 0.4980*** 0.62
(1.70) (2.61) (0.4473) (3.38) (4.52) (0.4310)
Market cap decile 0.4706*** 0.4564*** 2.21 0.4531*** 0.4424*** 1.19
(39.57) (40.87) (0.1370) (37.99) (39.45) (0.2744)
Share turnover (σy) 0.3746*** 0.3790*** 0.04 0.3381*** 0.3403*** 0.01
(9.42) (10.29) (0.8389) (8.66) (9.44) (0.9226)
Market trading volume 0.6705*** 0.6003*** 3.02* 0.7139*** 0.6051*** 7.42***
(14.04) (14.17) (0.0823) (14.24) (13.78) (0.0064)
SPY volatility -0.0571*** -0.0301 6.90*** -0.0565** -0.0301 6.53**
(-2.63) (-1.55) (0.0086) (-2.57) (-1.62) (0.0106)
Number of filings 0.0022 0.0038** 1.12 0.0022 0.0030* 0.29
(1.21) (2.11) (0.2909) (1.20) (1.71) (0.5876)
After market -1.5609*** -1.7689*** 5.14** -1.2120*** -1.0582*** 2.65
(-12.81) (-14.44) (0.0234) (-7.17) (-6.48) (0.1032)
Form 4 -0.0568 0.0120 1.93 -0.0443 0.0183 1.61
(-1.03) (0.26) (0.1651) (-0.80) (0.40) (0.2042)
Form 8-K 0.2635*** 0.3669*** 2.64 0.2677*** 0.3921*** 3.89**
(3.17) (4.51) (0.1044) (3.19) (4.84) (0.0486)
Schedule 13D 1.0432*** 1.0384*** 0.00 1.0683*** 1.1049*** 0.12
(4.05) (4.11) (0.9649) (4.04) (4.31) (0.7330)
Spread -0.3000*** -0.2843*** 0.15
(-6.68) (-6.54) (0.7031)
Constant -22.6962*** -21.0666*** 2.78* -23.7074*** -20.9680*** 7.93***
(-19.69) (-20.79) (0.0957) (-19.60) (-20.04) (0.0049)
Observations 1,115,497 1,115,497 1,081,992 1,081,992
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Table 2.15: Information Dissemination: Uncensored Version
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Expected delay -0.0099*** -0.0108*** -0.0108*** -0.0173***
(-3.55) (-3.83) (-3.62) (-5.89)
Time since t1 (t− t1) 0.0085*** 0.0085*** 0.0087*** 0.0086***
(10.94) (11.05) (11.54) (11.35)
Idiosyncratic volatility (Ω0) 4.2970*** 2.7562*** 2.7621***
(6.55) (4.32) (4.30)
Market cap decile -0.0169 0.1524*** 0.1589*** 0.1524***
(-0.60) (4.85) (5.16) (4.95)
Share turnover (σy) 1.0992*** 0.6575*** 0.6251*** 0.6700***
(7.66) (4.16) (4.05) (4.28)
Market trading volume 0.6081*** 0.6337*** 0.5701*** 0.6551***
(11.58) (12.04) (10.27) (11.23)
SPY volatility -0.0016 -0.0026 -0.0055 -0.0033
(-0.09) (-0.16) (-0.34) (-0.20)
Number of filings 0.0105* 0.0113* 0.0119** 0.0102*
(1.82) (1.96) (2.20) (1.88)
After market -1.8291*** -1.8772*** -1.7659*** -0.9850***
(-6.54) (-6.70) (-6.07) (-3.14)
Form 4 -0.6476*** -0.6583*** -0.4558** -0.4214**
(-3.45) (-3.52) (-2.48) (-2.28)
Form 8K 1.3049*** 1.2397*** 1.0511*** 1.2260***
(4.18) (3.98) (3.29) (3.75)
Schedule 13D 2.1468** 1.9639** 2.0903** 2.0158**
(2.29) (2.09) (2.26) (2.17)




Constant -10.9740*** -13.3427*** -12.1232*** -13.6762***
(-8.90) (-10.61) (-9.29) (-9.98)
Observations 2,640,656 2,637,773 2,532,825 2,484,557
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.043 0.047 0.100 0.102
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Table 2.16: Market Depth
Panel A: Bid-ask spread
Bid-ask spread
Full sample Front half of expected delay Back half of expected delay
(1) (2) (3)
Expected delay 0.0202*** 0.0220*** 0.0180***
(11.47) (16.77) (6.82)
Time since t1 (t− t1) 0.0005* 0.0006 0.0007**
(1.69) (0.96) (2.05)
Absolute deviation from liquidation value (|V−P |/P) -0.1825 -0.1134 -0.2238
(-1.50) (-1.12) (-1.53)
Idiosyncratic volatility (Ω0) 0.7129** 0.6724*** 0.7318**
(2.49) (2.73) (2.21)
Market cap decile -0.2150*** -0.2249*** -0.2094***
(-12.40) (-15.15) (-10.40)
Share turnover (σy) -0.6402*** -0.6656*** -0.6280***
(-11.36) (-15.04) (-9.29)
Market trading volume -0.4354*** -0.4851*** -0.3977***
(-10.32) (-14.61) (-7.18)
SPY volatility 0.0238* 0.0295*** 0.0203
(1.82) (2.64) (1.35)
Number of filings -0.0041 -0.0061** -0.0029
(-1.22) (-2.10) (-0.76)
After market 2.4144*** 2.1702*** 2.6437***
(12.46) (14.43) (9.14)
Form 4 0.6447*** 0.5722*** 0.6759***
(6.32) (6.57) (5.70)
Form 8-K 0.4608*** 0.4541*** 0.4605***
(3.16) (3.64) (2.72)
Schedule 13D -0.6824* -0.4047 -0.8221*
(-1.65) (-1.16) (-1.69)
Constant 10.9708*** 12.2308*** 10.0685***
(11.15) (15.71) (7.96)
Observations 2,484,801 847,720 1,637,081
R-squared 0.238 0.222 0.247
118
—Continued
Panel B: Absolute price change
Dependent variable Absolute price change
Full sample Front half of expected delay Back half of expected delay
(1) (2) (3)
Expected delay -0.1024*** -0.1663*** -0.0640***
(-10.19) (-13.47) (-5.38)
Time since t1 (t− t1) 0.0011 0.0077 0.0007
(0.62) (0.54) (0.39)
Absolute deviation from liquidation value (|V−P |/P) 14.1215*** 16.1433*** 13.2265***
(13.50) (14.36) (10.41)
Idiosyncratic volatility (Ω0) 9.1468*** 6.3992*** 10.2952***
(4.39) (3.04) (4.15)
Market cap decile 5.1649*** 5.6698*** 4.8940***
(24.50) (25.27) (18.41)
Share turnover (σy) 4.2629*** 5.6531*** 3.5960***
(8.51) (10.80) (6.51)
Market trading volume 6.7442*** 8.2493*** 5.8905***
(16.56) (15.04) (13.29)
SPY volatility -0.4487*** -0.4462** -0.4160**
(-2.63) (-2.36) (-2.34)
Number of filings 0.0517** 0.0709*** 0.0444**
(2.57) (3.08) (2.12)
After market -21.5319*** -23.3289*** -21.7099***
(-16.60) (-15.75) (-13.00)
Form 4 -0.0378 1.2865** -0.5317
(-0.08) (2.44) (-0.99)
Form 8-K 4.7754*** 5.7664*** 4.4275***
(5.15) (5.85) (4.33)
Schedule 13D 14.6705*** 19.8751*** 11.6708***
(5.44) (5.12) (3.84)
Constant -249.0399*** -294.1053*** -224.5844***
(-20.79) (-18.54) (-16.69)
Observations 2,503,065 834,146 1,668,919
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.134 0.138 0.132
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2.6.3 Additional Discussions
FTP vs. PDS time stamps
We explain why we use the FTP time as the main proxy for the beginning of the private
window in Section 2.2.1. The reason we use the FTP stamp for our main analysis is
that it allows a significantly longer sample period (85 business days); and during the
period in which we have both time stamps (52 business days) we find that the two time
stamps are very close—they are often identical and when they do differ they differ by
a matter of few seconds. The correlation between the delay variables using FTP vs.
using PDS is 0.88, and the median absolute difference is one second.
The closeness of the two time stamps (FTP vs. PDS) is not a coincidence but is
the outcome of the infrastructure of the system. New filings are uploaded to the SEC
and sent to all three systems. The FTP and PDS times are tightly correlated because
they do not involve an “intermediary” (a public website). The FTP system is simply
a repository of files which can be downloaded on demand, if one knows where to look.
Each filer has its own “directory,” and new filings are deposited there immediately;
but with 20,000+ filers (directories), it is impossible to know where the next filing will
appear. The PDS system solves this problem; it was intentionally engineered to rapidly
“push” filings to subscribers in real-time.
The EDGAR website is the only place where the general public can find new securi-
ties filings (without knowing in advance which firms have filed); but because it contains
an entire user interface, it is much slower. Each filing needs to be added to the list on
the EDGAR website (https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcurrent),
and this process takes time. For that reason, the website is in a “class of its own” --
during high-volume periods, thousands of submissions may be submitted within a very
short time, but the exact order in which they appear online--while technically deter-
120
Table 2.17: Information Dissemination: Dependent Variable Scaled by Price Change
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Expected delay -0.0137 -0.0141 -0.0165 -0.3479***
(-0.18) (-0.19) (-0.22) (-3.51)
Time since t1 (t− t1) 0.3610*** 0.3610*** 0.3611*** 0.3523***
(21.18) (21.17) (21.14) (20.69)
Idiosyncratic volatility (Ω0) 2.8094 -5.2363 -11.4731
(0.17) (-0.30) (-0.64)
Market cap decile 9.7561*** 9.8571*** 10.0199*** 10.2076***
(13.41) (11.10) (11.24) (11.28)
Share turnover (σy) 9.4125*** 9.1422*** 9.7554*** 10.9457***
(3.80) (3.11) (3.32) (3.64)
Market trading volume 9.6230*** 9.6549*** 9.9787*** 13.7011***
(3.61) (3.61) (3.78) (4.71)
SPY volatility -1.5439 -1.5467 -1.5533 -1.1406
(-1.60) (-1.61) (-1.61) (-1.16)
Number of filings 0.3301** 0.3296** 0.3272** 0.2651*
(2.08) (2.08) (2.06) (1.67)
After market -72.2842*** -72.2860*** -73.9725*** -40.6133***
(-9.35) (-9.36) (-9.69) (-4.05)
Form 4 4.3249 4.3655 4.6756 5.5777
(0.97) (0.98) (1.05) (1.25)
Form 8K 15.7123** 15.6822** 14.7196** 18.0753***
(2.44) (2.44) (2.29) (2.77)
Schedule 13D 37.3887** 37.2859** 38.1658** 42.8585***
(2.46) (2.47) (2.51) (2.77)




Constant -436.9765*** -438.8823*** -447.3157*** -513.6135***
(-6.76) (-6.71) (-6.91) (-7.23)
Observations 1,115,735 1,115,497 1,115,471 1,081,992
(Pseudo) R-squared 0.0189 0.0189 0.0191 0.0175
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mined by the submission order--is as-good-as-random from the standpoint of each user,
who does not know their relative position in the “burst” of filings that were submitted
at that moment in time (essentially simultaneously).
PDS advantage and public knowledge
The PDS system was neither established nor operated as a for-profit business venture.
Rather, it was conceived of and implemented as a government contracting project;
the contractor was chosen to design and implement the system on behalf of the SEC,
a government agency, not to maximize profits but rather to provide a service to the
business community. In other words, from an institutional standpoint, the service
provider lacked the freedom to pursue profit maximization. Were it to do so, the
SEC would almost certainly be strongly condemned for attempting to monetize the
dissemination of material information that should be in the public domain. Hence,
there was no “business model” in the conventional sense for the PDS. Participants were
subscribing to a government service that, like many other government services, was
technically provided by a third party contractor. It is thus likely that the service was
priced at something close to stated cost, which explains the seeming modest subscription
cost.
Moreover, a PDS subscriber needs to have sophisticated system/skill in order to
profit from the opportunity. From our own experience as a PDS subscriber attempting
to simulate trading, it seems that the level of sophistication required to accurately
predict the value of the information in real-time (from a machine learning standpoint)
is very high. This is critically different from the “fact snippets” that can be quickly
and easily traded on like a single macroeconomic news figure (Hu et al. (2017)). Even
in the case of Form 4 filings, that contain very structured trading and directional
information, the trades have already occurred sometime in the last 48 hours. Thus
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much or all of the price impact of these trades should have already been absorbed into
the price. The type of filings that contain the most potentially profitable information
is Form 8-K—which announces material value-relevant specific events that do not fit
into scheduled disclosure, such as a material customer and supplier agreement—often
requires sophisticated judgment to determine the value effect on the company. This
explains the seeming “slow reaction” in the price we documents.
The contractor was not hired to give its subscribers an advantage over the general
public, but just to disseminate or “rebroadcast” the filings at the same time via a “push”
mechanism. Thus, one explanation for the low number of subscribers may simply be
that it was not public knowledge that the PDS channel was systematically faster than
the EDGAR. There is no reason to expect that a government-contracted service should
create an uneven playground—such a sentiment was apparent when the outrage over
revelation from the fact that the public was potentially taken advantage of.
In the end, there is no evidence (through formal investigation) that either the SEC,
or the contractor, was acting opportunistically. It was plausibly an innocent mistake due
to poor engineering coordination between the public website and the private feed which
was not properly understood. And to fix the problem the contractor “resynchronized”
the systems. There was no marketing of the timing advantage, it was never mentioned
in the advertising materials. Even if maybe it was an “open secret” among some, it was
certainly not something that the firm was building a business off of.
The effect of newswire on information dissemination
Because anecdotal discussions suggest that the subscribers of the PDS may include
newswire agencies, we assess the potential impact of “indirect leakage” from such agen-
cies to their clients. To begin, we code an alternative t2 (the end of the private window
or the time of the filing’s public disclosure) to be the earliest possible time at which
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the filing was released via newswire. More specifically, for each filing, we obtain the
time of the first newswire in the Dow Jones Newswire dataset that mentions the com-
pany ticker after t1 (the beginning of the private window) on the day of the filing. We
were able to match 6,160 of the Trimmed Sample. We find that the first newswire
timestamp is later than the EDGAR public timestamp, i.e., t2 (EDGAR), for all of
these 6,160 filings except 30. Because of the very tiny percentage of cases (less than
0.1%) where t2(Newswire) < t2(EDGAR) , our results are virtually identical if we set
t2 = min (t2(Newswire), t2(EDGAR)). Note that this is a very conservative coding of
an alternative t2 because we code any newswire regarding a firm (which may or may
not be related to the actual filing under consideration) to be a potential public release
of the news prior to the EDGAR posting of that filing.
We also interviewed a newswire writer from a leading news agency about the process
and speed of wire news composition and dissemination. According to the interviewee,
the wire writers set up a program (by key words, etc.) to be alerted when news of
particular topics arrive at their terminal. The interviewee told us that it takes “a few
seconds to deem [the alert] news,” and “another 10-15 seconds to capture and code [the
alert] to the right category.” The rule, according to the interviewee, was that “a two
paragraph ‘URGENT’ goes on the wire in two minutes, a five paragraph update on the
wire in 20 minutes.” Therefore, even if a newswire agency has a subscription to the PDS,
investors who receive news from the wire agency still have a significant lag behind the
direct subscribers to PDS, and in most cases will also fall behind the EDGAR release
time. Finally, we note that the data in Rogers et al. (2017) was obtained from an
anonymous hedge fund, a fact consistent with the notion that investors such as hedge
funds are the main sources of informed trading during the private window.
As for information releases prior to PDS (or before anyone receiving the SEC filings
more generally), in principle this should not occur under Regulation FD, which gener-
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ally requires simultaneous public disclosure of material nonpublic information. Earnings
guidance, of course, is not uncommon, but quarterly filings reflect only a small percent-
age of our sample. Finally, we searched for wire-based disclosure of earnings prior to
our t1 time stamp on the same day, and were unable to identify any cases of any such
disclosure.
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On October 30, 2014, an article in the Wall Street Journal revealed that a group of
investors could receive market-moving information ahead of other users of EDGAR1.
The earlier access to the filings provided these investors a potential advantage over
others by giving them extra time to trade on the news.
The issue emerged from the lack of coordination between the two primary electronic
portals that public investors were using to access the newly disclosed security filings
of public companies.2. Once a public company uploaded its filings to SEC, the filings
became available to investors through three distribution channels. The main portal was
(and continues to be) SEC’s EDGAR system accessible by the public through SEC’s
website. The other channel, and the primary source of controversy, was a private
contractor, operating the Public Dissemination Service (PDS), who distributed the
SEC filings to a group of paying subscribers at an annual cost. Due to different data
1Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval, EDGAR, is the SEC’s automated system for
collecting and reporting the submissions of public companies. The database is publicly available via
the internet.
2The U.S. law imposes specific disclosure requirements for publicly traded companies, mandating
these companies to publicize certain types of their financial and business data (by submitting to the
SEC, generally in the form of security filings) on a regular basis.
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transfer technologies used in these two distribution vehicles, the transmission time by
which the filings reach their destination varies across the channels.
As reported by Bolandnazar et al. (2020) (henceforth BJJM), the filings were avail-
able on the EDGAR website with a delay, ranging from seconds to several minutes,
beyond the time they took to reach PDS subscribers. 3 4 Depending on the amount of
congestion resulting from the volume of filing submissions, the delay mentioned above
may seem to depend on the time of the day; For example, if public companies prefer
particular times of the day for submitting their filings. Even so, at a specific time
when several issuers are submitting their reports, it is not easy for them to choose the
position of their submission within the queue of simultaneous orders. In other words,
conditional on the time of the day, the speculators perceive the realized delay to be
partially random. In other words, conditional on the time of the day, the speculators
perceive the realized delay to be partially random. In particular, BJJM verify that
once one controls for the time-of-day of filing release, there is no significant relationship
between the realized delay and the filings’ observable characteristics (e.g. market cap-
italization, liquidity, and idiosyncratic volatility of the corresponding stock value). 5
The exogenous variation in the delays forms the basis of the causal inference in BJJM.
It provides a neat setting for analyzing how private information is disseminated in prices
and a unique opportunity for studying the trading behavior of speculators possessing
informational advantage. This further enables BJJM to test standard models of trading
under information asymmetry.
The main findings of that study are summarized as follows. First, BJJM provide
3There was also a third distribution channel, the SEC’s File Transfer Protocol, or FTP server. As
it is practically difficult to constantly navigate for detecting unexpected filings of a firm through its
directory, BJJM assume that the number of investors getting early access to the filings via FTP is
negligible.
4The EDGAR system, unlike the other two, includes a user interface (to facilitate the users accessing
the system through its website) which makes it slower, in general.
5Further, they emphasize that the majority (94.7%) of the filings in their sample are non-scheduled
and hence unanticipated by the market participants.
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evidence that the early informed can make a profit from their early informational ad-
vantage. Based on empirical evidence, speculators seem to be successful in smoothing
out their trade over time to mitigate the price impact caused by their own trades. More
importantly, the paper documents a particular pattern in price movements within the
private window, i.e., the time interval between the moments PDS users and EDGAR
users get access to a specific filing. The evidence suggests a modest but sudden price
change within the first second, followed by a long period (around 100 seconds) of grad-
ual and slow price movements. To further explore this, the paper detects a particular
trading pattern: The volume of trade in the first second is almost three times as large
as usual. Following this, the trading volume per second gradually lessens while still
stays above normal levels.
Another interesting observation in BJJM is that the speed at which the private
information is impounded into the prices depends on the expected duration of the pri-
vate window rather than its realized duration. As we described earlier, the public
announcement’s time is perceived by the speculators to be random. However, they can
predict, to some extent, the time of the public announcement, using observables such
as time-of-day at which they get access to private information. They choose their trade
smoothing strategy based on what their expectation suggests about the time of the
public announcement. Accordingly, the pace of information dissemination caused by
informed trading depends more firmly on the expected delay than on the actual delay.
This prediction is also in line with the empirical evidence provided by BJJM.
The next set of results in BJJM concentrates on the patterns in the trading behavior
during the private window, using the TAQ data aggregated at the security-second level
across different filings. First, the empirical evidence shows that as the expected delay
increases, it takes longer before the first trade occurs. Interestingly, this is not the case
if one considers “actual delays” instead of “expected delays”. This suggests that when
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the speculator anticipates a longer delay, he takes his time to process the information
available in the filings. Furthermore, the speed of trading is significantly higher for the
filings with easier-to-digest information. Finally, BJJM study the relationship between
the propensity to trade and deviation of price from ex-post liquidation value. They
find that higher price deviation is positively related to the number and dollar value of
trades. A more important observation is that trade takes place more aggressively the
closer we get to the end of the expected private window.
The current paper’s primary goal is to design a model consistent with the empirical
findings of BJJM. To this end, I propose a model of strategic trading under informa-
tion asymmetry, which builds upon Kyle (1985). In the original model of Kyle (1985),
there are three groups of agents: uninformed traders, market makers, and one informed
trader who has some private information about the liquidation value of the asset. The
private information is assumed to be publicly announced to all market participants at
a fixed time known by everyone. The equilibrium consists of a trading rule for the
informed who places market orders at each step, and a pricing scheme based on which
the market maker sets the price competitively and takes the other side of the trade
to clear the market. Kyle (1985) solves the model in discrete-time and introduces the
model’s continuous-time limit as an approximation for the case where the trades and
price changes take place almost continuously. Back (1992) generalizes Kyle’s model to
continuous-time and derives the equilibrium rigorously and in a more general frame-
work. Unfortunately, as these models assume a fixed and known public announcement
time, we cannot directly use them for our setting. We need some level of random varia-
tion in the arrival time of public news (which serves as the time when the filings appear
on EDGAR).
My model closely follows the one proposed by Caldentey and Stacchetti (2010) (here-
after CS), in which the asset value is publicly announced at a random time. In that
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model, the asset’s fundamental value varies continuously and is perfectly observed by
the insider. The authors show that the equilibrium consists of two trading regimes and
an endogenous transition time that separates the two regimes. Before the transition,
the insider trades smoothly on his information advantage as if there is a fixed stopping
time (like in Kyle (1985)). By that time, the insider has impounded all her informa-
tion into stock prices. From that point onward, the insider trades highly aggressively
and disseminates his private information immediately. Indeed, the market efficiency is
reached by a deterministic (though endogenously determined) time even though there
might be a gradual inflow of private information afterward.
More specifically, I study a model in which the informed agent does not perfectly
observe the asset’s fundamental value once he gets access to the private source of in-
formation. Instead, using his private source, the insider continues to extract a flow
of signals about the security’s actual value. He starts with a lumpy informational ad-
vantage with the first glance at his source and then gradually hones his knowledge of
the fundamental value going forward. Other traders, however, only observe the total
order flows. At some random time, the asset’s actual value is publicly announced, and
the trading opportunity ends. I show that under specific conditions, there exists an
equilibrium in which the insider follows two different behaviors before and after some
endogenously determined finite time T . Before this time, the insider trades as if he is
facing a deterministic terminal time (i.e., public announcement arrival). He smooths his
trades over time, like in Kyle (1985), to minimize the price impacts of his trades, and
as a consequence, he gradually reveals his private information. By the time T , he has
released all the informational advantage. He switches to an entirely different trading be-
havior: He trades in large volumes and discloses every bit of new information he receives
immediately. I refer to this post-revelation phase as a “trade frenzy”. Even though the
market reaches its full price efficiency by time T , the insider continues to make profits
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by washing away all the mispricing that takes place going forward. The existence of a
finite “endogenous stopping time” depends on several factors. First, as it is always opti-
mal to reveal “lumpy” private information by smoothing the trades over time, following
Kyle (1985), thus, to be able to reach the trade frenzy regime after some finite time,
the insider must expect to have enough time before the arrival of public announcement.
Indeed, when the public announcement is expected to happen late enough, the insider
has sufficient time to gradually give away his lumpy private information by smoothing
the trades. Whereas, if the insider expects the public announcement to arrive soon,
compared to the time he needs to release his lumpy informational advantage gradually,
he would not be willing to rush into revealing his precious private information. In this
case, the market efficiency is reached only asymptotically. Another critical factor is
the speed at which the insider can extract information once he started the trade frenzy
phase. Remarkably, the rent that the informed gets after time T comes from the in-
stantaneous informational advantage that he gains at every single moment. The more
information he can get in a short amount of time, the larger profit he can make by
correcting the instantaneous mispricings. Consequently, the insider must anticipate a
high rate of information inflow to plan for a finite endogenous stopping time, a time
of deliberate information revelation. The rate of information inflow may vary depend-
ing on the insider’s cognitive characteristics (e.g., his financial expertise or information
processing ability) or the level of complexity of the private source (e.g., the type of fil-
ing). If the insider expects the public announcement to arrive soon or anticipates only
a modest inflow rate of private information, a two-regime equilibrium of the type we
described does not exist anymore. There is instead an equilibrium in which the insider
patiently smooths the trades over time to prolong his informational advantage, with-
out any willingness to release his private information perfectly. With an overly patient
insider, the market efficiency is reached only asymptotically. Even though these two
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types of equilibrium suggest different implications in many respects, they share some
common features. In particular, the equilibrium price and trade quantity dynamics
depend on the distribution moments of the random terminal time. As the insider acts
strategically to smooth his trades over time, he forms expectations about the arrival of
the public news and changes in the prices. On the other hand, the prices (set by the
market maker) track this strategic behavior by closely monitoring the total order flow’s
movements. As a result, both prices and quantities depend on the expectations about
the private window’s size.
My model is also essential from a technical point of view in that it addresses some
shortcomings of continuous-time models in approximating multi-period discrete-time
models. It is now common in quantitative finance to use continuous-time models
as approximate representations of multi-period models. An apparent reason is that
continuous-time models, using the powerful machinery of stochastic calculus, provide
us closed-form solutions that further simplify the analysis of the models and their im-
plications. Caldentey and Stacchetti (2010) noted that an equilibrium solution to the
“continuous-time” model might be far from being an accurate approximation of the
discrete-time model. Bearing this issue in mind, I solve the equilibrium by directly
using the multi-period (discrete-time) model. Then I work out the continuous-time
limiting behavior of the equilibrium. I further show that, for cases such as ours, it
might be misleading to focus only on the continuous-time model results. In particular,
I solve for the equilibrium in the continuous-time model and show, through some ex-
amples, that these solutions are strikingly different from those of the “continuous-time
limit” model.
This paper diverges from the seminal work of Kyle (1985) in two directions. First,
the insider’s perception of the asset’s fundamental value is moving over time following
a martingale process. Second, the public announcement time is unknown to the insider,
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even though he can make some predictions about it. In Kyle (1985), the insider had to
trade more aggressively as he became closer to the terminal time, in fear of losing his
informational advantage immaturely, hence leaving money on the table. As a result, in
that model, the market efficiency is reached eventually once the terminal time arrives.
However, with a random announcement time, the insider does not feel such pressure to
release his private information. Consequently, it is not obvious, per se, whether in our
model, the market efficiency is ever reached.
Two main features distinguish my model from that of CS. First, to make my model
more realistic, I allow for more general distributional assumptions for the arrival of
public news than the memory-less exponential distribution used in CS. Second, I as-
sume the true value of the asset is fixed, which might or might not be immediately
observable by the insider. Instead, the informed agent gets noisy signals about the
true value throughout the private window and constantly updates his beliefs about
the fundamental value. The assumption of fixed liquidation value seems to be more
appropriate for our purpose, as in BJJM, we study relatively short time windows (in
the order of a few minutes). It is also important to note that CS results only apply
when the speed of (private) information inflow is constant over time. This inherently
leads to an infinite amount of information that the insider can learn as time passes.
However, when we assume a fixed value for the asset that is to be learned gradually
over time, we are essentially considering only a bounded amount of information that
the insider can receive. The CS solves for the equilibrium of the “bounded information
inflow” case, but only under continuous time. As I will show, under some conditions,
the continuous-time model results do a poor job in approximating the discrete-time
model.6 As a final remark, even though I allow for the insider’s gradual learning of the
6This issue is first noted by Caldentey and Stacchetti (2010). Still, their analysis of limiting
continuous-time model only covers the “unbounded information inflow” case, which is not formally
equivalent to the model I study here.
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actual value, my model subsumes the case in which the insider instantly observes the
fundamental value. As I will show later, the gradual learning assumption enables me
to explain several empirical results of BJJM in a unified framework.
To this day, the basic Kyle model of strategic trading has been extended in various
directions, ever since Kyle’s seminal work (Kyle (1985)). To name a few, Rochet and
Vila (1994) analyze a two-period model in which the insider observes both the fun-
damental value and the order flow of the noise traders. Holden and Subrahmanyam
(1992) and Foster and Viswanathan (1996) show that in the presence of multiple in-
formed traders, the speed at which the private information is impounded in the prices
is much higher. Jain and Mirman (1999) assume that the market maker observes the
total order flow and a signal about the value of the asset. This leads to an equilib-
rium in which the stock prices are more informative than in the Kyle model. Back and
Pedersen (1998) study a continuous-time model in which the fundamental value varies
over time. To prove the existence of an equilibrium, they assume that the lumpy infor-
mational advantage the insider gets is high compared to the inflow of information over
time. This is inevitable in the class of continuous-time models that emerged from Back
(1992) since these models restrict the admissible trading strategies to absolutely con-
tinuous ones. Interestingly, the absolute continuity assumption is violated in limiting
equilibria of discrete-time models, which does not allow us to capture those equilibria
when we focus only on the continuous-time models. This fact, which CS first noted,
seems quite relevant to our case. Using the framework of Kyle, a strand of literature
explores the impact of speculative motives on information dissemination in economies
with both financial and real sectors (see Jain and Mirman (2000), Wang et al. (2009)
and, Huang and Wang (2010)).
More recently, Collin-Dufresne and Fos (2016) extend Kyle’s model to a case in
which the noisiness (volatility) of the liquidity trades is itself stochastic. At times of
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high volatility of noise trading, market makers are willing to lower the price impact due
to the higher noise in order flows. As a result, the insider, facing a better opportunity
to camouflaging information and more favorable pricing terms, tends to trade more
aggressively. This generates a positive comovement between price volatility and trading
volume. In another recent work, Foucault et al. consider a model with time-varying
fundamental value. They show that if the informed trader can also get the news on
short-term changes in the asset value and its long-term movements, there is a much
more volume of informed trade and higher short-term price volatility.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 3.2, I propose a
discrete-time model and solve for the Markovian equilibrium. In Section 3.3, I char-
acterize the continuous-time limit of the equilibrium as the length of trading periods
tends to zero. Then I introduce and solve the continuous-time version of the model
in Section 3.4 and discuss the circumstances in which the continuous-time limit of the
discrete-time equilibrium is not identical to the continuous-time equilibrium. Section
3.5 concludes.
3.2 Discrete-Time Model
My model builds on Caldentey and Stacchetti (2010) but modifies the setting to fits
better the context of BJJM. First, I assume that there are three groups of market
participants: one insider (who serves as the speculators who have early access to the
SEC filings), a market maker and a large number of noise traders. There exists only





.In the discrete-time version of the model, I assume that the trades can take
place only at equidistant discrete times {tn}n≥0 where tn = n∆ for some constant ∆ > 0.
In this notation n-th period means the time interval [tn, tn+1). At the beginning of
period n ≥ 1, the insider observes a (noisy) signal about the true value of the asset sn =
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V + εn with (possibly time varying) precision 1Σs,n =
∆
σ2s,n
where (εn)n≥0 is a sequence of
independent noise terms with mean 0 and variance Σs,n. Next, the insider and liquidity
traders place market orders to buy/sell quantities xn and yn respectively. Finally, the
market maker facing a total order zn = xn+yn, sets a price and takes the other side of the
trade to clear the market. The orders are executed at the end of each period. Moreover,
there is a discrete random time T independent from the random processes of the signal
and price, with survival probability {Qn}n≥0where Qn = Pr {T ≥ n}. I further assume
(with slight abuse of notation) that Qn = e−
∫ tn





where T̂ ∈ R̄+ = [0,∞],7 and that is an a.e. positive function over its
support and satisfies
∫ T̂
0 htdt = ∞.8 For future reference let qn denote the probability
mass function of the underlying random time, i.e.qn = Pr {T = n} = Qn − Qn+1, and
hn denote the hazard at period n, that is as the conditional probability of arrival of
the public news at that time given that it has not arrived to that period, i.e. hn = qnQn .









. For the ease
of exposition, I assume from this point forward that T̂ = ∞, i.e. the support for the
random time consists of [0,∞), and in the next section, I formally generalize all the
results to the case with arbitrary support. At the end of period τ , all market participants
observe the true value of the asset and stop their trading activities 9. Before the public
announcement happens, at the beginning of any period n, a binding pricing rule pn (.)is
committed to by the market maker, which specifies the price pn (z)to any level of total
trading volume z in that period. The information set of the market maker is written
7Note that T̂ =∞ corresponds to the case in which the random time has unbounded support. Also




8Indeed, the h function is a hazard function for some well-behaved continuous random time.
9Note that I allow gradual learning of the value for insiders, but I also assume an immediate
learning for the market once the public announcement takes place. In one respect, this is an innocuous
assumption if I believe that once the filing becomes public knowledge, as there are a large number of
traders in the market (compared to early informed speculators) the information is immediately learned







. I also assume that noise trades do not act strategically,
and their trades {yn}n≥0follow an i.i.d. normal distribution with mean 0 and variance
Σy = σ2y∆. The insider however, places orders to maximize his expected net payoff. I
assume that, at t = 0+, by the first glance at the filing, the insider gets a lumpy signal











. As I mentioned earlier, the
insider further learns the true value by digging into the filings in depth. I model this
by the independent incoming signals, (sn)n≥1. So the information set of the insider in
period n, is specified as F In =
(
S, (si)i≤n , (zi)i≤n−1 , (pi)i≤n−1
)
. After observing the new
signal at the beginning of period n, the insider updates his beliefs about the true value




and places his order. For a given sample path of trades X = (xn)n≥0





The insider’s objective is to maximize the expected payoff which is











Qn [V − pn]xn
]
. (3.1)






A strategy for the insider consists of a trading plan which is F In-adapted process
X = (xn)n≥0 . Similarly a strategy for the market maker consists of a pricing plan
which is a FMn -adapted process P = (pn)n≥0 . I call a pair of strategies (P,X) an
10This is a zero profit condition that follows from the perfect competition among the market makers.
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“equilibrium” if given X, the price plan satisfies (3.2) and given P , the trading plan
maximizes insider’s expected net payoff, given by(3.1). Here, following the literature, I
are looking for a Markovian linear equilibrium, one in which both pricing and trading
rules follow linear forms and the value function is naturally a quadratic one. Indeed,
in our desired equilibrium we have a pricing rule which is linear in the total order
flow, i.e.pn (z) = pn−1 + λnz and a trading rule which is linear in price deviation, i.e.
xn (Xn, Vn) = βn (Vn − pn). In the following, I focus on existence of such an equilib-
rium. In the literature, 1
λ
usually serves as a measure of the “depth”of the market or
market “liquidity”. Before solving for the equilibrium, I introduce some pieces of nota-
tion. At the beginning of each period n ≥ 1, after observing the current signal about





with squared estimation error of Γn = E
[
(Vn − V )2 |X,F In
]
. Also,
at the same time, before observing the total order flow, the market maker’s best es-




and the squared error in






. For the ease of exposition,
I also denote the market maker’s uncertainty about the insider’s best estimate of the























= V̄n. Thus the
expression for Σn is indeed the squared error in the market maker’s best estimate of
the insider’s best estimate. It is worth noting that by the law of total variance we have
Ωn = Σn+Γn. The following proposition characterizes the linear Markovian equilibrium
for the discrete-time version of the model.
Proposition I. The unique linear Markovian equilibrium is generated by the sequence




















given the initial conditions Γ0 and Σ0 = Ω0 − Γ0.
The results are pretty similar to those in Theorem 1 of CS. The only differences
are the time dependence of the failure probability as shown by Qn+1
Qn
and the time de-
pendence of the noisiness of insider’s private signals as shown by ΓnΓn+1Σs,n . The second
difference is critical to my results. The amount of remaining uncertainty about the
actual value V is bounded in my case, while the insider in CS could face an infinite
amount of information inflow as he further learns about the time-varying fundamental
value. I will show later the two sets of equilibria that cannot coexist under CS model
specification can now be achieved in my setup. This will enable the model to generate
predictions that are not otherwise attainable using the theoretical results of CS, espe-
cially those that nicely match the empirical results of BJJM. The generalization of the
failure probability first ensures us about the robustness of the equilibrium under the
general distributional assumption. It makes it easier to match the empirical setting of
BJJM in which some extent of predictability (by the market participants) about the
arrival time of the public announcement is evident.
Following the expressions above, several implications are in order. First, for fixed
volatility of noise trading, more aggressive trading implies a more informative order
flow and makes prices respond more strongly to the market order. This means that
pn−pn−1 = λnzn must be increasing in βn. Remember, though, the impact of changes in
βn is not transferred one-for-one into λn as the total market order zn is itself increasing
in βn. This means that the effect on price change occurs partly by the zn term. This
is why we see βn with power 1 in the numerator while it shows up with power 2 in the
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denominator. Moreover, with higher volatility of noise trading (lower signal-to-noise
ratio), the market maker’s reaction is also weaker. This is why λn is decreasing in Σy.
Now, we turn our attention to dynamics of market maker’s uncertainty as charac-
terized by (3.5). To make an inference about the true asset value, the market maker
can instead estimate the unbiased estimate of the insider. Intuitively, the market maker
does not have direct access to the true asset value. She infers the value indirectly from
the order flows11. However, two sources of noise make inference from the order flows
more difficult: one is the amount of uninformative trade, which is indistinguishable
by the market maker from the informative portion of the trade. This source of noise,
characterized by the second term on the right-hand side of (3.5), is quite standard in
all the variations of the Kyle model. A higher noisiness of the total trade, i.e. larger
Σy or lower prior precision, larger Σn, both imply lower posterior precision, largerΣn+1.
Also, higher insider’s aggressiveness, βn, implies a higher information content in the
order flow and hence a higher posterior precision.
The second source of noise, which is a unique feature of my model, comes from the
informed trades. Indeed, the insider himself does not perfectly observe the true asset
value, and he places orders only based on his best estimation. Therefore, the market
maker takes this into account when she wants to update her beliefs about the true
asset value. The first term in the expression(3.5), which captures the second source of
uncertainty, is decreasing in the volatility of the incoming insider’s signal Σs,n+1 and
increasing in the current estimation errorΓnof the insider’s best estimation. To see the





The precision of updated belief is equal to the sum of precisions of the prior and the new
signal. So the first term in (3.5) is essentially equivalent to Γn− Σs,n+1ΓnΣs,n+1+Γn = Γn−Γn+1.
The intuition for the first term in (3.5) is now more straightforward. A higher drop
11Here, I follow the literature and assume that both market maker and insider update their beliefs
using Bayes rule.
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in the uncertainty of the insider’s assessment (higher magnitude of |Γn − Γn+1|) means
that the insider changes his belief more strongly following the arrival of a new piece
of information. This makes the market maker feel “left behind”. In other words, in
this case, the informational content of the incoming signal to the insider is relatively
high. It makes the market maker realize that what she has learned so far about insider’s
estimate is not as precise as it looked before. In other words, she becomes more confused
about how relevant her previous knowledge is to the asset’s true value. It follows from
(3.5)that the dynamics of the market maker’s error in the estimate of the true value
Ωnis given by




Indeed, the total uncertainty of the market maker is unambiguously declining over time.
The following proposition states a standard result in the multi-period Kyle model,
which makes it easier to analyze the insider’s motive to smooth out the trades through-
out the private window to alleviate the unfavorable price impacts of his trades.
Proposition II. In the equilibrium, the insider’s expected payoff at period n, is quadratic
in the perceived price deviation. Specifically, if M stands for the insider’s perceived price
















The proposition reveals an important implication. First of all, if conditional on
reaching to period n, the public announcement arrives at the end of the period, i.e.
Pr {T = n|T ≥ n} = qn
Qn
= 1, then the right hand side of expression (3.6)simplifies to
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1
2λn , which is identical to the expression for β in a one-period Kyle model. It means
that the aggressiveness of the insider inversely depends on the market impact. Indeed,
when the market is deep, the insider is more willing to trade on his private information.
On the other hand, when Qn+1
Qn
> 0, i.e., the trading period is likely to be continued,
the insider cares not only about the current depth of the market, but also about the
continuation value of his informational advantage. Since his current orders impact the
price of both current and future periods, he trades even more conservatively compared
to a single-period case. That is βn < 12λn which follows from
Qn+1
Qn
λnαn+1 < 1. Now,
it is not surprising that a higher sensitivity of the expected payoff-to-go of the next
period to price deviation,αn+1, implies a more conservative trade in the current period,
i.e., an even lower βn. Furthermore, a lower hazard at period n makes the remaining
payoff more important and, in turn, the insider trades less aggressively. Finally, as we
see, the current price impact not only affects this period’s share of total expected profit
but also attenuates the profits that the insider expects to earn out of his informational
advantage down the road. So, as long as the hazard rate is lower than one, with a rise
in price impact λ, the insider acts even more conservatively in a multi-period than a
one-period Kyle model.
3.3 Continuous-Time Limit of the Discrete-Time Model
Now we turn my focus to the limiting behavior of the equilibrium when the period size
∆approaches 0. To this end, I introduce a set of notations corresponding to those we
saw earlier for discrete-time model. Now for any t ≥ 0 I set Σ∆ (t) = Σb t∆c. In a similar
fashion I define Ω∆ (t) ,Γ∆ (t) , λ∆ (t) , σ∆,s (t) , Q∆ (t) from (Ωn,Γn, λn, σs,n, Qn)n≥0 on
R+. Also I let β∆ (t) =
βb t∆c
∆ . Next define, Sn =
∑n
k=0 sk Xn =
∑n
k=0 xk, Yn =∑n
k=0 yk Zn =
∑n
k=0 zk and for any sample path (Sn, pn−1, Vn, Xn, Yn, Zn)n≥0 I define
(S∆ (t) , P∆ (t) , V∆ (t) , X∆ (t) , Y∆ (t) , Z∆ (t))t∈R+as S∆ (t) = Sb t∆c, P∆ (t) = pb t∆c−1,
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V∆ (t) = Vb t∆cX∆ (t) = Xb t∆c, Y∆ (t) = Yb t∆cand Z∆ (t) = Zb t∆c. There exists a
bounded functionσs : R+ → R+such that σ∆,s (t) converges pointwise to σs (t) as ∆ ↓ 0
(recall that I assumed earlier that σs,n is uniformly bouded). Moreover, there exist
two independent Brownian motions Byt and Bst such that Y∆ (t) and S∆ (t) uniformly
converge on any compact set to Yt = σyByt and St = V t +
∫ t
0 σs (r) dBst as ∆ ↓ 0. It










In particular, (as I will elaborate more in Section 3.4) the movements of the insider’s




(dvt − Vtdt) .
Another observation is that for the pointwise limits we have
Σt = Ωt − Γt
which is a continuous-time version of the law of total variance that we had for the
discrete-time. Finally, as ∆ ↓ 0 Q∆ (t) converges pointwise to Qt = e−
∫ t
0 h(s)ds on
any compact set andT ∆converges in law to a continuous random stopping timeτ with
survival probability e−
∫ t
0 h(x)dx. Recall that due to the assumption I made earlier, that
T̂ = ∞(the support for the random time T is infinite), the random time τ then also
has infinite support. I will generalize to the case of arbitrary support at the end of this
section.
Now we are ready to characterize the limiting equilibrium. To start, define endoge-
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nous stopping time, denoted by T as
T = inf
{





with the convention inf ∅ =∞.
Proposition III. Suppose that T =∞. As ∆ ↓ 0, the profile (Ω∆ (t) ,Σ∆ (t) ,Γ∆ (t) , λ∆ (t) , β∆ (t))


























given Ω0,Γ0 and Γt is derived from (3.7).
Several implications emerge from Proposition III. First of all, when T =∞, the price
impact λt, is a decreasing function of time and depends linearly on the probability of
survival, i.e. Qt = P (τ > t). Intuitively, this condition eliminates the destabilization
schemes for limiting equilibrium. As argued in Kyle (1985) Section 5, when trading
takes place continuously, the insider acts like a perfect monopolist who moves up and
down along a supply curve that is linear at each time. If he wants to trade in a large
position in a short period, the average price he pays is about the average of the highest
and lowest price in that period. Now, if he expects that going forward, the supply curve
flattens with speed greater than the hazard, more than likely, he can liquidate his large
position with a much higher favorable price. Indeed, this entices insiders to take un-
bounded positions in an extremely short period, which is inconsistent with equilibrium.
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Thus, by imposing the market impact to decline with a rate equal to the probability
of arrival of public news, we eliminate unbounded payoffs from profitable destabilizing
schemes. In the basic Kyle (1985), however, the market impact was required to be con-
stant. To see this through my framework, note that in Kyle’s model, the time of arrival
of public news was known, i.e., P (τ > t) = 1 for t < 1. Another observation is that the
illiquidity λt is increasing in the total uncertainty Ω0 and decreasing in the amount of
noise in liquidity trades. That is quite a standard result in the Kyle model. What is
new to my specification is that the effective total uncertainty, a total uncertainty that









sds can be thought of as the expected arrival rate for a stopping
time with a hazard twice as big as the τ of public news. This is, in fact, the average
time that the total uncertainty is resolved. Indeed, in equilibrium, a higher market
impact is tied to a more rapid resolution of uncertainty. Finally, from (3.9)we see that






depends neither on the initial uncertainty
Ω0, nor on the market impact λ0, which echo Kyle (1985).
Next I analyze the expression (3.11)which describes the dynamics of insider trading
intensity. For a given deviation of current perceived value from price, a larger amount
of noise trading σ2y provides a greater “camouflage” for an insider to conceal his private
information. This makes him trade more aggressively on his informational advantage.
To have a more clear picture on the rest of the components, I define the ratio of relative
information advantage at time t ≥ 0, by Ξt = ΣtΩt . At each point in time, this ratio
reflects the proportion of the market’s uncertainty known by the insider. Now we can
rewrite the expression (3.11), as λt = βtΩtσ2y × Ξt. There are two components in this
expression. The left term is exactly what Kyle (1985) model suggests. Indeed, a large
trading intensity tells that the incoming trades are highly informative, so they severely
impact prices. The higher the impact, the more confused the market maker is about
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the true value (higher Ωt). With higher current uncertainty, the incoming new trades
have larger impacts as they marginally add even more information. However, not all
the incoming trade contains “useful” information. As I said in the discrete case, there
is now a second source of noise hidden in the informed trade. The information in the
new trades is relevant for revealing the true value of the asset, only up to the level
that the insider is sure about. In one extreme, Ξt = 1 means that the insider perfectly
observes the true value. So whatever comes from his trades is useful for inference. On
the other hand, Ξt = 0, means that the insider knows nothing about the true value,
and the entire incoming trades consist of noise.
To complete the analysis of this case, I derive the dynamics of the unconditional12
expectation of the price and deviation of the private signal from price.










Due to normality, the unconditional expectation of the price at any time t, the expected
price is a linear combination of the actual value and initial price, where the weights
depend on the proportion of total uncertainty that has been resolved up to that time.
Further, note that the expected price deviation is proportional to Σt rather than Ωt
since the insider’s estimation of the actual value is not perfectly precise.
Proposition IV. Suppose that T <∞ and that there exist positive constants σ(H)and
h(L) such that for all t ≥ 0, Γt
σs(t) ≤ σ
(H) and lim inft→∞ h (t) ≥ h(L) > 0 . As ∆ ↓ 0, the
profile (Ω∆ (t) ,Σ∆ (t) ,Γ∆ (t) , λ∆ (t) , β∆ (t)) converges pointwise to (Ωt,Σt,Γt, λt, βt)
12More precisely, these expectations are instead “conditional” on the initial price and fundamental
value. I used the term unconditional as these expectations are only conditional on the values observed








σyσs(T ) t < T
Γt











(Ω0 − ΓT ) t < T
Γt t ≥ T




for t < T.
Furthermore, the processes for price, and informed trades, (P∆ (t) , X∆ (t)) converges
weakly to (Pt, Xt) which solve the system of stochastic differential equation
dPt = λt (dXt + dYt)
dXt =

βt (Vt − Pt) dt t < T
Γt
(σs(t))2
(dSt − Vtdt)− σydByt t ≥ T
.
with initial conditions X0 = 0 and P0 = V̄0.
The specification of the limit equilibrium described in Proposition IV is closely
similar to what is derived in Chapter 4 of CS. The proposition states that when T
is finite, the insider reveals all his private information by the time T . It is as if the
insider is trading in a private window of size T (yet with random arrival of public
news) where he tries to smooth his trades only over this window to gain the highest
possible profit. By the time T , the insider and the market maker are both on the same
page, and there is no information asymmetry, ΣT = 0. In fact, after this time, the
price is always identical to the insider’s best estimate of the asset value. From this
time, the insider immediately discloses whatever he learns over time until the public
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announcement happens. Even though the market efficiency is gained from T onward,
the insider expects to earn positive rents by using the leftover of the informative signals
he gets about the actual value. One can show that at any time t ≥ T , the expected







Note that this integral is finite under the conditions of Proposition IV. In fact, γt ≤
σyσ
(H)E [τ |τ > t]P (τ > t). Furthermore, using the law of motions for the trading vol-
ume Xt and prices Pt as in Proposition IV, one can calculate the expected ex-ante












The first component is the amount of profit the insider expects to get from trading
smoothly before the market efficiency is reached. The second component is the present
value of the payoff-to-go that he expects to get from the trading regime he follows after
the endogenous stopping time T . The expected payoff is increasing in the level of noise
trading, σy, as in the Kyle model. I postpone the discussion of other components of
the payoff to the section of Specific Examples.
Up to this point, I assumed an infinite support for the random time in both discrete-
time model and continuous-time limit model. Here I formally generalize the results to





for T̂ ∈ R̄+ = [0,∞]. For the discrete-time model this is equivalent










+1. Also one should redefine all the functions and processes, and in particular
the approximation functions, e.g. Ω∆ (t), only over the correct support. Though, to keep
the manuscript short, I do not state these details here. I only explicitly define the en-
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with the assumption that inf ∅ = T̂ and leave all the other definitions for the reader.





For a given Σ0 and Γ0, there exists a profile {(λn, βn)}n∈[0,N̂) characterized as in the





and the sequence (αn)n∈[0,N̂) . (b) Suppose that the random arrival




. Now, suppose that T = T̂. As ∆ ↓ 0, the profile




to (Ωt,Σt,Γt, λt, βt)
which solves the system of equations (3.8, 3.9, 3.10, 3.11), given Ω0,Γ0. Alternatively,







(H). Then all the pointwise convergences and weak convergences stated
in Proposition IV holds when the profiles (Ωt,Σt,Γt, λt, βt)and (Pt, Xt) are defined ac-





To get a better sense of the propositions above, I solve for the equilibrium for a
particular example.
Specific Examples
Here I want to analyze the implications of the model under few different scenarios
for the speed at which the insider can learn from the source of information, taking the
initial uncertainty of both insider and market maker as given.13 I also make simplifying
conditions for the distribution of arrival time of public announcement to understand
further the mechanisms of the limit equilibrium in this section.
13One intuitive way of understanding this gradual learning is by using the notions of entropy and




















bits of information in order to perfectly
know the true value. The main focus of the current setup is to compare the implications of insider
trading, when the private information is revealed for the insider in a lumpy fashion (i.e., he observes
the true value immediately at the beginning) versus when it is learned gradually over time.
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Example I. Pick positive constants α ∈ (0, 1) and a C > 0, and define Γt = αΩ0e−Ct.14
Indeed, Γ0 = αΩ0 < Ω0, which means that the insider has some initial informational
advantage as well as some uncertainty about the true asset value. Also, the insider’s
inflow rate of information is C. In fact, C is a measure of the speed at which the insider
realizes the true value. 15 A higher C implies that for a given level of precision about
the fundamental value, it takes less time for the insider to get that level. Next, I assume
that the hazard function for the arrival time of public news is linear on R+as given by
h (t) = a + bt for some constants a ≥ 0 and b ≥ 0 at least one of which is nonzero.
Recall that the special case ofa > 0, b = 0 is equivalent to the memory-less exponential
distribution used in CS, and the special case of a = 0, b > 0 is equivalent to a Rayleigh





































Here Φ and ϕ denote the cumulative distribution function and probability density
function for standard normal. For exponential distribution, .i.e. b = 0, we get T =∞.
In this case Ωt = Ω0e−2at and from Σt ≥ 0 we have αe−Ct ≤ e−2at for all t ≥ 0. This
14This is not really an ad-hoc choice. To see this, once again, I use the notion of entropy and
information. Think of the insider’s cognitive ability as a communication channel with a limited capacity
of Cbits/second. This means that he can extract at most C bits of information per second. Roughly,
in the spirit of Shannon’s theorem, we can say that the rate of change in the entropy (uncertainty) of
insider’s beliefs takes place at rate C. Following footnote 3 and ignoring the intercept Ω0 and constants,
we have C ≈ − ddt ln (Γt − Γ0). Indeed, with this assumption, the insider is constantly utilizing his full
capacity to extract information from the news.
15To get this specification for Γt , it suffices to set, σs (t), the volatility of the private stream of news




−C2 t. Also, one can use σ(H) ≥
√
αΩ0C for the requirement of
Proposition IV.
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means that for the existence of equilibrium, we must have C ≥ 2a. Therefore, when
the insider is fast enough, it is not optimal to reveal all the private information at
any finite time. The intuition is that the insider anticipates learning a great deal of
information about the fundamental value by a time sooner than the average arrival of
public announcement. For him, then it is worth waiting and trading on a sufficiently
precise valuation. The effective (average) time of resolving the entire uncertainty for
the insider is 1
C
which, in this case, is smaller than the expected arrival time of public
news.
Now we turn our focus to the other extreme case : Rayleigh distribution. In this


















This equation has a finite solution. To see this, note that the left-hand is negative when
the value of T is set to be 0 and is equal to C2 when T goes to infinity (note that ϕ
goes to zero faster than eCt explodes). Recall that E [τ ] =
√
π
2b . We can examine the
relationship of the endogenous T with the expected arrival time of public news. By



















































Hence, the endogenous T is positively related to the expected size of the private window,
consistent with the empirical results of BJJM.
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Example II. In this example, I consider a case in which the arrival time has a bounded




where t̄ > 0
is a constant that determines the bound of the distribution support. In fact, T̂ = t̄.
















) . Next, I
specify the dynamics of insider’s information inflow. Pick an α ∈ (0, 1) and a c > 0,
and define Γt = Ω0 (α− ct)+ where x+ = max {x, 0}. Indeed, Γ0 = αΩ0 < Ω0 and
Σ0 = (1− α) Ω0, which means that the insider has some initial informational advan-
tage and some uncertainty about the fundamental value. Recall that 1− α determines
the ratio of initial informational advantage and α determines the insider’s initial level
of confusion (uncertainty) about the asset value. In other words, Γ0 = αΩ0 is the
amount of potential informational advantage that the insider can gain using the incom-
ing information. Furthermore, the insider’s inflow speed of information is c. In fact c,
is a measure of the speed at which the insider realizes the true value. Note that by
time tc = αc the true asset value is known perfectly by the insider. Also for t ≤ tc,
Γ0 − Γt = cΩ0t is the amount of information the insider learns from the beginning up
to time t. A higher c implies that (i) the insider knows the fundamental value sooner,
and (ii) for a given level of precision about the fundamental value, it takes less time for
the insider to get that level. 16
We further require that t̄ < tc. It follows from Proposition V that the endogenous

























T < t̄ ⇐⇒ 32
1− α
c
< E [τ ] . (3.15)
16To get this specification for Γt , it suffices to set, σs (t), the volatility of the private stream of
news to the insider, equal to σs (t) = (α− ct)
√
Ω0




requirement of Proposition V.
152
In order to have an endogenous stopping time, the private window must be expected
to last long enough (for a fixed insider characteristics). In particular, in order to see




, which depends only on the characteristics of the insider, in terms of his
current information advantage and speed of information inflow. Another observation is
that T < E [τ ] ⇐⇒ Σ0 < 1481 (cΩ0E [τ ]). Intuitively, the market efficiency is expected
to be reached when the initial informational advantage is less than 1481s of the expected
inflow of new information (recall the expression Γ0 − Γt = cΩ0t). Also, by noticing the
shape of y (t), one can show that for c→∞ or α→ 0, the endogenous revelation time











Furthermore, recall that the amount of rent that the insider gets after he deliberately




2t̄ . In cur-








2t̄2 . When the insider
gets information more quickly, he is able to take more advantage of mispricings at any in-
finitesimal time after T . Indeed, in this case he will be sure about the true value sooner,
and then he will wash out all the local mispricings without being afraid of the arrival
of public announcement. In addition, one can show that E0 [Πt] = κ (T − t)σy
√
Ω0c
for some non-decreasing function κ. Also it can be shown that E0 [Πt] is increasing in
c (even though T is decreasing in c). The higher speed of learning by the insider, the
faster the private information is disseminated by the insider, following (3.16). However,
this market efficiency is not reached for free. In fact, if there is not enough compen-
sation for the insider, he will not give away his information advantage. In this case,
prices are more informative when the insider learns faster. In the extreme case, when c
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is extremely smaller than α, then the insider’s expected payoff is close to zero and the
market efficiency is reached only at t̄.
The following observation is that the market efficiency is reached earlier with smaller











This is because the lower the informational advantage, the less it takes for the market
to catch the insider’s level of precision. All in all, by (3.15), in order for an insider to
reveal information before the public news, either the insider must be too quick (for a
fixed degree of insider’s initial informational advantage and expected arrival of news),
or there must be a relatively low initial informational advantage to be smoothed away
with trading gradually. When the informational advantage is high enough, the insider
does not expect to reach the second regime before the public announcement. Indeed,
even if there is a large amount of rent that the insider can get after T , because of, say,
high speed of learning, he may expect that he never reaches that point. In that case,
the market efficiency is reached only at the latest possible time, t̄. In sum, I conclude
that trading slowly is worthwhile for the insider, only if (1) his current informational
advantage is high enough that he anticipates staying in the smooth-trading phase, (2)
there is not enough rent to get out of the higher ability to analyze the filings once
the market efficiency is reached, or (3) the insider does not expect to reach the post-
revelation phase earlier than the arrival of the public announcement.
3.4 Continuous-Time Model
In this section, I solve for the continuous-time model and show that with only using
the standard techniques of stochastic calculus, one cannot get equilibria of the type I
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described in Proposition IV. Indeed, no matter how the inflow of insider information
moves over time, we always get an equilibrium as if the endogenous stopping time is
T = ∞. In other words, if one only solves the continuous-time model, one concludes
that the market efficiency is always reached asymptotically. Here, I only consider the
case of constant hazard function for the random arrival time for simplicity. All the
results hold in the same way for the general distribution forms, where the expressions
are identical to those in (3.8, 3.9, 3.10, 3.11). For finite-support, the results are identical
to those in Proposition V if one follows the adjustments stated in the last section prior
to that proposition.
My model is a modified version of Caldentey and Stacchetti (2010). Suppose that





We have three groups of market participants, as described in Section 3.2. The private
window is of size τ which is a random stopping time that follows an exponential dis-
tribution with a rate µ. I assume that the distribution of the random time is public
knowledge.
In the beginning, the insider does not observe the actual value of the security. How-
ever, he can infer the value over time in two steps: (i) From a partially revealing lumpy
signal at the beginning and (ii) From gradually processing the filing content through-
out trading time. In other words, due to the cognitive limits and lack of expertise or
even complexity of the filing, the insider cannot learn the actual value immediately.
However, he might be able to gradually process the content of the filing and refine his
beliefs about the true value of security. As a special case of my model, I can study
the two extreme cases: (1) the one in which the insider learns the fundamental value
immediately and (2) the case in which there is no lumpy information at t = 0 and the
entire knowledge is gained throughout trading.
More precisely, let Vt denote the estimation of the insider about V at time t ≥ 0.
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I assume that the insider gets a lumpy signal about the true value at t = 0. That is
to assume that the insider observes an independent signal S ∼ N (V,ΣS) and update
his belief to V0 = ΣSΩ0+ΣS V̄0 +
Ω0
Ω0+ΣS






Thus, up to the information of the insider at t = 0+the true value V is drown from
a normal distribution N (V0,Γ0), where Γ0 ≤ Σ̄0. Furthermore, at time t, the insider
gets a signal dSt = V dt + σs (t) dBvt , where Bst is a Wiener process adapted to the
natural filtration. For convenience, I assume that the noisiness of the signal σs (t) is a
deterministic function. In CS, the asset’s fundamental value is a Wiener process, and
the insider perfectly observes the value of the asset at any point in time. However, I
assume that the asset’s true value is fixed at V , is not instantly observed by the insider.
The insider’s best estimation, in my model, follows an arithmetic Brownian motion in
the eyes of the insider. This is similar to the law of motion for the fundamental value
in Caldentey and Stacchetti (2010) given by Vt = σvBvt , but slightly different in that
I only consider the case of bounded information inflow. When the value is fixed, the
insider’s total amount of uncertainty could resolve through processing the incoming
signals cannot grow upper than the total initial uncertainty, Ω0. In most of CS, the
emphasis is on the case of constant σv which by construction leads to an infinite amount
of information inflow unless σv = 0. This is why CS we cannot have an equilibrium with
bounded endogenous stopping time T , for the cases where the amount of information
inflow is bounded, i.e.Γt <∞.
Let denote the filtration corresponding to the evolution of the information known
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Note that FMt ⊆ F It . A strategy profile is a pair (X,P ) of processes where Xt, anF It -
adapted and square-integrable semimartingale, is the cumulative trading of the insider
up to time t and Pt , an F It -adapted process, is the the market maker’s competitive
price at time t. The aggregate demand process for liquidity traders follows a Brownian
motion Yt = σy (t)Byt where Byt is independent of Bvt . The insider’s payoff is written as





Pt−dXt − [X,P ]τ
]
. (3.17)
Moreover, the market maker facing an aggregate demand Zt = Yt + Xt sets the price
based on the pricing rule Pt = H (Zt) where H is a twice-continuously differentiable.
The pricing rule H is rational if, for any t, H (Zt) = V̄t where V̄t denotes the market
maker’s estimate of V , at time t. That is
V̄t = E
[
V |FMt , X
]
.




denote the insider’s best estimation of the true value at time t.
In follows thatV̄t is indeed the orthogonal projection of insider’s estimate, Vt on FMt .
Since the insider’s information set contains that of the market maker, the assumption
















V |FMt , X
]
.
The equilibrium is defined as a pair of (X,H) such that the trading rule X maximizes
insider’s payoff (3.17) given the pricing rule H, and that the pricing rule H is rational
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given X. Moreover, I impose the same restrictions on H as in Back (1992) by assuming
that H is strictly monotone. Next I specify the dynamics of estimated value by insider.
Define Γt = E
[
(V − Vt)2 |F It
]
as the variance of the insider’s estimation at time t ≥ 0.


















, ∀t > 0. (3.18)
The intuitions is that the precision of the knowledge about the true value (measured
by the reciprocal of the variance) at any time t is the sum of total precision of the
gradual signals (first term on the right-hand-side) and the initial precision about the









where Bv,It is a Wiener process with respect to insider’s filtration, which is independent
from Byt . My goal is to find a linear Markovian equilibrium following the framework in







the variance of the market maker’s estimation error of the insider’s valuation at time






as the time-t uncertainty of the market maker about
the true value. Applying the law of total variance, one can show that Ωt = Σt + Γt. I








to rule out the bluffing schemes, i.e. destabilizing behavior by insider that I discussed
in the previous section. More specifically,
dPt = λt (Σt,Γt) dZt,
dXt = βt (Σt,Γt)× (Vt − Pt) dt.
The following Proposition I characterizes the equilibrium.
Proposition VI. If the insider trading strategy is chosen from the set of strategies that









Σt = Ω0e−2µt − Γt, or,
Ω̇
Ω = −2µ. (3.22)
The rate of information dissemination is a constant linear function of the expected
arrival time of the public announcement. Another interesting prediction of the model
follows from (3.21). As we see, the depth of the market only depends on the total
uncertainty of the market maker about the true value, the expected time of the public
announcement, and the noisiness of the liquidity trades. It is not dependent on how
precise the initial signal of the insider is or how fast the insider learns the true value of
the signal. An important lesson following (3.20) is that the sensitivity of the trades to
price deviations, for an insider who, at the beginning (t = 0+) reveals only a part of the
information is always higher compared to an immediate learner who reveals the true
value right away. To see this, rewrite the equation as βt =
σ2yλt
Ωt−Γt . For an immediate
learner, the leftover information is always zero, that isΓt = 0, while it is positive at
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least for a time interval with a positive measure.17 In other words, for a fixed total
uncertainty Ω0 and rate of arrival µ. Since the market maker only cares about the total
uncertainty in setting the price at any point in time, the more aggressively the insider
trades on his information, the less he knows about the true value to take advantage of
the market maker’s ignorance. The higher aggressiveness on the price deviation exactly
offsets the lower informational content of the price deviation based on which the insider
makes his instant trades. Consequently, the movement of Ωt is independent of the
information inflow of the insider. Conditional on the initial price and fundamental
value of the asset (final price), the expected price at each time is a weighted average
of these two prices, where weights depend only on the fraction of the total uncertainty
that has been revealed at that time.
Proposition VII. Given initial priceP0and fundamental value V , the conditional time
t equilibrium price of the asset, conditional on no public announcement up to time t is
given by





First, as the informed traders strategically trade on their private information, the
asset prices gradually converge to the true value. Due to normality, the expected price
at time t is a weighted average of the initial and final price, where the weights depend
on the amount of total uncertainty that has been resolved up to that time. In particular
17In order to make comparisons easier, I derive the equilibrium condition for a case where the
insider gets all the information about the true value at the beginning (immediate learning). In this
case we simply have Γt = 0 and Σt = Σ0e−2µt for all t. The market depth λt is not affected by this






µt and ΣIt = Ω0e−2µt. Superscripts refer to the special case
of “Immediate learning”. This is indeed the Kyle with random stopping time.
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the expected level of information dissemination, as used in BJJM18, is given by
V − P0
V − E [Pt|V, P0]
= e2µt = e2t/E[τ ].
As we see, the information dissemination ratio depends positively on time elapsed and
negative on the expected size of the private window. It depends neither on the market
depth nor on the initial uncertainty of the asset. Next, I analyze the insider’s trading








The relation between the total uncertainty at time t (Ωt) and the insider’s sensitivity to
his information consist of two components. On the one hand, the insider tends to trade
less aggressively when the total uncertainty is high to prolong his information advantage,
as in Kyle (1985) model. On the other hand, with a fixed amount of insider’s precision,
depending on his relative information advantage to the market maker, Ξt = ΣtΩt , the
insider trades less aggressively when this ratio is high, i.e., when the market maker’s
estimation error of the insider’s valuation is high relative to the total uncertainty. The
later motive acts as an amplification of the former. In other words, with a higher
information advantage, the insider’s ability to camouflage his information is magnified
one-for-one, which in particular implies that the sensitivity of insider’s trade to his
information is unambiguously decreasing in the total uncertainty.
Paying attention to the two components of the right hand side of equation (3.23),
sheds light on the dependence ofβt on t. It is not surprising that in the case of full
information advantage (i.e., Γt = 0), the insider’s trade sensitivity to his signal increases
18In BJJM, the measure of information dissemination is measured as the AR(V,P0)AR(V,Pt) where AR is
accumulated returns. This is identical to the expression I used here.
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over time, as he further loses his willingness to conceal the information. This can be
seen from the first component of the expression. However, at times of rising information
advantage, the insider faces unattractive pricing terms by keeping the same rate of
trading since the market maker knows that the current trades are more informative
than usual. Hence, when the contemporaneous information advantage of the insider
increases at an unusually high rate, the insider may find it advantageous to trade less
aggressively now and wait for better liquidity conditions going forward. Suppose the
rate of changes in the relative information advantage, Ξ̇tΞt , is (positively) large enough.
In that case, the effect of the second component can dominate the first one, and the





Thus during times with high enough growth in information advantage, the insider
slows down his aggression in trading on his additional information. Notably, and per-
haps not surprisingly, βt is increasing in µ, or equivalently is decreasing in expected
announcement time. Indeed, with a larger hazard rate, the insider is afraid of losing his
information advantage once the true value is publicized and trades more aggressively
on his information.
Example III. I complete this section by considering a special case in which the in-
formed trader gains no private information at the beginning. Rather, he learns the
entire private information gradually over the trading window. In this case, I assume
that the insider has limited cognitive capacity in extracting the information from the
reported files. Such an insider needs to take time to understand what the content of
the files tells about the true value of the asset. In particular Γ0 = Ω0 and Σ0 = 0. For




−Ct. This follows the same intuition
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I mentioned in Example I. Next note that ΓIIt = ΓII0 e−2Ct with ΓII0 < ∞. A necessary
condition for the existence of the Markovian equilibrium proposed in this section is
C ≥ µ, which is identical to what I derived in ExampleI. In other words, the capac-
ity (rate of extraction of information) of the insider must be at least as much as the
arrival rate of the announcement.19 The characterization of the continuous-time linear
















Note that, although at t = 0, by (3.24) we get βII0+ = +∞, the expression does not
violate the definition of the equilibrium, since in this case V0 = P0. Moreover, even
though the aggressiveness is extensively large, the deviation of the informed estimated
value from the price is close to zero, keeping the amount of trade bounded. Comparing
these expressions with those I found in the immediate learning case (footnote 17) leads
us to interesting predictions about the model. First of all, the expression (3.24) implies
that the slow learner insider trades more aggressively than an immediate learner insider.
The slower he is in learning, the more aggressive he trades. 20
Given initial priceP0and final price V , we can derive the unconditional expected
19Otherwise the insider has an incentive to give away all the private information and then only
take rents from the liquidity traders by trading infinitely aggressive starting from some endogenously
determined time, which breaks down the equilibrium in the continuous-time version, even though there
was such a possibility in the continuous-time limit equilibrium described in the last section.










































incremental dollar value of informed trade conditional on public announcement happens
later than time t as E [βt (Vt − Pt)Pt|V, P0] = σy
√
2µΩ0 {(1− A) e−3µt + (B − 1) e−µt}
where A = (V−P0)
2





which is independent of the learning speed and
initial uncertainty of the insider. One can show that, this independence result is general
and it holds for the equilibrium I considered in this section, no matter how the incoming
private signal evolves over time.
This example shows how different the results of the continuous-time model and
continuous-time limit of a discrete-time model can be. From Proposition IV, it is imme-
diately seen that there is an endogenous stopping time atT = 0 for the continuous-time
limit. The market efficiency is reached immediately even though the insider contin-
uously receives private information. In such an equilibrium, starting from the first
moment, the insider trades in large volumes and thus constantly discloses his private
information throughout the private window.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I extend the Kyle (1985) model of strategic trading to a case where (i)
the time of the public announcement is unknown and (ii) the insider learns the true
value of the asset gradually over time. The model generates two types of equilibrium.
There is a deterministic time T in type I, endogenously determined by the insider, that
separates two distinct regimes. Before T , the insider smoothly trades like in a Kyle



















This equation implies that a gradual-learning insider, when his immediate signal is not informative at
the beginning of the private window, gets less aggressive as the time passes (βII declines). However, his
aggressiveness in trade will start to increase with time after his opinion on the true value gets precise
enough. It is not hard to see that aggressiveness is always increasing in time for an immediate-learning
insider.
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all the private information he gained up to that time. After that, the insider trades
in large volumes and discloses every single bit of private information once he receives
them. Even though the market efficiency is reached by time T , the insider can make
positive profits by continually correcting the small mispricings caused by uninformed
trades. The amount of profit the insider makes is positively related to the inflow rate
of new information about the asset’s fundamental value. When the insider initially
has precise knowledge of the asset value, he does not anticipate gaining much from the
trade frenzy after revealing his information. In this case, he feels no rush into releasing
all his private information before the public announcement, and such an equilibrium
breaks down. If the insider does not expect to have enough time to move toward the
post-revelation phase smoothly, there will be no equilibrium of type I.
When the current insider’s perception of the true value is precise enough or when the
insider expects an early arrival of public announcement, the second type of equilibrium
emerges. In this type, the insider trades excessively patiently. Even though he may
lose all his private information at once by the time the value is publicly announced, he
smooths away his trades to prolong the informational advantage. Especially at times of
higher information asymmetry, he trades less aggressively on his private information as
he anticipates a high price impact by the market maker. As a result, the price efficiency
is reached only asymptotically.
I use this model to explain several findings of the paper by Bolandnazar et al. (2020)
in a unified framework. In particular, I show that most of the private information is
revealed during the expected size of the private window rather than its actual size.
I also address a shortcoming of continuous-time models in approximating the multi-
period discrete-time models. I show that one cannot generate type I equilibrium if one
only uses the continuous-time model to solve for the equilibrium. This is particularly
important from the modeling point of view in that it warns us to be cautious in using
165
continuous-time models for solving problems in economics and finance.
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